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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Change in real property law often occurs with glacial speed.
This rate of change in part reflects the normal inertia of estab-
lished law. A more complete explanation, however, is the innate
conservatism connected to a commodity that once was the primary
source of wealth and power. That this conservatism is innate
should not prevent application of Ockham's razor as needed. The
relationship of the doctrine of merger to the burgeoning law of
mortgages is one such area. "If the law has to bear these medieval
shackles the time surely has come to examine them carefully. They
may have rusted away."1
The modern doctrine of merger is easily stated: When a per-
son holds two estates in property in the same right and without an
intervening estate, the two estates will coalesce to one estate unless
a beneficial reason exists for keeping them distinct.2 For example,
a life tenant who acquires the reversion immediately following his
life estate usually will be deemed to own the fee simple title rather
than a separate life estate and reversion.3 Similarly, a tenant for
years who acquires the landlord's interest in the leased property
usually will be deemed to own the fee simple title.4 The doctrine of
merger operates in these cases as a technical, nonsubstantive rule
concerning property titles. If the holder of the interests is not ben-
efited in any way by keeping the estates distinct, they will merge
to simplify the state of title.
Although the application of merger to separate estates in land
is generally straightforward, the application of the doctrine to
lesser property rights is far from clear. Indeed, with respect to
questions involving title to property and a mortgage encumbering
that property, merger has been described as "one of the most com-
plex and confusing areas of the law of mortgages."5 Examination of
1. Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd. v. Associated Elec. Indus. Ltd., [1977] 1
Q.B. 580, 613.
2. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.142 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter AM. L.
PROP.]; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY % 459 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1984); 5 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1479 (B. Jones 3d ed. 1939).
3. See, e.g., Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Watkins, 215 N.C. 292, 296, 1 S.E.2d 853,
856 (1939). Merger will not apply if the interests are held in different "rights." Therefore, if
the trustee of a life estate acquires the reversion immediately following the life estate in his
individual capacity, the life estate and reversion will not merge because the life estate is
held in trust and the reversion is held in the owner's individual capacity.
4. See, e.g., Buell v. Simon Newman Co., 61 F. Supp. 157, 160 (N.D. Cal. 1945);
Thomas v. Farr, 380 Ill. 429, 431, 44 N.E.2d 434, 435 (1942).
5. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 6.15 (2d ed. 1985). Other
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the historical developments of merger and of mortgages reveals
why their union has created theoretical and practical problems: the
modern mortgage does not create an interest in land to which
merger should apply.' Furthermore, modern title and finance prac-
tices have obviated the need for merger.
The doctrine of merger and the practice of using land as
security for the repayment of loans, integral parts of English land
law since the feudal period, originated when the common law of
property was in its infancy. The advantages of the abstract concept
of title had not been discovered; recognized interests in land con-
sisted primarily of the right to possess or to receive feudal inci-
dents as an overlord. With the increase in property transactions,
merger and mortgages developed as transactional devices. Despite
substantial alterations in title forms and practices since the incep-
tions of merger and of mortgages approximately seven hundred
years ago, courts continue to apply merger largely unchanged to
the modern mortgage, a property interest that bears only one fea-
ture in common with its feudal counterpart-the existence of a
debt.
If the continued application of merger to mortgages created no
problem other than a problem of theory, even such a thoroughgo-
ing theorist as a legal scholar might be willing to ignore the prob-
lem as a harmless anachronism. Continued application of merger
to mortgages, however, often has adverse and occasionally devas-
tating economic effects without serving any beneficial purpose.
Courts' rote applications of merger to mortgage interests have
unnecessarily destroyed valuable property rights and have wrong-
fully created others. Additionally, as bad law begets worse, mis-
perceptions concerning the doctrine have caused many courts to
apply the doctrine not only to interests in property, but also to
debts secured by property as if debt were a new variety of real
commentators have described the topic as "[o]ne of the most perplexing incidents of title,"
G. WARVELLE, ABSTRACTS AND EXAMINATIONS OF TITLE § 347 (4th ed. 1921); and as "a fear-
some title, because it invokes the fine points that attend the law of real property." 1 G.
GLENN, MORTGAGES § 45.2 (1943).
6. Throughout this Article, the term "mortgage" will be used to refer to all types of
real property security instruments, including deeds of trust and deeds to secure debt.
Although the various types of real property security instruments differ in some respects, the
issues raised in this Article concerning the applicability of merger apply with equal force to
each type of instrument. See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 1.
Similarly, although this Article focuses on real property security interests, merger
applies with equal force to personal property security interests. See, e.g., Wilhelmi v. Leo-
nard, 13 Iowa 330 (1862); Food City, Inc. v. Fleming Cos, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1979).
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property interest.
With respect to mortgages, the merger issue typically arises
when a secured lender agrees to accept title to the encumbered
property from the defaulting debtor in lieu of foreclosing its mort-
gage on the property. In this way, the borrower and lender avoid
the time and expense of a foreclosure action. As described in this
Article, if a court holds that the lender's mortgage lien thereby
merged into its fee title, the lender usually will be an unsecured,
rather than a secured, creditor if the debtor's conveyance to it is
voided, such as in connection with the debtor's subsequent bank-
ruptcy. Furthermore, the lender will be unable to clear the title of
junior liens although the law is well established that the lender
could have done so if its lien did not merge. These merger-related
problems are not outweighed by any beneficial effect of merger.
As the number of loan defaults and foreclosures occurring
nationwide has increased to the greatest level since the Great De-
pression of the 1930s,7 the problems created by the misapplication
7. During 1985, delinquencies on debts secured by one to four unit residential proper-
ties ranged from 6.19% during the first quarter to 5.72% during the fourth quarter, which is
more than double the rate during the 1950s. Foreclosure actions were commenced during
1985 against .92% of all one to four unit residential properties encumbered by mortgages, as
contrasted with .59% just five years earlier. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, ECONOMICS DEP'T, JUNE 1985 REPORT. See also STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS DIVISION,
OFFICE OF POLICY AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD., REPORT ON MORT-
GAGE FORECLOSURES BY FSLIC-INSURED SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1984).
During fiscal year 1985, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
acquired approximately 38,000 houses through foreclosure and, after selling all but 16,700
properties, estimated the value of its holdings to be $627,500,000. The agency's deputy assis-
tant secretary for single family housing estimates that HUD may acquire more than 40,000
additional properties during 1986. At the end of January 1986, the Veterans Administration
owned 18,783 properties as a result of loan defaults, with an estimated aggregate value of
$787,000,000, and acquisition procedures had been commenced for an additional 14,809
properties as a result of loan defaults. By mid-1985, federally insured savings and loan com-
panies owned or were foreclosing against properties with an aggregate value of
$7,700,000,000. Three-quarters of the properties were residential. Two of the largest second-
ary mortgage market purchasers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and Federal
National Mortgage Association, owned more than 3,400 homes and 7,700 homes, respec-
tively, at the end of 1985. Because of the large volume of properties held by these lenders
and participants in the secondary mortgage market, they have had to sell the properties by
conducting auctions, rather than continuing their practice of selling through real estate bro-
kers. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Mar. 22, 1986, at 3S, col. 2.
The rapidly increasing number of defaults and foreclosures has had a serious impact on
the mortgage insurance industry. In 1984 mortgage insurance companies paid $472,000,000
in insurance losses, which is five times the amount paid in 1981. The severity of the impact
on the insurance industry is demonstrated by the fact that the companies paid 73.8% of all
premiums collected in 1983, as contrasted with 18.9% in 1980. Greenhouse, The Mortgage
Insurers Woes: Defaults at Record High, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at D8, col. 2.
Comparison of current foreclosure rates with those during the Great Depression of the
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of merger to mortgages have assumed increased importance. High
interest rates, coupled with a downturn in property prices, have
contributed to a record number of property owners' defaulting on
their mortgage payments. The recent popularity of graduated pay-
ment mortgages has fueled the problem. Default rates for these
types of mortgages are five times the default rates for conventional
fixed rate mortgages, as borrowers' incomes fail to keep pace with
increases in the interest rates on their loans.8 Additionally, the ag-
ricultural economy has suffered and continues to suffer massive
blows. Record numbers of farm loans are in default. Penny auc-
tions and other desperation tactics are occurring in agricultural
areas as farmers try to save their farms and farm communities.9
Finally, states with economies dependent on oil, such as Texas,
have suffered the effects of a downturn in oil prices.'0 In light of
the fact that more than 2.25 trillion dollars in debt is secured by
mortgages," the importance of the merger problem is manifest.
Despite the problems created by merger as applied to mort-
gages, this topic has not been analyzed extensively since 1821,
when an English lawyer devoted a volume of his conveyancing
treatise to merger.' 2 The application of merger to mortgages merits
1930s illustrates the severity of the current financial crisis. During the depths of the Great
Depression, the foreclosure rate on mortgages encumbering nonfarm properties ranged from
approximately 1.06% to 1.16%. By 1936, the rate decreased to .86% and steadily decreased
thereafter. By 1941, the foreclosure rate was down to .27%. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970,
BICENTENNIAL EDITION, 1975; J. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING: COMPARATIVE MARKETS
AND EXPERIENCE 95-98 (1956). Although the foreclosure rate on nonfarm properties was not
substantially greater than the current rate, the percentage of residential loans that were in
default in 1933 was estimated to be 25%. Home Owners' Loan Act: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (state-
ment of Horace Russell, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Atlanta,
Georgia).
8. Greenhouse, supra note 7, at D8, col. 6.
9. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Mar. 22, 1986, at 3S, col. 1; Greenhouse, supra note 7.
10. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Mar. 22, 1986, at 3S, col. 1; Greenhouse, supra note
7.
11. As of the fourth quarter of 1985, $2,250,370 in debt was secured by mortgages and
similar security interests. Telephone interview with Kitty Sydnor, Statistical Assistant, Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (Apr. 1986). See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 134 (Feb. 5, 1985).
12. 3 R. PRESTON, CONVEYANCING (3d ed. 1821). Mr. Preston devoted a substantial por-
tion of his career to the study of merger and found it to be particularly edifying.
[T]he law of merger is in itself a curious and interesting learning, scattered in the
books, and not collected with scientific skill, or in a detailed manner in any work: also,
as this subject will be found worthy of notice, in proportion as it is thoroughly under-
stood, the first and a large part of this volume will be devoted to a review of the learn-
ing applicable to merger. This will be done from the fullest conviction, that its impor-
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re-examination in light of the growth and importance of real estate
financing to the national economy, to local economies, and to indi-
viduals' personal economies. To assess the continued applicability
of merger to mortgages, this Article first will trace the historical
developments of merger and of mortgages in England and in
America. Examination of their developments will demonstrate that
merger was not designed to affect property interests adversely.
This analysis also will demonstrate that a modern mortgagee's in-
terest in secured land is not the type of interest to which merger
should apply. After focusing on the origins and natures of merger
and mortgages, this Article will analyze the modern status of
merger as applied to mortgages and, distressingly, as applied to
debts. This analysis will demonstrate that merger is an obsolete
doctrine in the mortgage context, though it continues to generate a
significant amount of litigation.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Doctrine of Merger
By the time of the earliest English language legal reports, the
doctrine of merger was well established. Early judicial decisions
involving the doctrine and early commentators' works usually yield
no clue of the origins of merger or of the reasons underlying its
creation and application.'3 The origin apparently has become
shrouded in the mists of time. The leading nineteenth century
authority on the doctrine states: "An endeavor to refer the learning
of merger to any precise principle of policy, or of reason, and to
support it with certain exclusive pretensions, on that ground,
tance, illustrated as it will be with observations leading to practical conclusions, will
engage the attention, and invite the study of those for whose use this work is designed.
No subject has engaged more of the author's attention for the last twenty-five years, or
received a greater portion of his research.
The necessity then of studying a head of law, involving so many important
considerations, is too obvious to require a recommendation enforced in strong terms.
Perhaps it may be advanced, that few subjects are more deserving of investigation; and
it is well known, that few have received a smaller portion of attention.
Id. at 1-4.
Mr. Preston's work was well received. Kent comments that the merger treatise "is the
ablest and most interesting discussion in all his works. It is copious, clear, logical and
profound." 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 104 n.b (J. Gould 14th ed. 1896).
13. See, e.g., Platt v. Sleap, Cro. Jac. 275 (1611), 79 Eng. Rep. 236 (1907); Hughes v.
Robotham, Cro. Eliz. 302 (1593), 78 Eng. Rep. 554 (1907); Case #5, Gouldsborough 93
(1588); Bracebridge v. Cook, 2 Plow. 416, 419 (1578-79), 75 Eng. Rep. 626, 631 (1907); XVII
Mich., 4 Eliz., 3 Leonard 7 (1562).
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appears to be a vain attempt. The subject does not admit of any
historical deduction."' 4
This commentator is correct to the extent that early courts
and commentators did not ground the doctrine on any one policy
or rationale. This fact hardly is surprising, however, because the
doctrine evolved concurrently with the law of estates in land. As
the universe of legally recognized estates, with their particular at-
tendant rights and obligations, has emerged during the last several
centuries, merger necessarily also has undergone profound, yet par-
allel, changes, and the explanations for its application have
changed accordingly. Courts and commentators, however, have
overlooked this process of evolution in attempting to determine
the reasons for the existence and scope of merger. Instead, they
have uprooted earlier explanations of merger from their historical
contexts and have attempted to transplant those explanations to a
more modern legal environment that is significantly different.
Conflicting applications of the merger doctrine by the English
courts of law and of equity have compounded the difficulty in iden-
tifying a policy or policies underlying the doctrine. The law courts
applied the doctrine mechanically, which incorrectly extended the
reach of merger. The courts of law applied the doctrine whenever a
person held consecutive estates in the same right, regardless of the
resulting injury to the ownership interests of the holder and to
others with interests in the parcel. In contrast, the court of equity
profoundly affected the evolution of merger in the seventeenth
century when it intervened to prevent destruction of property
interests by application of merger. Examination of the develop-
ment of merger, however, will reveal its correct purpose and
application. 15
The most frequently cited explanation of the reason for the
doctrine of merger is contained in the maxim Nemo potest esse
dominus et tenens.'6 Some early legal commentators cite this
maxim as the basis for merger. 17 Later courts and commentators,
bound to primitive concepts of title, broadly construed this apho-
rism to mean that, as a conceptual matter, a person cannot hold
title to consecutive possessory estates in land unless an equitable
14. 3 R PRESTON, supra note 12, at 15.
15. Useful compilations of early merger cases are contained in 13 MEw's DIGEST OF
ENGLISH CASE LAW TO 1924 and in VINER'S ABRIDGMENT (1742-53).
16. No man can be both tenant and lord.
17. See, e.g., 4 J. KENT, supra note 12, at 99; 3 R. PRESTON, supra note 12, at 15.
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reason exists for keeping them distinct.'8 Although this construc-
tion of the aphorism is accurate when applied to the interests in
land existing when merger originated in the common-law system,
its viability as an overarching rationale for modern courts' applica-
tion of merger is limited by two factors: (1) it goes beyond the orig-
inal meaning of the maxim by requiring merger regardless of the
owner's best interests and of the resulting destruction of property
interests; and (2) it is an inadequate statement of policy to deal
with the diverse property interests that can be created today.
The origin and rationale of merger cannot be dismissed with a
simplistic maxim. Instead, they must be examined against the legal
environment in which they arose. Merger originated during the
feudal period in England, which began approximately with William
the Conqueror's victory at the Battle of Hastings in 1066.1' After
his victory, William installed himself as monarch of England.
Because the English had refused to recognize him as monarch until
he took the monarchy by force, William ignored land titles as they
existed before the Battle of Hastings and claimed title to all lands
in England.20
Because of difficulties of standardization, widespread counter-
feiting, and the threat of debasement, coins and other forms of
currency were disfavored. Instead, land and cattle were the pri-
mary media of exchange and were sources of both wealth and
power.21 Rather than conveying all interest in a parcel of land, Wil-
liam and subsequent feudal monarchs provided for the needs of
their courts by transferring only the right to hold land in fee in
exchange for the tenant's agreement to perform stated services for
the monarch. To the modern mind, these services partake of con-
18. See, e.g., Miehling, Merger or Extinguishment in the Law of Mortgages of Real
Estate, 26 ALB. L.J. 506 (1982).
19.
Whether the English feudal system which matured in his reign was largely a Norman
importation or whether William merely modified an Anglo-Saxon feudalism which he
found in process of development, is not easy to say. It is generally agreed, however,
that the advent of William the Conqueror to the English throne marks the beginning of
the most important period in the development of feudalism in England.
1 AM. L. PROP., supra note 1, § 1.3, at 5-6.
20. G. CHESHIRE, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 12 (9th ed. 1962).
21. Id. at 14. According to Milsom:
From the earliest settlements until the industrial revolution, the economic basis of soci-
ety was agrarian. Land was wealth, livelihood, family provision, and the principal sub-
ject-matter of the law. To begin with, moreover, land was also government and the
structure of society.
S. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 99 (2d ed. 1981).
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tractual duties. At the time, however, the services were attendant
to the sovereign's interest in land. The most important forms of
service, or tenure, by which land was held included the following:
(1) military service, which obligated the tenant to provide military
service and related services;22 (2) frankalmoin, which obligated the
tenant to provide spiritual services for the monarch; (3) sergeanty,
which obligated the tenant to provide personal services, such as
performing ceremonial services, managing estates, or even cook-
ing;23 and (4) socage, which obligated the tenant to perform agri-
cultural services or to pay rent.
24
This method of linking possession by the junior interest holder
with duties to the senior interest holder was not exhausted by the
transfer from the monarch. Instead, a tenant in fee could convey to
a subtenant the right to hold a portion of the tenant's land in fee
for as long as the subtenant in turn provided specified services to
the tenant. This process, termed subinfeudation, initially was
unlimited and could continue through several transfers of the right
to possess in exchange for the performance of services. 25 This sys-
tem governed land ownership throughout England and continued
to do so, at least as a technical matter of title, until 1925, when
Parliament converted all anachronistic forms of tenure into tenure
by socage and abolished tenurial incidents.2
In this feudal context, Nemo potest esse dominus et tenens
states a correct-indeed, an unassailable-legal conclusion. As
stated above, during this era property rights consisted primarily of
the corresponding rights to possess and to receive tenurial inci-
22. Military tenure originally was the most important form of tenure. This fact is
attributable to the societal forces that gave rise to feudalism. Feudalism generally arises in
the absence of a government strong enough to protect its citizens. In the absence of govern-
mental protection, people may be willing to surrender title to their lands and a portion of
their personal liberty to a powerful person in exchange for that person's agreement to pro-
vide protection. Obviously, the lord's ability to provide protection was dependent on the
ability to raise a military force. Therefore, military tenure initially was the most important
and imperative form of service that the lord required. 1 Am. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 1.4;
S. MrLsoM, supra note 21, at 102-03. Although military tenure declined in importance rela-
tively early, Parliament did not abolish it until 1660 and then only to convert lands held by
military tenure into tenure by socage. Statute of 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24; 1 AM. L. PROP.,
supra note 2, § 1.35, at 9.
23. Pollock and Maitland describe a situation in which land was held in "the serjeanty
of finding three arrows when the king should hunt on Dartmoor." 1 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335 (2d ed. 1898 reissued 1923).
24. For a more detailed discussion of the forms of tenure and their incidents, see 1 AM.
L. PROP., supra note 2, § 1.4; S. MILsoM, supra note 21, at 99-103.
25. G. CHESHIRE, supra note 20, at 14.
26. Law of Property Acts, 1922 & 1925; G. CHESHIRE, supra note 20, at 26-7.
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:283
dents. The ownership of consecutive estates would not be
enhanced by holding them separately. A duty owed to oneself is a
nullity, and possession cannot be divided among one.27 In light of
the fact that the interests holder was not benefited by holding the
two estates separately, merger was the tool for combining the
estates, which simplified the state of title. Rather than describe
ownership of the property through four levels of subinfeudation,
for example, it could be described through only three levels.
As the courts of law recognized new types of interests in land,
however, the courts inexorably applied the doctrine of merger to
these interests with strict literalness, ignoring the nonsubstantive
purpose for merger. The paradigmatic example of the substantive
intrusion of merger is the doctrine of destructibility of contingent
remainders. After the courts of law had recognized contingent
remainders as a valid interest in the fifteenth century, 8 the courts
applied merger to destroy those remainders when the holder of the
possessory estate acquired the reversion following the contingent
remainder or when the reversion holder acquired the possessory
estate, even when the sole purpose for the conveyance was to de-
stroy the intervening contingent remainder.2 9 This result devolved
27. The owner of the consecutive estates still was entitled to receive the tenurial ser-
vices to be rendered in connection with any subinfeudation of his junior estate and was
obligated to perform the services to be rendered in connection with the creation of his senior
estate. Obviously, however, his continued enjoyment of the benefits flowing from his interest
in the land no longer depended on his performance of the services to be rendered in connec-
tion with creation of the junior estate because he was the person entitled to the performance
of those services.
Littleton describes this process as an "extinguishment" because it does not enlarge the
owner's holdings.
[R]eleases which enure by way of extinguishment against all persons, are where he to
whom the release is made, cannot have that which to him is released. As if there be
lord and tenant, and the lord release to the tenant all the right which he hath in the
seigniory, or all the right which he hath in the land,. . . this release goeth by way of
extinguishment against all persons, b~cause that the tenant cannot have service to
receive of himself.
.. . In the same manner is it of a release made to the tenant of the land of a rent
charge... because the tenant cannot have that which to him is released.., so such
releases shall enure by way of extinguishment in all ways.
LrrTLTON's TENURES §§ 479, 480 (E. Wambaugh ed. 1903) (footnotes omitted).
28. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1937).
29. In the famous case of Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380 (1671), 85 Eng. Rep.
1181 (1908), for example, a woman held a life estate, followed by a remainder to her son if
one should be born. Before the life tenant gave birth to a son, the reversion holder conveyed
the reversion to her spouse and her. Because a son had not been born, the grant to a son was
a contingent remainder. The court held, therefore, that the life estate merged into the rever-
sion to create a fee simple estate, thereby destroying the contingent remainder.
Courts also applied merger to destroy a contingent remainder in the converse case. In
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from the courts' categorization of contingent remainders as mere
expectancies of an interest in land upon the happening of a stated
event rather than as estates in land. Because these remainders
were not intervening estates, the courts reasoned that merger val-
idly applied and thus united the currently possessory estate with
the reversion, which completely bypassed the grantor's intended
contingencies."
Pressure for increased alienability of land is the policy nor-
mally cited for the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remain-
ders. Today, we would argue that such radical treatment of contin-
gencies should be left to the legislature. It is especially unfortunate
that a device developed merely to facilitate transactions was trans-
formed by judicial fiat into a substantive device. Although the
courts' application of merger to destroy contingent remainders
increased the alienability of land, it defeated the grantor's express
intent and destroyed the interests of the contingent remainder
holders.31 The recognition of contingent remainders as a valid
Thompson v. Leach, 2 Vent. 198 (1691), 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (1908), a person owned a life
estate in a parcel of land, followed by contingent remainders in tail, then by a vested
remainder in tail, and finally by a remainder in fee. Before the contingency occurred on
which the contingent remainders depended, the life tenant surrendered his interest in the
land to the holder of the vested remainder in tail. The court held that the intervening con-
tingent remainders would have been destroyed by the life tenant's surrender of his estate
but for the fact of his mental incompetence. See C. FEARNE, ON THE LEARNING OF CONTIN-
GENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES (1772), in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN
THE MODERN ERA (1979).
30. Some commentators have theorized that the operation of merger to destroy contin-
gent remainders is the basis for the infamous Rule in Shelley's Case. The Rule is named for
the case Wolfe v. Shelley, I Co. Rep. 88b, 93b (1581), 76 Eng. Rep. 199, 206 (1907), though it
originated in Abel's Case, Y.B. Edw. 2, 577 (1324). The Rule operates to convert a convey-
ance "to A for life, remainder to his heirs" or "to A for life, remainder to the heirs of his
body" into fee simple or fee tail estates, respectively, in A. If a testator owned fee simple
title to a parcel of land and devised it to his oldest son for life with a remainder to the son's
heirs, the son would receive a life estate by the terms of the will and the reversion in fee
simple by descent. If the intervening remainder to the son's heirs was contingent, which it
must be if the son were still alive, the life estate and reversion would merge to destroy the
contingent remainder and to vest the son with fee simple title. Similarly, if the owner of a
parcel of land conveyed it inter vivos to his oldest son for life with a remainder to the son's
heirs, the oldest son would acquire not only a life estate, but also the next vested estate of
inheritance. If the son was alive when this conveyance became effective, the remainder in
his heirs was contingent and was destroyed by operation of merger. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 28, at 109-10. Other possible explanations for the origin of the Rule are set forth
in 4 J. KENT, supra note 12, at 215-18, and in L. SImEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 20, 21
(2d ed. 1966).
31. Ironically, while the law courts used merger to destroy property interests, those
courts held that merger had not occurred in one situation in which merger would not have
affected property rights significantly. Some of the earliest merger cases involved the situa-
tion in which the lessee of land married the owner of the reversion following the leasehold.
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interest precluded the transactional simplification of title. The
simplification of title instead should have depended on whether
the contingency occurred and not on the application of merger.
Although courts at this time rarely explained the reason for
merger or for the court's application of merger in a particular case,
when a court of law did explain its application of merger to destroy
an otherwise valid property interest, its reasoning was superficially
similar to that employed with respect to the earlier feudal estates.
For example, in Hecker's Case,32 a 1523 decision, a church leased
certain church lands to a person who subsequently was appointed
parson of the church while the lease term was in effect. At this
time, a parson was treated as being in full possession of the rights
and obligations of his parish. The court held, therefore, that the
tenancy merged into the reversion retained by the church because
"[t]he same person at the same time, cannot have an assise 3 and
an ejectione firmae3' . . . ."" As described in a case decided some-
time during the period between 1548 and 1579, Hecker's Case
turned on the fact that a parson was viewed as holding the fee
interest, as well as the leasehold interest, in his individual
capacity.36
During this era in the development of real property law, a husband was treated as the owner
of his wife's real property. His use of the land was unfettered by any claim by his wife. For
example, he had the right to collect and to use all rents and profits from his wife's lands
without any obligation to account to her. Despite this fact, the courts of law held that the
husband did not acquire fee simple title to the land upon marriage by operation of merger
because the husband held one interest in his own right and the other interest in autre droit.
See, e.g., Thorn v. Newman, 3 Swans. App. 603 (1673), 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1904); Platt v.
Sleap, Cro. Jac. 275 (1611), 79 Eng. Rep. 236 (1907); Bracebridge v. Cook, 2 Plow. 416, 418-
19 (1548-79), 75 Eng. Rep. 626, 629-32 (1907). Coke states that merger did not occur only if
the husband owned the freehold in his own right and the term for years in autre droit.
According to Coke, merger would occur in the reverse situation. Coke Litt. 338.b. This state-
ment conflicts with the holding in Platt v. Sleap.
32. 14 Hen. 8, 2 Jenk. 200 (1523).
33. An assise is an action for possession available to the holder of the fee.
34. An ejectione firmae is an action for possession available to a tenant.
35. Littleton broadly stated the same result when a tenant acquires the reversion. In
his treatise on tenures in land, Littleton describes a merger of title, though he does not refer
to it as such, when the holder of the fee lets lands "to one for term of years, by force
whereof he is in possession, and after" the owner releases the reversion to the tenant and his
heirs. In this case, the tenant is treated as owning fee simple absolute title. LiTTLErON'S
TENURES, supra note 27, § 465.
36. Bracebridge v. Cook, 2 Plow. 416, 420 (1548-79), 75 Eng. Rep. 626, 632-33 (1907).
This view of the law applicable to Hecker's Case, however, was not accepted universally. At
least one justice stated that merger should not destroy the leasehold because the parson
held the fee and leasehold interests in different capacities. He owned the leasehold in his
individual capacity and the fee in his capacity as parson. Id. Even accepting that the parson
in Hecker's Case held the interests in different rights, the interests would have merged
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As stated by the court, the reason for applying merger was vir-
tually identical to that expressed by the feudal maxim Nemo po-
test esse dominus et tenens. The court updated the maxim to re-
flect the court's recognition of a tenancy for years as an estate in
land and of the attendant causes of action that had developed with
respect to that estate. By unthinkingly adopting the form of the
feudal maxim, however, the court's statement of its reason for ap-
plying merger converted merger from a transactional aid for sim-
plifying property titles into a compulsory rule to be applied re-
gardless of the owner's best interests. By 1523, interests in land
had evolved beyond the bare right to possess or to receive feudal
incidents, which were the primary rights in land when merger
originated. By neglecting to focus on the reason for merger rather
than on the words used to explain the application of merger at an
earlier stage in the evolution of estates in land, the court extended
merger beyond its appropriate scope and committed the same er-
ror that other courts had committed by applying merger to destroy
contingent remainders. If the tenant in Hecker's Case had ob-
tained a lease for one hundred years, for example, the court's ap-
plication of merger destroyed that portion of the tenancy interest
that still would have existed at the tenant's death.
The reported opinion in Hecker's Case does not include suffi-
cient facts to determine whether the court's application of merger
to the facts in that case was harmful. This lack of information con-
cerning the legal, social, political, and economic issues involved in
that case has two results: (1) a decision comprehending a particu-
lar complex of facts may be applied in its reduced form in wholly
inappropriate ways; and more selfishly, (2) the legal historian's job
is rendered more difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, the danger
created by the coupling of the court's incorrect description of
merger in that case with the somewhat cryptic statement of its rea-
soning is demonstrated by its infectious effect in other cases de-
cided during the same era.
For example, during this time period courts of law held that
when a landlord borrowed money from his tenant and granted the
tenant a mortgage on the reversion following the tenancy, the ten-
ancy interest merged into the reversion and was extinguished. 37 If
the landlord paid the loan in full on the specified day, which re-
leased the mortgage, the tenant had no further interest in the land
according to Coke. Coke Litt. 338.b. See also 4 J. KENT, supra note 12, at 102.
37. Case #5, Gouldsborough 93 (1588); XVII Mich., 4 Eliz., 3 Leonard 7 (1562).
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even if the lease term had not expired according to its terms. The
courts treated the tenancy as having been merged into the rever-
sion when the mortgage was given, even though the term of the
tenancy was longer than the mortgage term. This application of
merger resulted in an obvious destruction of the leasehold interest,
which defeated the parties' expectations, without creating any
transactional or other benefits. Indeed, the courts' application of
merger in this context created transactional costs by necessitating
the negotiation and execution of another lease.
Similarly, Coke, in his Commentaries on Littleton, stated that
merger operates to destroy a term for years when the lessee
acquires a life estate in the same land even if the term for years
would have lasted longer than the life estate s.3 Because a term for
years, categorized as a chattel real, was considered at law to be an
inferior estate to the life estate, the courts of law applied merger,
although this application potentially reduced the grantee's rights
in the land. Indeed, by applying merger to destroy the term for
years, the law courts ignored not only the purpose for the merger
doctrine, but also the grantor's purpose. The grantor probably con-
veyed the term for years in addition to the life estate to ensure
that the grantee or his heirs would have the right to possess the
property for a minimum number of years, as specified in the term
for years.39 The grantor's and grantee's intent, however, could not
prevent the courts of law from applying merger to destroy the term
for years.
The courts of law also distorted merger when considering situ-
ations in which ownership of a fee title and a mortgage encumber-
ing that title united in a single entity. The courts of law merged
these interests for the stated reason that the same person cannot
be debtor and creditor.40 Again, this rationale for applying merger
38. "[fIf a man make a lease to one for 21 yeares, the remainder to him for terme of
his life, the lease for yeares is drowned." Coke Litt. 54.b.
39. 3 R. PRESTON, supra note 12, at 44-45.
40. A possible explanation for this result is that application of merger in this context
ensured that the entire title to a parcel of property would descend to one set of heirs, rather
than the interests "becom[ing] split and divided between the personal and real representa-
tives." J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 487-88 (1st Am. ed. 1807). For
example, if a borrower granted a term for years to secure a loan and subsequently acquired
the term, a court of law would merge the interests to avoid the term descending to the
borrower's personal representatives upon his death and the reversion descending to his real
representatives. This problem largely has been obviated today because a property owner can
execute a will specifying to whom title will devolve. This right was created by the Statute of
wills, which was adopted by Parliament in 1540. Furthermore, even if the owner dies intes-
tate, modern intestate succession statutes normally do not distinguish between real and per-
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is similar to that expressed by Nemo potest esse dominus et
tenens. Like the statement expressed by the court in Hecker's
Case, however, the maxim that the same person cannot be debtor
and creditor is a fine adage, but a poor and overly broad statement
of the situations to which merger should apply. When a lender
acquires fee title to land on which he holds a mortgage, the lender
often has a legitimate, beneficial reason for preventing merger.
41
The courts of law, however, applied merger regardless of the
owner's best interest.
The law courts may have extended merger out of a misplaced
desire to increase alienability of land,42 or they simply may have
been mesmerized by the thaumaturgy of words (Latin having
proven to be especially magical to lawyers). Eventually, however,
the court of equity, which was more firmly rooted in the world
than in the law, was petitioned to effectuate a grantor's and
grantee's intent by refusing to apply merger.43 In response, during
the seventeenth century 44 the court of equity began to decline to
apply merger when the court believed the application would cause
an unjust result. In Thorne v. Newman,45 for example, Baker
acquired a ninety-nine year term in a parcel of land, which he
assigned to secure a debt. His wife subsequently acquired the free-
hold, so that he became seised of the freehold in autre droit. Baker
then argued that the term had merged into the freehold estate,
which extinguished the lender's interest in the property. Although
the court of equity stated that the legal doctrine of merger was
applicable according to its terms, the court declined to apply it.
Lord Nottingham stated that on the facts of the case, "whatever
the law be, it ought to be no merger in equity."' 6 Thus, by using its
equitable power, the court prevented a destructive application of
merger.
In an attempt to restore merger to its original nonsubstantive
character, the court of equity subsequently adopted a broader
strategy than using its general equitable powers. Having no power
to overrule the law courts, the court of equity instead created an
sonal property in specifying the descent of title to the decedents property.
41. See infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
42. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 28, at 111; L. Simxs, supra note 30, § 22, at 48.
43. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 28, at 295; 4 J. KENT, supra note 12, at 103-04; 3 R.
PRESTON, supra note 12, at 45.
44. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 28, at 110-11.
45. 2 Ch. R. 71 (1672-73), 21 Eng. Rep. 619 (1902).
46. Thorn v. Newman, 3 Swans. 603 (1673), 36 Eng. Rep. 991 (1904).
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exception to the doctrine: Merger would apply only if the holder of
the property interests intended them to merge. If the holder of the
interests had a beneficial reason for holding them separately, she
could do so by expressing that intention. This exception operated
to eliminate the destructive aspect of merger as applied by the
courts of law and to restore merger to its original nonsubstantive
transactional use.
The equitable exception originated in a 1696 Chancery opin-
ion, Thomas v. Kemeys, 47 though the opinion gives little indication
of that fact. In Thomas a girl's parents conveyed a term for years
in a parcel of land to trustees to raise a specified amount of money
for her. The parents then created a fee tail male in the land sub-
ject to the term, with a remainder to the father's heirs. The par-
ents' only children were the daughter and a son, who died in his
infancy. The daughter, therefore, inherited the land upon her
father's death. She then died, devising the land to her mother.
When her mother went into possession of the land, the trustees
filed an action in ejectment to recover possession pursuant to the
term for years.
The mother argued in defense to the action that the daugh-
ter's interest in the term had merged into the fee and that, in any
event, the purpose for the trust, to provide for the daughter, termi-
nated upon the daughter's death. The trustees countered that the
daughter's interests could not merge because she did not own them
in the same right. That is, she owned the fee-subject to the
term-in her own right, whereas she owned only the equitable title
to the term. The trustees further argued, however, that,
[w]here an infant hath two rights in her, this court which is to take care of
infants will always preserve that right, which is most beneficial to the infant;
and i& this case, it was for the interest and advantage of the infant, that the
portion should be looked upon as a continuing and subsisting charge,and not
sink into the inheritance . . .48
The trustees buttressed this argument with cases in which Chan-
cery had exercised its equitable powers to protect a child or a men-
tally incompetent person. That the child was dead when suit was
brought indicates the trustees were focusing on whether the inter-
ests coalesced when acquired.
The Lord Chancellor held in Thomas that the interests had
not merged. The one sentence holding concerning the issue of
47. 2 Vern. 348 (1696), 23 Eng. Rep. 821 (1902).
48. Id. at 352, 23 Eng. Rep. at 822.
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merger is conclusory, but indicates that the basis for the holding
was that the daughter held the interests in different rights: "[A]s
the term in law was not merged, so neither was the trust deter-
mined or extinguished in equity, but remained still a subsisting
charge upon the estate. . . . "4 The court did not indicate that its
holding was grounded on a policy of affording children special pro-
tection. Instead, the court found no equitable reason for altering
the basic rule of law that merger will not occur when the owner has
legal title to one interest and only equitable title to another inter-
est in the same land.50
Despite the limited holding in Thomas quoted above, the
court of equity later seized upon Thomas as the vehicle for creat-
ing the equitable exception to merger. Compton v. Oxenden51 was
the first reported decision in which the court discussed and
extended Thomas, if only in unequivocal dictum. In that case,
which was decided in 1793, a mentally incompetent person who
owned a parcel of land subject to two trust terms subsequently in-
herited the trust terms. The court held that the trusts had termi-
nated because the purpose for the trusts no longer existed and re-
cited the legal maxim that merger occurs when the same person
becomes the creditor and the debtor with respect to the same debt.
Citing Thomas, however, the court then stated: "But it is true in
equity, though there may be that, which if all was reduced to a
legal right, would of necessity operate as a merger, this Court act-
ing upon the trust will on the intent express or implied preserve
them distinct .... ,,52
The court described the Thomas result as turning on the
daughter's "supposed intent. '5 3 Moreover, the court focused its
examination on the benefit or detriment merger would confer on
the owner of the rights in question. The court reasoned that the
daughter in Thomas benefited at the time of her father's death by
retaining the trust term separate from the fee title because the
daughter could use and dispose of the trust term, which was an
49. Id. at 354, 23 Eng. Rep. at 823.
50. The court readily could have found an equitable reason for holding that the inter-
ests had merged. Because the daughter was dead, she could not be benefited by the term for
years. The court's refusal to merge the interests may be attributable to the fact that the
issue of merger was determined for all purposes at the moment when the daughter acquired
the second interest. This interpretation is consistent with some commentators' descriptions
of the operation of merger.
51. 2 Ves. Jr. 261 (1793), 30 Eng. Rep. 624 (1903).




item of personal property, before she became twenty-one years old,
whereas she had no disposable interest in the land until she
became twenty-one. Although the daughter in Thomas had not
expressed any intent concerning merger, the court in Compton
stated that the court of equity would act upon the supposed intent
an infant would have could she express it. Essentially, the court
acted on a presumption based on the intent a rational person
would have if possessed of the same property interests.
The Compton court's description of the holding in Thomas is
surprising for two reasons. First, the result in Thomas was logically
unnecessary to the holding in Compton. Second, the Thomas hold-
ing ostensibly was based on traditional legal doctrine rather than
on equitable concepts of the daughter's intent or of what was most
beneficial to her. Indeed, the inclusion of this dictum at this time
might indicate that the ambit of merger was a contested issue of
the day. The court's strongly stated dictum concerning merger,
however, was not without precedent.
Although Compton was the first published opinion in which a
court of equity clearly stated an "intent" exception to merger, an
earlier, unpublished opinion cited in the Compton decision
undoubtedly influenced the court. In Gwillam v. Holland54 the
owner of a charge against a parcel of land subsequently inherited
the land from her brother. Her brother had mortgaged the land
after the charge attached to it, thereby conveying the legal estate
in the land to the mortgagee. Because the owner of the charge had
inherited only her brother's remaining equitable estate in the land,
even a court of law would have held that the interests did not
merge, and the court of equity so held. The Gwillam court further
stated, however, that the holder of the interests was benefited by
keeping the charge distinct so as to avoid giving priority to the
mortgagee.5 5 As in Compton, this observation concerning the bene-
fit to the holder was unnecessary to the holding in the case; both
cases were governed by the traditional legal rule of merger.
These dicta coalesced into a judicially recognized and
approved equitable exception in Forbes v. Moffatt,56 decided eigh-
teen years after Compton. In that case, a mortgagee subsequently
acquired title to the mortgaged property. Unlike the previous
cases, no rule of law operated to keep the estates distinct and,
54. Cited in Compton v. Oxenden, 2 Ves. Jr. 263, 264-5, 30 Eng. Rep. at 625-26 and in
Forbes v. Moffatt, 18 Ves. Jr. 384, 393-94 (1811), 34 Eng. Rep. 362, 366 (1903).
55. Compton v. Oxenden, 2 Ves. Jr. at 264-65 (1793), 30 Eng. Rep. 624 (1903).
56. 18 Ves. Jr. 384, 34 Eng. Rep. 362 (1811).
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therefore, they would have merged at law despite the obvious ad-
vantage to the holder in retaining the priority of his lien over jun-
ior liens encumbering the property when he acquired it. The
Forbes court, citing Thomas, Compton, and Gwillam, held in
broad language that the mortgage had not merged into the fee:
It is very clear that a person, becoming entitled to an estate, subject to a
charge for his own benefit, may, if he chooses, at once take the estate, and
keep up the charge. Upon this subject a Court of equity is not guided by the
rule of law. It will sometimes hold a charge extinguished, where it would sub-
sist at law; and sometimes preserve it, where at law it would be merged. 57
The Forbes court clearly stated its refusal to apply the legal
doctrine in determining issues of merger, and it was successful in
permanently altering the course of merger, especially as applied to
mortgages. Indeed, the equitable exception stated in Forbes essen-
tially swallowed the legal doctrine of merger. Rather than blindly
applying the doctrine regardless of the injury to or destruction of
property rights, courts, from that point on, focused on the real
world effect merger would have on ownership interests.
The Forbes court's touchstone for merger application became
the owner's "intent." After stating that equity could refuse to
merge interests that law would merge, the court announced that
the application of merger would turn on the effects of merger on
the owner rather than on estate theory.
The question is upon the intention, actual or presumed, of the person in
whom the interests are united.
• . •Where no intention is expressed, or the party is incapable of expressing
any, I apprehend the Court considers what is most advantageous to him. 58
Earlier Chancery decisions, such as Thomas, had indicated
that the owner of the interests could prevent their merger only by
expressly stating that desire. This burden on the owner was quite
onerous if the owner was an infant, mentally incompetent, or a
person otherwise afforded special protection by Chancery. In such
situations, the court sub silentio presumed that the owner would
desire the result most beneficial to him, hence the fictional "sup-
posed intent" in Thomas. The property owner in Forbes, however,
suffered from no disability and had not expressed any intention
concerning merger. The Forbes formula for the requisite intent
thus envisioned a much broader role for the equitable exception to
merger: The court of equity would not hold that interests had
57. Id. at 390, 34 Eng. Rep. at 364.
58. Id. at 390-92, 34 Eng. Rep. at 364-65.
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merged if the owner's property rights would be injured.
This focus on the effect of merger on the owner is the appro-
priate method for analyzing merger problems. Merger originated
before detailed written records of land transactions were main-
tained in England and before land conveyances were effectuated
by writings. It was merely a tool to simplify property titles before
alternative methods, such as recording a release in the public prop-
erty records, existed. By simplifying titles, merger facilitated prop-
erty transactions. The law courts' applications of merger, however,
hampered property transactions by defeating conveyancers' expec-
tations and by destroying valuable property interests. The increas-
ing dominance of the equitable exception after the Forbes decision,
therefore, is not surprising. Indeed, Parliament ultimately ratified
the exception. In 1873 Parliament adopted the Judicature Act,
which provides in part: "There shall not after the commencement
of this Act be any merger by operation of law only of an estate, the
beneficial interest of which would not be deemed to be merged or
extinguished in equity.
5 9
The American doctrine of merger firmly embraces the equita-
ble exception. From the earliest reported American cases involving
merger, courts have stated that merger will apply only if the owner
so intends. As in England, courts generally equate the owner's
"intent" with the result most beneficial to him. 0 Indeed, the no-
tion of protecting existing property rights, such as security priori-
ties, from merger is now so firmly embedded in American property
law that many courts do not treat interests as merged even when
the owner originally expressed an intention that his interests
merge but subsequently had a nonfraudulent reason for holding
them distinct. 1
Despite the adoption of an expansive equitable exception to
merger, the doctrine continues to plague property owners. The
continuing impact of the English law courts' merger doctrine is
demonstrated by the fact that at least one American jurisdiction
has not recognized the equitable exception and accordingly has
destroyed property interests without regard to the owner's best in-
terests.2 A more insidious aspect of the development of merger is
59. 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 25(4) (1873).
60. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 373, 388-90 (1827); Baldwin v. Norton,
2 Conn. 161, 163-64 (1817); James v. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. 416, 422-24 (N.Y. Ch. 1822);
Gardner v. Astor, 3 Johns. Ch. 53, 55-56 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
61. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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modern courts' rote applications of the simplistic and obsolete
maxims developed by law courts for explaining the reason for
merger. For example, the statement that "a person cannot be the
debtor and creditor with respect to the same debt" simply does not
comprehend modern financing methods and notions of title. Mod-
ern courts, however, still recite this and other similarly outdated
maxims in cases involving a person who holds fee title to a parcel
of property and a mortgage encumbering it. As demonstrated in
the following sections of this Article, that maxim does not apply to
modern mortgages and should not be used to destroy them or their
attendant security priorities. Furthermore, widespread adoption of
the equitable exception, coupled with the universal existence of
title recording systems in America, virtually has destroyed the util-
ity of merger as a title simplification device. Instead, merger has
become a trap for the unwary purchaser.63
B. Mortgages
1. English Development
As discussed above, post-feudal merger properly applies only
when the owner of two or more consecutive estates in land holds
them in the same right and has no beneficial reason for holding
them separately. Theoretically, therefore, merger should apply to
mortgages only if they constitute an estate in land. Examination of
the forms of land security from their medieval origins to their cur-
rent form demonstrates that although some early mortgage coun-
terparts did convey an estate in land to the lender, the modern
mortgage does not do so.64 Like the mechanics' lien, judgment lien,
or other forms of debt lien, the modern mortgage empowers its
holder to sell, under circumscribed conditions, the encumbered
land to satisfy the secured debt, but does not vest its owner with
any of the normal attributes of ownership of an estate in land.
Therefore, as a matter of title theory, merger should not apply to
mortgages because estates in land simply are not involved.
The history of mortgages is at least as ancient as our written
records, though relatively little detailed information is available
63. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
64. Although a few states still describe mortgages as conveying an estate in land,
examination of the law and practices in these states reveals that the mortgage is a mere




concerning the methods used before 1066.65 Because land was cen-
tral to the predominantly agrarian medieval economy and because
of the permanence and immovability of land, it has been an attrac-
tive form of security for as long as private property rights have
been recognized and protected. Furthermore, the availability of
land as security made loans available on less stringent terms than
otherwise might have existed." At the same time that the doctrine
of merger was evolving into its present form, English medieval con-
veyancers were grappling with the problem of securing loans of
money with the borrower's land. As with the doctrine of merger,
the forms of land security first were shaped by the theories of the
courts of law, but did not assume the forms recognized today until
the more practical court of equity had ameliorated the strictness of
the legal forms.
During the earliest part of the English feudal period, from
approximately 1066 through 1250, a possessor of land was not free
to use it as security for a debt. Because written conveyancing
records did not exist, possession was the primary method by which
a property interest holder, including a secured lender, manifested
and protected his interest. As discussed above, however, possession
of property inextricably was linked to personal services to be ren-
dered to superior interest holders.6 The importance of these ser-
vices cannot be overestimated: the tenant was the person obligated
to provide services for the lord "in war and peace. ' 6s During this
time, therefore, a possessor of land was not free to convey the right
65. In his treatise on mortgages, Jones states that mortgages have existed since anti-
quity. 1 L. JONES, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1 (8th ed. 1928). A reference
to mortages is included in the Old Testament:
Now there arose a great outcry of the people and of their wives against their Jewish
brethren. For there were those who said, "With our sons and our daughters, we are
many; let us get grain, that we may eat and keep alive." There were also those who
said, "We are mortgaging our fields, our vineyards, and our houses to get grain because
of the famine." And there were those who said, "We have borrowed money for the
king's tax upon our fields and our vineyards. Now our flesh is the flesh of our brethren,
our children are as their children; yet we are forcing our sons and our daughters to be
slaves, and some of our daughters have already been enslaved; but it is not in our
power to help it, for other men have our fields and our vineyards.
Nehemiah 5:1-5. See also G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 1, at 2 (2d
ed. 1970); Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Medieval England, 17 HARv. L. REV. 549, 552
(1904); Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 1 (1961).
66. F. POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 132-33 (3d ed. 1896).
67. J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 3-4; 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE § 1348 (14th ed. 1918).
68. J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 3-4.
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to possess unless the lord of the manor agreed to performance of
these essential and personal services by the new tenant.
A dramatic change occurred when license to alienate interests
in land was granted at about the time of Henry III.9 The earliest
form of common-law real estate security, the gage, was introduced
almost immediately.70 Our information about the gage comes from
Glanville, 71 who described two primary types of gage in use at this
time, the vif gage or vivum vadium ("living pledge") and the mort
gage or mortuum vadium ("dead pledge"). According to Glanville,
under both types of gage the gagor authorized the gagee to take
possession of the encumbered land and to collect the rents and
profits from it.
69. W. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 102-09 (1927); 1
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 329-49; 1 J. POWELL, supra note 40, § 1, at 4
(1799). The historical records do not provide a clear picture of restraints on alienation dur-
ing the feudal period. The existing records do indicate, however, that significant restraints
existed before enactment in 1290 of the statute Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1. Before enact-
ment of Quia Emptores, a tenant could convey his interest in land and could substitute a
new tenant in his place as the person to perform the feudal incidents connected with the
estate only with the lord's permission. This process was called "substitution." The tenant
also could convey the right to possess the land in exchange for the new tenant's agreement
to perform tenurial services for the conveying tenant rather than for the lord. This process,
called "subinfeudation," created a new feudal relationship and may not have required the
lord's consent.
As described above, a particular parcel of land might be transferred several times by
subinfeudation. Although each tenant in the chain of subinfeudations continued to be
responsible for performance of the obligations to which he agreed in connection with his
acquisition of his interest in the land, subinfeudation might substantially affect the value of
the tenurial incidents associated with the land. Pollock and Maitland cite as an example the
situation in which A enfeoffed B to hold by knight's service and then B enfeoffed C to hold
for rent of a pound of pepper. If B dies survived by a child, A still is entitled to wardship of
the child, but the wardship is worth substantially less after the subinfeudation to C. Instead
of being able to take possession of the land before the child is an adult, A will be entitled
only to the rent of pepper. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 330-31.
Because of the importance of the tenurial incidents, the monarch agreed to a compro-
mise with the tenants. The statute Quia Emptores provided that a tenant in fee simple
could substitute another tenant in his place without the lord's consent, which gave the ten-
ant a free right of alienation by substitution. In exchange, the statute was construed to
forbid future subinfeudations, thereby protecting the lord's tenurial incidents.
70. 3 J. STORY, supra note 67, § 1348. Pollock and Maitland state that the gage may
have been used as early as the twelfth century. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23,
at 118-19.
71. Ranulph De Glanville was Chief Justiciar of England under Henry II and was one
of the earliest English legal commentators. He described the vif gage and the mort gage in A
TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND, bk. X, ch. 6-11 (J.
Beames trans. 1900), which was published between 1187 and 1189 (although legal scholars
have questioned whether Glanville actually authored the treatise). Id. at xiii-xvi. The trea-
tise is the earliest systematic treatise on law written in modern times. Id. at xvi. See 1 G.
GLENN. supra note 5, § 2, at 3 n.2; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 438.
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Depending on the type of gage given, however, the financial
consequences were vastly different. Pursuant to a vif gage, the
gagee was required to apply the rents and profits to reduce the
outstanding debt. The pledge was "living" because it reduced the
debt. Glanville described this form of security as "just and bind-
ing.17 2 Glanville denounced the mort gage, on the other hand, as
"unjust and dishonest ' 7' because the gagee was not required to
apply the rents and profits to reduce the debt.7 4 The pledge was
"dead" because the pledged property was not generating any bene-
fit for the gagor.
In addition to being disfavored as "unjust," the mort gage was
considered a type of usury because the gagee received the rents
and profits as "interest. 7 5 Although the courts of law did not pro-
hibit lenders from charging interest on loaned money on the basis
that the courts should not interfere with private contracts, 7  the
English Church prohibited interest as a form of usury. Indeed, a
Christian lender who died while holding a mort gage died as a sin-
ner, and his personal property was forfeited to the monarch. As
an illustration that human nature has changed little since the
medieval period, the short term economic gain apparently out-
weighed the possibility of a long term penalty in the afterlife, and
the mort gage was the predominant form of gage employed by
Christian and Jewish lenders alike.7
No reported case or commentator discusses the applicability of
merger to the vif gage or to the mort gage. The legal treatment of
the gagee's interest, however, was inconsistent with an interest in
land and, therefore, also with the applicability of merger. Although
the gagee's possession of the land pursuant to either type of gage
72. R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, ch. 8.
73. Id.
74. "A pledge is designated by the Term Mortgage, when the fruits and rents, which
are received in the interval, in no measure tend to reduce the demand for which the pledge
has been given." Id. at bk. X, ch. 6.
75. Id. at bk. X, ch. 8; 1 L. JONES, supra note 65, § 5, at 6; R. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION 17 (1931). Although the holder of a vif gage also might charge interest, that
action alone did not constitute usury. As long as the gagee was to be repaid only from the
income and profits generated by the pledged land, a risk existed that the loan would not be
repaid. Pursuant to a mort gage, on the other hand, the gagee was entitled to collect the
loan from the gagor, as well as to collect the income and profits from the land. Therefore,
the mort gage correctly was considered to be usurious. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 2, at 5.
76. A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 132 (1961).
77. R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, ch. 8; Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 552.
78. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 1, at 4; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23,
at 119.
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was characterized as seisina et de vadio ("seisin by way of
pledge"), the gagee did not have actual seisin or a recognized
estate in land but only the right to possession until the debt was
paid. As a consequence, if a stranger to the title ousted the gagee
from possession of the property, the gagee could not bring a pos-
sessory action; because the gagor retained seisin, only he had the
right to bring the action. Even if, in total derogation of the gage
relationship, the gagor ousted the gagee or refused to deliver pos-
session of the land, the gagee had no cause of action to obtain
possession.
79
Glanville attributed the inferiority of the gagee's interest to
the distinction between rights in the land and rights in the debt.
That is, the gagee enjoyed no rights in the land but only in the
debt, albeit secred by the land. 0 Later commentators, however,
have attributed the absence of protection for the gagee's interest to
the embryonic stage of development of the possessory forms of
action, such as the assise of novel disseisin. Because the gagee's
seisina was not a freehold estate, the king's justices did not believe
that the courts should protect it.81 The gagee also may have been
denied protection because of the connection between the mort gage
and usury.8 2 The forms of possessory actions then available were
designed to protect the owners of recognized freehold estates only,
79.
If the Creditor lose his Seisin, either by means of the Debtor, or any other person, he
cannot recover it through the assistance of the Court; not even by a Recognition of
Novel Disseisin.
For if he was unjustly and without a judgment disseised of his pledge, by any other
person than the Debtor himself, the Debtor may have an Assise of Novel Disseisin. If,
however, the Creditor was disseised by the Debtor himself, the Court will not assist
him against the Debtor, in recovering his pledge, or in giving him a Re-entry, unless
through the Debtor himself; for the Creditor should resort to an original Plea of Debt,
in order that the Debtor may be compelled to render him satisfaction for his Debt.
R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, ch. 11. See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 23, at 120-21; Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARv. L. REV. 1, 7 (1890); Hazel-
tine, supra note 65, at 555.
80. R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, ch. 11.
81. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 120-21. Another source states:
As pointed out by Pollock and Maitland, the king's justices in the time of Glanville are
experimenting with the new possessory actions. They are agreed that the freeholder
shall have the assize of Novel Disseisin; but they are not quite sure whether the gagee
really and truly has a seisina that calls for protection. Influenced perhaps by theories
of the Italian glossators as to possessory protection, they end in refusing the gagee a
remedy.
Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 555. See also R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, ch. 8
(footnotes omitted).
82. A. SIMPSON, supra note 76, at 133.
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not usurers.
Despite the lack of legal protection afforded the gagee's pos-
session, possession was a necessary element of the gage: "[S]i non
sequatur ipsius vadii traditio, curia domini regis hujusmode
privatas conventiones tueri non solet.' ' 83 Possession was the pri-
mary means by which a gagee was able to manifest his interest in
the property. Furthermore, the gagee's possession prevented subse-
quent pledges of the property because his presence would alert
potential subsequent lenders of the gagee's prior interest.8 ' Grant-
ing the gagee possession also may have been a response to the early
stage of development of the legal system: "As long as the adminis-
tration of justice is slow, weak and formal, the creditor will secure
himself by that possession which is said of old to be nine points in
the law."'85 Of course, this rationale has survived in the form of
certain types of pledges of personal property.
Possession also facilitated the gagee's remedy upon default.
The gage contract might include a forfeiture clause, specifying that
the lender would acquire title to the pledged land if the debtor
defaulted in repayment of the loan. If the gage included that provi-
sion, title immediately vested in the lender upon default without
the necessity of a court action. Even if the gage did not include a
forfeiture clause, the lender could acquire title to the pledged land.
After default, the lender would institute a court action against the
debtor. If the court determined that the gage was valid and that
the gagor was in default, the court would issue a writ ordering the
debtor to pay the debt within the time specified by the writ. If the
debtor failed to pay, the court's writ decreed that title to the
pledged land would pass to the lender.8 6 Because the lender
83. "If delivery of the pledge itself do not follow, the king's court is not accustomed to
take cognizance of private agreements of this kind." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 n.38 (W. Lewis ed. 1902); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 2, at 4.
Osborne cites authority for the proposition that the gagor might retain possession of the
pledged land but questions the validity of that authority. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 1, at
2-3.
84. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 160, in which Blackstone states: "[T]he frauds
which have arisen since the exchange of these public and notorious conveyances for more
private and secret bargains, have well evinced the wisdom of our ancient law." Id. Accord
1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 2, at 9.
85. Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J. 233, 235 (1923).
86.
[W]hen a thing is pledged for a definite period, it is either agreed between the Creditor
and Debtor, that if, at the time appointed, the Debtor should not redeem his pledge, it
should then belong to the Creditor so that he might dispose of it as his own; or no such
agreement is entered into between them .... [I]n the latter [case], the Term being
unexpired without the Debtor's discharging the Debt, the Creditor may complain of
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already was in possession of the property, no additional legal ac-
tion was necessary to enforce the forfeiture clause or the court writ
that vested title in the lender.
Therefore, although the gagee had the right to possess the
pledged property, his possession was not incident to an estate in
land to which merger would apply. Rather, the gagee's possession
served the functions of preventing subsequent pledges of the same
property and of facilitating the gagee's remedy upon default. The
necessity for a writ of a forfeiture clause to transfer title to the
lender strongly indicates that the lender did not acquire title to
the pledged land merely by the debtor's execution of the gage.
Similarly, the court's grant to the debtor of additional time to pay
the debt after default reflects the fact that the lender owned only
the debt and not an interest or estate in the pledged land. This
conclusion is confirmed by the absence of protection for the
lender's possession of the land. Therefore, because the gage did not
convey to the gagee an estate in the pledged land, the inference is
reasonable that merger did not apply if the gagee acquired the
gagor's interest in the property or if the gagor acquired the gage.
8 7
him, and the Debtor shall be compelled to appear in Court, and answer by the follow-
ing writ ...
"The King to the Sheriff, Health. Command N, that justly and without delay, he
redeem such a thing which he has pledged to R, for a hundred Marks, for a Term
which is past, as he says, and of which he complains that he has not redeemed it; and,
unless he does so, & c."
.. .But when the Debtor appear in Court, he will either confess, that he pledged the
thing in question for the Debt, or he will deny it. If he confess it, as he has in so doing
confessed the Debt, he shall be commanded at a reasonable period to redeem his
pledge; and, unless he should comply, liberty shall be given to the Creditor, from that
time, to treat the pledge as his own property, and do whatever he chuses with it ...
[I]f a thing be pledged indefinitely, and without any period being fixed, the Creditor
may, at any time he chuses, demand the Debt.
R. GLANVILLE, supra note 71, at bk. X, chs. 6-8 (footnotes omitted). 1 G. GLENN, supra note
5, § 2, at 5.6; A. SIMPSON, supra note 76, at 133; Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 554. Thus,
despite the usual requirement at this time for livery of seisin to convey title to land, the
forfeiture clause alone was held sufficient to convey title to the gagee. 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 120; Chaplin, supra note 79, at 8.
The court's grant of additional time within which the gagor could pay the debt and
could recover his property is an early counterpart of the equity of redemption created by
Chancery in the seventeenth century. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. During the
reign of Edward I, Longshanks (1272-1307), the law court eliminated this right to pay the
debt after the due date. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 1, at 5.
87. Some commentators might disagree with this inference because of their disagree-
ment with the description of the basic structure of the Glanvillian gage. Consistent with the
description in this Article, Osborne has characterized the gagee's interest in the pledged
land as subject to a condition precedent. He states that nonpayment was a condition prece-
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The succeeding form of security device adopted by medieval
conveyancers was susceptible to merger. The absence of protection
for the lender's possession under the Glanvillian gage was an
acknowledged and substantial defect in the commercial utility of
that gage. 88 To ensure protection of the lender's possession and, by
inference, his security, conveyancers recast the security transaction
to provide the lender a recognized and, therefore, protected estate
in land.8 9 Using the limited estates in land recognized at this time,
the Glanvillian gage was replaced in the thirteenth century by a
grant to the lender of a long term of years, such as five hundred or
one thousand years, subject to the condition that the conveyance
would be void upon repayment.e0 This new form of security is to-
day called the Bractonian mortgage, in recognition of the thir-
teenth century commentator, Bracton,91 who described this secur-
ity device in his treatise on English law and customs.
As with the Glanvillian gage, the lender's interest in a
Bractonian mortgage was treated as a conveyance of the right to
dent to the gagee's acquisition of title to the land. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 1, at 3.
Accord Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 553. Other commentators, however, have described the
gagee's interest as a determinable fee or a fee subject to a condition subsequent. These
commentators view the gagee as having acquired an estate in the pledged property by virtue
of the gage transaction, which estate would revert to the gagor upon payment in accordance
with the terms of the gage. See, e.g., 1 CooTE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 1 (R.
Ramsbotham 9th ed. 1927); 1 L. JoNEs, supra note 65, § 3, at 5. Glenn characterized the
gage in modern terms "as a lease which ripened into a fee simple upon default." 1 G. GLENN,
supra note 5, § 2, at 6. See also Chaplin, supra note 79, at 7. In light of the absence of
protection for the gagee's interest and the other factors stated in the text preceding this
footnote, however, the gagee's interest in the pledged land could not have been an estate in
land. Therefore, merger would not have applied to the gagee's interest.
88. A. SIMPSON, supra note 76, at 133; Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 556. The gage also
was objectionable to the gagor because he was deprived of his right to possess the pledged
property and because, with respect to the mort gage, the gagee could retain all rents and
profits generated by the pledged land even if the gagor repaid the loan in full according to
its terms.
89. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 121-22; Hazeltine, supra note 65, at
556.
90. 3 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND F. 268 (G. Woodbine ed.
1977). This security device also might take the form of a long term lease to the lender, such
as a lease for 500 years, coupled with a release to the borrower for a slightly shorter period,
such as 499 years. The release to the borrower was subject to the condition that the release
would be void if the borrower did not repay the debt on the specified date. The security
device also sometimes consisted of a lease to the lender subject to the condition that the
lender's interest would be void on payment and subject to the covenants that the borrower
would retain possession until default and that, upon default, the borrower would convey the
freehold to the lender. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 4, at 7; J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 11-
14.
91. Bracton was a royal judge from approximately 1245-57. G. RADCLIFFE, REAL PROP-
ERTY LAW xxvii (1933).
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possess the land until the debt was repaid. Additionally, according
to the terms of the agreement, the lender's interest ripened into a
fee estate if the borrower defaulted.2 Unlike the Glanvillian gage,
however, the term for years was a protectible estate in land.
Because the borrower also retained an estate in land, a reversion
following the term for years, the borrower's and lender's inter-
ests-both legally recognized estates in land-could be merged
when held by the same person, as described by Powell in his 1799
treatise on mortgages."3 Therefore, if a lender who held a
Bractonian mortgage on a parcel of land subsequently purchased
or otherwise acquired the reversion, the lender's term for years
would merge into the reversion, and, in the absence of intervening
interests, the lender would have the fee estate in the land.
Although the Bractonian mortgage successfully provided the
lender with a protected right to possession during the life of the
loan, this mortgage eventually proved to be an unsatisfactory form
of security. As real property law developed from its feudal origins
to strict notions of seisin and to formally defined estates in land,
courts experienced increasing conceptual difficulties with the
Bractonian mortgage. Courts could not logically justify the trans-
formation of a term for years, which was characterized as a chattel
92.
Antecessor quidem ille tenementum illud pignori supposuit creditori ad certum diem
sub tali condicione, quod nisi pecunia tali die solveretur quod tenementum iliud
remaneret in feodo creditori. Et unde videndum, utrum dies solutionis praeterierit vel
nondum advenerit. Et si praeterierit, tunc videndum erit utrum solutio facta, fuerit
vivente debitore vel post mortem vel non. Si autem facta fuerit solutio vel pecunia
oblata suo die sub bonorum virorum testimonio, procedet assisa in modum iuratae de
solutione facta, et recuperabit heres per iuratam. Si autem soluta non fuerit nec
oblata, tunc cadit assisa, et remanebit tenementum creditori, quia non est satisfac-
tum condicioni. Si autem dies nondum praeterierit, tunc suspenditur assisa usque, ad
diem, et secundum quod solutio facta fuerit ad diem suum vel non, procedet assisa in
crastino vel remanebit.
[An ancestor pledged a tenement to a creditor until a certain day, subject to the condi-
tion that if the money was not paid on that day that the tenement should remain to
the creditor in fee. We must (then) see whether the day of payment has passed or has
not yet arrived. If it has passed, then whether payment was made in the lifetime of the
debtor, or after his death, or not at all. If it was made, or the money was proffered on
the day, as attested by the evidence of reputable men, the assise will proceed in the
manner of a jury as to the payment made, and the heir will recover by the jury. If
payment has not been made nor proffered, the assise falls and the tenement will
remain to the creditor, because the condition was not satisfied. If the day has not yet
passed, the assise is then suspended until the day, and, depending upon whether pay-
ment is or is not then made, will proceed on the morrow or remain.]
3 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUTUDINmus ANGLIAE F. 268b; 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 122.
93. 1 J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 13 (1799).
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real, into a fee estate without a further conveyance from the bor-
rower. The primary difficulty with this result was that a term for
years was not created by the formal requisite of livery of seisin,
which was a necessary element of a fee estate.94 Therefore, courts
concluded that the lender's interest upon the borrower's default
was only that of a termor rather than that of a fee owner.95
Lenders responded to this development by including in the
document creating the term for years a covenant that the borrower
would convey the freehold to the lender upon default.9 6 Although
this simple addition of a covenant was a solution, it was not an
entirely satisfactory solution for lenders. The task of enforcing the
covenant against a borrower who had lost a parcel of land poten-
tially worth several times more than he had received from the
lender could be onerous. To remedy the remedy, Littleton intro-
duced a new form of security in about 1475 that became the most
commonly used security device and was the direct forerunner of
the modern common-law mortgage.97
Littleton began by adopting the terminology of the Glanvillian
gage; real property security interests again were named mort
gages.98 Unlike the Glanvillian gage, however, the borrower con-
veyed not merely possession when the loan was made, but rather
the fee title by formal livery of seisin' 9 This fee estate was created
subject to the borrower's right to re-enter if he paid the loan
according to the terms of the gage. If the borrower failed to per-
form in full on the specified day, which, ironically, was termed
"law day,"100 the lender's fee estate became absolute regardless of
the value of the property in relation to the amount of the out-
standing debt. Moreover, the borrower had no judicially recognized
94. LITTLETON'S TENURES, supra note 27, § 59; A. SIMPSON, supra note 76, at 133;
Hazeltine, supra note 65, at 556.
95. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 122-23; J. POWELL, supra note 40,
at 11-12. See Coke Litt. 216-8.
96. J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 11-14.
97. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 2, at 6; G. OSBORNE, supra note 64, § 5, at 8-9;
A. SIMPSON, supra note 76, at 133-34.
98. The lender's right to possession carried with it the right to collect the rents and
profits from the property. This right continued to be important because, at this time, it still
was viewed as usury to charge interest on a loan. Although at this time, the rents and profits
the lender collected were to be applied to reduce the debt, Osborne states that the lender
"almost certainly. . . made a surreptitious profit. The ability thus to circumvent the man-
date against taking interest doubtless was a potent factor in the popularity of this form of
security." G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 5, at 8 (footnote omitted).
99. LITrLETON'S TENURES, supra note 27, § 332. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83,
at 157-58.
100. Kratovil, supra note 65, at 2.
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right of redemption to ameliorate the consequences of default,
which is in marked contrast to the Glanvillian gage. 10 1 Because the
borrower's right of re-entry did not constitute an estate in land,
102
the Littletonian gage was not subject to the operation of merger.
The differences in lenders' and borrowers' rights between the
Glanvillian gage and the Littletonian gage demonstrate the differ-
ent foci of the gages. The Glanvillian gage focused on the debt and
whether income from the land reduced the debt. In contrast, title
was central to the operation of the Littletonian gage. It is telling
that Littleton's discussion of the mort gage in his famed treatise
on tenures is contained in the section on estates in land. Unlike
Glanville's explanation for the term mort gage, that income from
the land would not reduce the debt, Littleton's explanation of the
term focused on ownership of the fee.10 3 Littleton opined that the
term referred to the consequences of payment or default; the bor-
rower lost title to the land and, therefore, it was dead to him. Sym-
metrically, if the borrower did pay on law day, the title to the land
was lost, or dead, to the lender.1
0 4
At this stage in the development of real estate security, the
courts and Parliament virtually ignored the loan relationship in
determining the borrower's and lender's rights in the land. In part,
this can be explained as a concomitant of the formality of real
property law. To the early theorists, seisin was a basic and indivisi-
ble category. Because the lender was seised of the fee title, he was
101. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 5, at 9.
102. Coke Litt. 218.a; R. TURNER, supra note 75, at 11.
103. LTTLETON'S TENURES, supra note 27, §§ 332-44. Osborne states that the reason
for Littleton's change in the explanation for the term mort gage from that given by
Glanville is that the holder of a Littletonian gage normally did not take possession of the
pledged land though he was entitled to do so according to the terms of the gage. G. Os-
BORNE, supra note 65, § 1, at 3. Accord 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 159. Because the
gagee did not take possession and did not collect the rents and profits from the land,
Glanville's explanation concerning the gagee's application of collected rents and profits no
longer applied. Therefore, Littleton invented a new explanation.
104.
Item, if a feoffment be made upon such condition, that if the feoffor pay to the feoffee
at a certain day, &c., 40 [pounds] of money, that then the feoffor may re-enter, &c., in
this case the feoffee is called tenant in mortgage, which is as much to say in French as
mort gage, and in Latin mortuum vadium. And it seemeth that the cause why it is
called mortgage is, for that it is doubtful whether the feoffor will pay at the day limited
such sum or not: and if he doth not pay, then the land which is put in pledge upon
condition for the payment of the money, is taken from him for ever, and so dead [to
him upon condition, &c. And if he doth pay the money, then the pledge is dead] as to
the tenant, &c.




treated as the owner of the land for all purposes regardless of the
reason for conveyance of the fee. Of course, he was entitled to pos-
session and to collect the rents and profits. Moreover, as a result of
this categorical logic, the lender's creditors could seize the land; his
wife had a dower interest in the land; the land passed to the
lender's heirs or devisees upon his death; the lender was entitled to
compensation if the land was taken by eminent domain; and the
lender's title could escheat.10 5 Furthermore, the passage of title
had ramifications beyond the economic. Because the franchise was
limited to freeholders at this time, the lender had the right to exer-
cise the franchise. °08 These results prompted Maitland to criticize
the Littletonian gage as being "one long suppressio veri and sug-
gestio falsi.'
' 0 7
Although the law courts must have been aware of the true
character of the borrower's and lender's relationship, 0 8 the courts
strictly enforced the terms of the Littletonian gage regardless of
the value of the land in relation to the debt amount and regardless
of the borrower's reason for default. Indeed, law courts enforced
the default even if it devolved from the borrower's simple inability
to find the gagee on law day for tender. The burden on the bor-
rower was as onerous as it was artificial. Littleton stated that to
pay the debt on law day, the gagor "is bound to seek the feoffee if
he be then in any . . . place within the realm of England."'09 In
light of this legal rule, to facilitate tender and to avoid losing their
properties, Littleton counsels gagors to specify a place for pay-
ment, such as "at the rood loft [of the rood] of the north door
within the [church of St. Paul's in London], or at the tomb of
Saint Erkenwalld, or at the door of such a chapel, or at such a
pillar, within the same church."" 0
Mortgage law remained in this state of arrested development
until the latter part of the sixteenth century, when the court of
105. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 9-10; Lloyd, supra note 85, at 239-40. See LIT-
TLETON'S TENURES, supra note 27, § 357.
106. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 5, at 10.
107. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 269 (1909). Pollock also criticizes this form of land security:
"It must be difficult for any one but a lawyer to believe that so clumsy an operation is to
this day the regular means of securing a debt on land in England." F. POLLOCK, supra note
66, at 134.
108. Osborne quotes a statement made by a law judge in 1314: "When a man pledges
tenements his intention is not to grant an estate of inheritance, but to give security for the
repayment of the money he has borrowed and to redeem the tenements; and in such case, if
he repay the money he can enter." G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 6, at 14.
109. LiTTLrroN's TENURES, supra note 27, § 340.
110. Id. § 342.
[Vol. 40:283
FREEING MORTGAGES OF MERGER
equity initiated a new epoch. Historically, the court of equity, like
the courts of law, had intervened to prevent a lender from refusing
to surrender possession of property when the loan had been paid in
full on law day.11' During the late sixteenth century and early sev-
enteenth century, the court of equity went further, however, and
broke from the law courts' treatment of the mortgage relationship.
Just as the court of equity had intervened to restore merger to its
appropriate jurisprudential role, the court intervened to reflect the
equities between the borrower and lender.
The court of equity now forced a lender to reconvey the
encumbered property if the borrower tendered payment within a
reasonable time after law day. This relief, which must have ap-
peared extraordinary to the ancients, was called the equity or right
of redemption. 112 Its evolution was gradual. The court of equity
first granted the equity of redemption only when the borrower
could establish traditional equitable grounds for its failure to pay
on law day, such as bad faith conduct by the lender." 3
This response to fraudulent evasion soon gave way to substan-
tive relief. By the early part of the seventeenth century, the court
of equity granted the right to redeem any time the borrower ten-
dered the debt amount within a reasonable time after law day."4
In effect, the court replaced a time certain with a reasonableness
standard. This protection for the borrower extended not only to
the lender's interest in the land, but also to the interest of anyone
claiming through the lender, including the lender's creditors or
spouse or a purchaser of the land." 5
Chancery's creation of the right of redemption may be attribu-
table primarily to equity's usual practice of refusing to enforce a
penalty or forfeiture when the injury can be compensated by pay-
ment of money. The value of the land the lender attempted to
retain under the terms of the gage almost always far exceeded the
amount of the outstanding debt. One commentator has stated, on
111. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 6, at 12.
112. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 158-59; Lloyd, supra note 85, at 235. Chan-
cery even extended this protection to the next Protestant heir of a Popish mortgagor. Jones
v. Meredith, Comyns Rep. 661 (1739). As stated by Lloyd, creation of the equity of redemp-
tion was not received warmly in all quarters. He quotes Lord Chief Justice Hale as stating
that "by the growth of equity the heart of the common law is eaten out." Lloyd, supra note
85, at 235.
113. G. OSBORN, supra note 65, § 6, at 13.
114. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Dirlton, 1 Ch. Rep. 165 (1654); Emanuel College v. Evans, 1
Ch. Rep. 18 (1625), cited in 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, at 12-13.
115. Croft v. Powell, Comyns Rep. 603 (1738); J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 11-12.
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the other hand, that Chancery's creation of the equity of redemp-
tion is attributable primarily to the struggle for power waged dur-
ing this period between the courts of law and of equity.116 Equity's
action also is fairly attributable to its recognition that payment on
the exact date specified in the gage was not so vitally important as
to justify forfeiture of land. As discussed above, courts had recog-
nized and acted upon this fact as early as the era of the Glanvillian
gage.
At this point in the evolution of mortgage law, equity merely
had given the borrower some additional time to repay the debt.
The court apparently had not yet recognized, or at least had not
yet acted on, a fact that is obvious to the modern mind: The
lender's only right is to repayment of the debt, not to retention of
the land that is mere security for the debt. After creating the right
of redemption, the court of equity initially continued to adhere to
the theory and wording of the Littletonian gage, treating it as con-
veying the fee estate to the lender.
117
Evolution of the mortgage relationship gained momentum,
however, because it was fueled by Parliament as well as by Chan-
cery.""8 Chancery's creation of the equity of redemption dovetailed
with a 1623 statute1 9 that permitted lenders to charge interest to
work a major change in mortgage practice; by the mid-seventeenth
century, the borrower typically retained possession of the property
unless and until the lender exercised its retained right to possess
upon default.120 In addition to modernizing the character of the
debt by permitting lenders to charge interest, Parliament modern-
ized the mortgage relationship in 1696 by restoring to the borrower
who retained possession of his land the right to exercise the
franchise with respect to the encumbered land. 2'
116. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 6, at 13; Lloyd, supra note 85, at 235.
117. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 2, at 9.
118. Lloyd has suggested that this process of evolution is partially attributable to
dicta of eminent eighteenth century jurists describing mortgages as conveying a mere secur-
ity interest. More important, however, was the common perception among laypersons that
mortgages conveyed only a security interest. This perception resulted from the mortgagor's
retention of possession of the mortgaged premises. Lloyd, supra note 85, at 237-38.
119. 21 Jac. 1, ch. 17, § 2, made permanent, 3 Car. 1, ch. 4, § 5 (1627).
120. Blackstone states that the lender might take possession also if the security is
"precarious or small." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 159; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2,
§ 438, at 547.
121. One commentator has stated that Parliament adopted legislation preventing
lenders from exercising the franchise with respect to land they held in mortgage because
this aspect of mortgage law disqualified "a vast number of voters." Lloyd, supra note 85, at
239. See R. TURNER, supra note 75, at 183-85.
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Finally, in recognition of the true nature of the mortgage
transaction, Chancery elevated the borrower's equity of redemp-
tion from a mere right to pay after the specified due date to an
equitable estate in the mortgaged land. 22 As an interest in land,
the borrower's right to redeem could be conveyed inter vivos and
by devise, could be mortgaged, was subject to the curtesy interest
of the borrower's husband, 23 was divisible into smaller estates, and
was subject to the operation of merger. 2 4 The pendulum had
swung so far that even if the lender took possession of the land
upon default, pursuant to his retained legal estate in the land, the
borrower's estate was not destroyed in equity until sufficient time
had elapsed to create a presumption of the borrower's abandon-
ment of the estate. Some courts extended the redemption period
for as long as twenty years from the time of default.
2 5
Equity's recasting of the mortgage relationship into its proper
role as a security transaction represents a major breakthrough in
English real property law. Substance triumphed over form, and the
court successfully had made the leap from primitive conceptions of
title to the abstract notion of security. Thereafter, when a lender
exercised its right to possess the mortgaged property, the lender
was subject to the borrower's equitable rights. For example, equity
held the lender liable to account strictly to the borrower for all
income collected from the property and to apply all such amounts
to reduce the debt.126 The swing of the pendulum had not stopped,
however.
12 7
Although recognition of the borrower's estate more accurately
reflected the substance of the mortgage relationship, the equity of
redemption threatened to destroy the utility of land as security for
debts because the lender had no means of terminating the bor-
122. Chaplin, supra note 79, at 10.
123. The borrower's right to redeem, however, initially was not subject to the dower
interest of the borrower's wife. Parliament subsequently changed this result. G. OSBORNE,
supra note 65, at 16-17.
124. 3 F. HARGRAVE & C. BUTLER, NOTES ON LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OR COMMEN-
TARY UPON LITTLETON § 332 n.96 (1809); G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 7, at 16.
125. 3 F. HARGRAVE & C. BUTLER, supra note 124, § 337 n.106; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 83, at 158-59 n.29; G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 5, at 11.
126. F. POLLOCK, supra note 66, at 134. Pollock states that at this time "the plight of a
mortgagee in possession is one of the most unenviable known to the law." Id. (footnote
omitted).
127. Pollock decried the development of English mortgage law to this time: "Begin-
ning with fictitious and impracticable stringency, our practice has ended in a wide and dan-
gerous laxity, which breeds doubtful titles and litigation, and is no small encouragement to
fraud." Id. at 133.
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rower's equitable interest without his consent. If the borrower con-
veyed his interest to the lender, merger would operate to merge the
borrower's estate into the lender's estate and thus to vest the
lender with the full fee estate because the legal and equitable in-
terests were held by the same person. In the absence of the bor-
rower's agreement to convey, however, the lender had to attempt
to establish that the borrower had abandoned his interest.
To conserve the utility of land as security for debts and to
facilitate the lender's ability to alienate the land after default, the
court of equity began according lenders an equitable cause of
action to clear title of the borrower's equity of redemption. Upon
proof of default, the court would issue a decree that the borrower
fulfill the terms of the debt within a specified time. Upon proof of
the borrower's failure to do so, the court terminated his interest in
the encumbered land by a decree of foreclosure, which "foreclosed"
his equitable estate.128 This procedure concerned only interests in
land. Neither the sufficiency of the value of the land to answer the
debt nor any value in excess of the debt was considered. Thus, this
action was, and today is, called a "strict foreclosure," because it
operates to vest full fee title in the lender regardless of the value of
the land in relation to the amount of the outstanding debt.
129
At this point in the evolution of mortgages, the lender still
retained an estate in the encumbered land. Chancery and Parlia-
ment, however, directly or indirectly had caused the lender to lose
almost all indicia of ownership, including the rights to possess and
to retain income from the property. The right to strict foreclosure,
which enabled the lender to eliminate the borrower's property in-
terest, was the primary continuing indicium of the lender's owner-
ship interest. During the 1800s, however, even this indicium of
ownership largely disappeared. Surprisingly, lenders voluntarily
gave up this right.
Because strict foreclosure operated without regard to the value
of the foreclosed land in relation to the outstanding debt amount,
equity began permitting borrowers to redeem property after strict
foreclosure. The court of equity extended this redemption right to
permit redemption even years after the strict foreclosure and from
subsequent purchasers of the encumbered land. The court granted
this right to redeem even when the lender had not acted fraudu-
128. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 159; F. POLLOCK, supra note 66, at 134-35.
129. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 59.1, at 401. The court, however, could reopen a strict
foreclosure if the borrower could establish an equitable reason for doing so. Id. § 61.
[Vol. 40:283
FREEING MORTGAGES OF MERGER
lently or otherwise inequitably. 130 As a result, lenders began
inserting in mortgages a clause permitting the lender to sell the
encumbered land to repay the debt rather than requiring strict
foreclosure.131 Upon exercising this right, the lender could retain
only so much of the sale proceeds as were necessary to pay the
debt, with the surplus being paid to the former owner or to junior
lienors. These "power of sale" foreclosures, named for the mort-
gage clause authorizing the lender to sell the encumbered land on
default, soon became the predominant mortgagee remedy.3 2 The
effect of the widespread use of this remedy was to dilute further
the notion that a mortgage conveys an ownership interest in the
encumbered land to the lender.
Although security devices and the foreclosure process have
changed with varying forms of land finance, the mortgagee's legal
status with respect to the encumbered property firmly was estab-
lished by 1800 as being a mere security interest,13 3 rather than any
form of ownership interest. Thus, the history of the mortgage in
England has been the relaxation of the formalism of real property
law and the concomitant recognition of the primacy of the debt
relationship between the parties. The American history of mort-
gages has followed a similar track. 3 4 The courts of both countries,
however, have not freed mortgages of merger, which is an anoma-
lous vestige of an earlier day.
2. American Development
As with other aspects of the common law, the colonists
brought with them the law of mortgages as it existed in England at
the time of their departure in about 1600.1 5 Mortgage instruments
were worded in terms of a conveyance of title to the mortgagee,
and some early American courts routinely held the mortgagee's
130. Id. § 61, at 405.
131. R. TURNER, supra note 75, at 121.
132. Id. at 121-22.
133. 3 F. HARGRAVE & C. BUTLER, supra note 124, § 332, at n.96.
134. This process of evolution is not unique to the common law legal system.
In all legal systems there seems to be in the law of mortgages an evolution from a
forfeiture idea in which the res is given as conditional satisfaction of some act for which
there is no personal duty. . . to a security idea. Although it is not a necessary conse-
quence of this development, there goes along with it a change from creditor-possession
of the res to debtor-possession.
G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 23.
135. Lloyd, supra note 85, at 240.
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interest to be an estate in land.136 In contrast to the English expe-
rience, however, the pervasive perception of the lender's interest
from earliest American history was that of a lien. Consistent with
this view, the borrower usually retained possession of the land
despite the wording of the mortgage instrument.1 3 One commenta-
tor has stated that the borrower's retained possession resulted
from popular hostility to the creditor class.1 38 Of equal importance,
however, was the fact that American mortgage law, unlike English
mortgage law, was not burdened with the centuries of mortgage
practice during which lenders took title to and possession of the
land. As all real property practitioners know, a practice with a so-
called rich tradition has an inertia all its own. Although American
mortgage law originated in the English law, American law rapidly
evolved away from the concept of a mortgage conveying an estate
in land. The parties to a loan transaction were freer than their
English counterparts to act in accordance with the substance of
the transaction rather than with the wording of the documents.
Even with the advantage of a relatively clean slate, the proper
categorization of the parties' interests crystallized slowly. The bor-
rower's retained possession, for example, initially provided concep-
tual difficulties for some early courts and commentators. These
courts and commentators responded to these difficulties by dis-
torting available legal categories. Thus, for lack of a better label,
they characterized the borrower as a tenant.'39 Other courts and
some early state legislatures, however, reflecting early American
pragmatism, recognized the lender's interest as akin to a lien,
rather than an estate in land.
South Carolina is justly honored by the enemies of empty for-
malism as the first state to enact legislation reflecting the popular,
though historically and formally incorrect, understanding of the
effect of a mortgage. 4 0 In 1791 the South Carolina legislature
defined mortgages as merely creating security for debts. Any estate
in land was expressly denied. The relevant legislation provided in
part:
136. Chaplin, supra note 79, at 12; Lloyd, supra note 85, at 240 and accompanying
notes.
137. Chaplin, supra note 79, at 12; Lloyd, supra note 85, at 240-41.
138. Lloyd, supra note 85, at 240-41.
139. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, § 13, at 23; J. POWELL, supra note 40, at 205-06; 3 R.
POWELL, supra note 2, § 439, at 549-50.
140. "It is quite significant that this undertaking was part of the reform legislation
that followed the constitutional convention of 1790." Lloyd, supra note 85, at 241.
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[N]o mortgagee shall be entitled to any possessory action for the real estate
mortgaged, even after the time allotted for the payment of the money secured
by the mortgage is elapsed, but the mortgagor shall still be deemed owner of
the land and the mortgagee as owner of the money lent or due.1
4
1
The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly identified the pur-
pose of this legislation as changing the common-law treatment of
the mortgage from a conveyance of title to security for a loan.142
Although South Carolina was the first state to cast mortgages
in their appropriate light through legislative action, widespread
recognition of mortgages as security for an obligation traces its
lineage from early nineteenth century decisions of the New York
Supreme Court.143 In Runyan v. Mersereau'" the court confronted
for the first time the issue of fee ownership of property encum-
bered by a mortgage. The case involved an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit. The plaintiff claimed title to and the right to pos-
sess the disputed land as the purchaser at a sheriff's sale on a judg-
ment against the former owner. The sale was subject to a mortgage
granted by the judgment debtor. The defendant claimed that the
mortgagee had given him permission to enter the property. To de-
termine who had the right to possess, the court had to determine
whether the plaintiff or the mortgagee owned the fee estate. In un-
equivocal language the court held that mortgagors retain the free-
hold estate and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to
possession.
Courts of law, both here and in England, have gone very far towards, if not
the full length of, considering mortgages, at law, as in equity, mere securities
for money; and the mortgagee as having only a chattel interest. Lord Mans-
field ... says, a mortgagee, notwithstanding the form, has but a chattel, and
the mortgage is only a security; that it is an affront to common sense to say
the mortgagor is not the real owner .... The debt is considered the princi-
pal, and the land is an incident only.'"
Despite the absence of legal support for the court's holding, the
court applied it as controlling precedent in subsequent cases. 146
141. Act of 1791, 5 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 174 (1814).
142.
It is clear beyond all dispute that one of the primary objects of the act of 1791, as
appears from its express terms, was to deprive a mortgage of real estate of its common
law feature as a conveyance of an estate, and to convert it into what it was really
intended for, a mere security ....
Navassa Guano Co. v. Richardson, 26 S.C. 401, 406, 2 S.E. 307, 309 (1886). See also Verree
v. Verree, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 211 (1807).
143. Lloyd, supra note 85, at 241.
144. 11 Johns. ch. 534 (N.Y. ch. 1814).
145. Id. at 538.
146. See, e.g., Bryan v. Butts, 27 Barb. 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857).
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The New York legislature followed the court's lead in 1828 by
enacting a statute providing that mortgagees did not have an ac-
tion for ejectment with respect to mortgaged lands.
14 7
Over the years, with near unanimity, the other states have
joined New York in characterizing mortgages as creating a lien
only, even when the instrument is worded in terms of a conveyance
of title to the lender. In the course of this development, commen-
tators have categorized states according to one of three theories
concerning the effect a mortgage has on title to the encumbered
land. The states that cling to common-law or title nomenclature
and theory are denominated title theory states. Those states that
treat a mortgage as conveying no title to the mortgagee but as cre-
ating only the right to sell the property to satisfy the secured debt
in the event of default are denominated lien theory states. The re-
maining states, those that follow the intermediate theory, treat a
mortgage as conveying to the mortgagee the right to possess the
encumbered land and to collect the rents and profits only upon the
mortgagor's default.
148
A 1902 survey of the states' mortgage laws characterized six-
teen states as following the title theory of mortgages and twenty-
three states and territories as following the lien theory.149 By 1965,
only eight states-Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-still
adhered to the title theory, and twenty-eight states accepted the
lien theory.1 50 Alabama, 15 1 Georgia,152 Maine,'5 3 Maryland,' Mas-
147. 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 1828, pt. 3, ch. 5, tit. I, § 57, cited in Lloyd, supra note 85, at
244 n.54.
148. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at 142-51. The theoretical explanation
sometimes given to justify the intermediate theory is that the mortgagor retains legal title
until default, at which point the mortgagee acquires the title. Other courts have not
attempted to explain this result on the basis of title but have held that the mortgagee is
entitled to possession only if the loan agreement has been breached. Id. at 149-50.
149. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at 158 n.24. By 1923, the "New York view" had
been adopted in "considerably more than a majority of states, although in New England and
some of the older communities there is a more or less close adherence to the common law."
Lloyd, supra note 85, at 244. A commentator writing in 1928 listed 17 states as following
title theory. 1 L. JONES, supra note 65, § 67, at 59. A 1957 survey prepared by in-house
counsel for a national bank identified eight states as still following the title theory, 13 states
following the intermediate theory, and 28 states as following the lien theory. Prather, Fore-
closure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 423.
150. Note, Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 331, 339
n.22 and accompanying text (1965). This Note characterizes Massachusetts as an intermedi-
ate theory state because the mortgagee does not have the right to possess until default in
the mortgage or secured note. Id. at 340 n.28. This conclusion is erroneous. Massachusetts is
a title theory state because it characterizes mortgages as conveying to the mortgagee legal
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sachusetts, 155 New Hampshire,e s and Rhode Island15 7 continue to
title to the mortgaged property. The mortgagor retains only an equity of redemption.
Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 1083, 1092
(D. Mass. 1977). A Massachusetts statute alters one effect of this mortgage characterization
by providing that, absent a contrary agreement in the mortgage, a mortgagor is entitled to
retain possession of the mortgaged property until default. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 183,
§ 26 (West 1987).
151. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-26 (1975) ("The payment of the mortgage debt ...
divests the title passing by the mortgage."); Southern Bank of Lauderdale County v. Com-
missioner, 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986); Trauner v.
Lowrey, 369 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala. 1979) ("Alabama classifies itself as a 'title' state with
regard to mortgages. Execution of a mortgage passes legal title to the mortgagee.").
152. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-60 (1982):
Whenever any person in this state conveys any real property by deed to secure any
debt. . . the conveyance of real. . . property shall pass the title of the property to the
grantee until the debt or debts which the conveyance was made to secure shall be fully
paid. Such conveyance shall be held by the courts to be an absolute conveyance, with
the right reserved by the grantor to have the property reconveyed to him upon pay-
ment of the debt ....
Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee, Inc., 251 Ga. 629, 630, 308 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1983) ("Regante,
as the assignee of the security deed, has legal title to the property, subject to the right of
[the grantor] to have the realty reconveyed to him upon payment of the debt."). Accord
Turner Advertising Co. v. Garcia, 252 Ga. 101, 311 S.E.2d 466, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-30 (1982) ("A mortgage in this state is only security
for a debt and passes no title."); Cole v. Cates, 110 Ga. App. 820, 823, 140 S.E.2d 36, 39
(1964) (quoting Loftis v. Alexander, 139 Ga. 346, 349, 77 S.E. 169, 170 (1913)) ("In this
state, a deed to secure a debt is not the same as a mortgage. Such a deed conveys title. A
mortgage is only a lien.").
153. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 502 (1964):
A mortgagee . . . may enter on the premises or recover possession thereof, before or
after breach of condition, when there is no agreement to the contrary. In such case, if
the mortgage is afterwards redeemed, the amount of the clear rents and profits from
the time of taking possession shall be accounted for and deducted from the sum due on
the mortgage.
Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973) ("This State has accepted the doctrine that
a mortgage is regarded as a conditional conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortgagee.
All that remains in the mortgagor is the equity of redemption."). Accord Pettengill v. Turo,
159 Me. 350, 193 A.2d 367 (1963).
154. Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 503, 175 A. 331, 332 (1934)
("At common law, a defeasible legal estate vested in the mortgagee, that became absolute
upon default. The mortgagee is entitled to immediate possession upon the execution of a
mortgage, unless there is some other agreement of the parties.").
155. Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 437 F. Supp.
1083, 1092 (D. Mass. 1977) ("In Massachusetts, the mortgagee has legal title to the mort-
gaged property and the mortgagor retains an equity of redemption."). Accord Carpenter v.
Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 362 Mass. 770, 775, 291 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1973); cf. Negron v.
Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 204, 366 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1977).
156. Furbush v. Goodwin, 29 N.H. 321, 332 (1854) ("The mortgage, immediately upon
its execution, vests in the mortgagee, and those claiming under him, the seizin as well as the
title, and, as against the mortgagor, he is regarded in law as the owner of the estate.").
Accord Brown v. Cram, 1 N.H. 169 (1818); cf. Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N.H. 274 (1840).
157. RL GEN. LAWS § 34-11-20 (1984). The short form mortgage is deemed to include
covenants:
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describe a mortgage as conveying title to the mortgagee.15 Rela-
tively recent decisions indicate that Pennsylvania may be shifting
to the lien theory, though Pennsylvania courts also have rendered
contrary decisions relatively recently.
159
Despite the different labels-title theory and lien theory-that
states use to describe mortgage practice, examination of the laws
and practices in the title theory states reveals that the labels are
the primary distinction between title theory and lien theory states'
treatment of mortgages.6 0 In some title theory states, statutes al-
ter or remove the very legal incidents that once denoted title the-
ory treatment of mortgages. 161 For example, one category of stat-
utes provides that the mortgagor retains the right to possess the
encumbered property until default or until her interest in the
property has been eliminated. 162 Additionally, security instrument
forms commonly used in many title theory states provide that the
[Tihat mortgagor. . has good right, full power, and lawful authority to sell and con-
vey the same to the mortgagee and his heirs and assigns; that the mortgagee and his
heirs and assigns shall at all times hereafter peaceably and quietly have and enjoy the
mortgaged premises and that the mortgagor will, and his heirs, executors, and adminis-
trators shall, warrant and defend the same to the mortgagee and his heirs and assigns
forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons ....
First Nat'l Bank v. Dispeau, 32 R.I. 396, 79 A. 945 (1911) (mortgagee has right to possess as
soon as mortgage executed); Doyle v. Mellen, 15 R.I. 523, 8 A. 709 (1887).
158. Of the eight title theory states, six were among the original thirteen states and,
therefore, were more likely than later states to have adopted the English common law rule.
Furthermore, all title theory states are eastern states, whereas the lien theory has been
adopted almost uniformly in the western and midwestern states.
159. Compare Hahnemann Medical College v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. Commw. 558,
564, 416 A.2d 604, 607 (1980) ("A mortgage is in essence a defeasible deed, requiring the
grantee to reconvey the property held as security to the grantor upon satisfaction of the
underlying debt or the fulfillment of established conditions.") with Mancine v. Concord-
Liberty Say. & Loan Ass'n, 299 Pa. Super. 260, 266, 445 A.2d 744, 747 (1982) ("A mortgage,
although in form a conveyance of title, is only security for the payment of money or the
performance of another collateral contract.") and with Myers-Macomber Eng'rs v. M.L.W.
Constr. Co., 271 Pa. Super. 484, 489, 414 A.2d 357, 359-60 (1979) ("When a mortgagee goes
into possession, he does not become the owner of the real estate. . .. Rather, he becomes a
quasi trustee, managing the property for the benefit of the mortgagor, but at the same time
protecting his own interest."). See Lloyd, The Mortgage Theory of Pennsylvania, 73 U. PA.
L. REv. 43, 44 (1924) (There is "conflicting dicta on the nature of a mortgage in
Pennsylvania.").
160. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 439. See, e.g., Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191,
119 S.E. 210 (1923).
161. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 5, § 4.1, at 144; 3 R POWELL, supra
note 2, § 439, at 552; Kratovil, supra note 65, at 5.
162. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 26 (West 1987) (mortgagor retains
right of possession until default); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4772 (repealed 1971) (current
version at V.R.C.P. § 80.1). Pierce v. Brown, 24 Vt. 165 (1852) (estate and right of posses-
sion given to mortgagee by statute after condition broken).
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mortgagor has the right to possess the property until default or
until her interest in the property has been eliminated. 1 3 Moreover,
courts in title theory states have held that a mortgage does not
convey title to the property to the lender, but only certain rights to
possess and to sell the property to satisfy the loan in the event of
default.'64 Finally, even in title theory states, when a lender exer-
cises its right to possess the property, it is not entitled to retain
the benefits of the property; it must apply all rents and other
income from the property to reduce the outstanding indebted-
ness.6 5 Thus, even in title theory states, the mortgage is recog-
nized as the appurtenance of the secured debt rather than as a
title conveyance.
Title theory states' treatment of the nonpossessory incidents
of the mortgage relationship confirms the practical and essential
similarity of mortgages in title theory and in lien theory states.
Thus, real property taxes are not assessed against the mortgagee's
interest.' 6 Neither dower nor curtesy are created in a mortgagee's
interest. 67 The mortgagee can convey its interest without a deed
163. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 4.1, at 144; Kratovil, supra note 65, at
5-6. See Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 503, 175 A. 331, 333 (1934)
("[T]here is usually incorporated in a mortgage of a leasehold estate, as was incorporated in
the mortgage at bar, a provision whereby the mortgagors, their personal representatives and
assigns, may continue to hold and possess the mortgaged premises, and to receive the rents
and profits thereof. .... ).
164. See, e.g., Malamut v. Haines, 51 F. Supp. 837 (M.D. Pa. 1943); Turner Advertis-
ing Co. v. Garcia, 252 Ga. 101, 102, 311 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1984); Mancine v. Concord-Liberty
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 299 Pa. Super. 260, 445 A.2d 744 (1982).
165. Nettles v. First Nat'l Bank, 388 So. 2d 916, 920 (Ala. 1980); Williams Realty &
Loan Co. v. Simmons, 188 Ga. 184, 187, 3 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1939); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 502 (1964); Hubbard v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 172 Md. 645, 650, 192 A. 592, 594
(1937); Landau v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 445 Pa. 217, 223, 282 A.2d 335, 339 (1971);
Koury v. Sood, 74 R.I. 486, 492, 493, 62 A.2d 649, 652, 653 (1948); Kratovil, supra note 65,
at 5.
166. See ALA. CODE § 40-5-12 (1975) (lists property that is subject to taxation; mort-
gages are not included); Hood & Wheeler v. Clark, 141 Ala. 397, 37 So. 550 (1904); GA. CODE
ANN. § 48-5-9 (1982) (requires possession); Decatur County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Thigpen,
173 Ga. 363, 160 S.E. 387 (1931); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 551 (1964) (lists property
that is subject to taxation yet excludes mortgages); Williams v. Hilton, 35 Me. 547 (1853);
MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 6-101 to 6-104 (1986) (lists property that is subject to taxa-
tion; refers to interest of a mortgagor or grantor under a deed of trust as taxable, § 6-
102(d)(3)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-10 (1970) (property is taxed to person claiming or in
possession); R.L GEN. LAWS § 44-4-5 (1980) ("The mortgagor shall be deemed to be the
owner of mortgaged real estate, so long as the same is in his possession.").
167. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, ch. 65, § 32 (1884); LaGrange Mills v. Kener,
121 Ga. 429, 435, 49 S.E. 300, 303 (1904); Knox v. Stamper, 186 Md. 238, 245, 46 A.2d 361,
365 (1946). Dower has been abolished in all the title theory states. ALA. CODE § 43-5-1
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-113 (1964); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-202 (1974); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560-3 (1974); R.I. GEN.
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or other formal instrument of conveyance. The mortgagee can as-
sign its interest by an instrument of assignment and can eliminate
its interest by a simple release. 168
Perhaps the most telling sign that modern American mort-
gages do not convey an estate in land to the lender is the virtual
abolishment of strict foreclosure of mortgages in all but two
states.16 By 1800, foreclosure by sale had become the established
means in America of satisfying a defaulted loan.17 0 Strict foreclo-
LAWS § 33-25-1 (1984).
168. ALA. CODE § 35-10-27 (1975); Turner v. Flinn, 72 Ala. 532 (1882); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-14-3 (Supp. 1986); Frost v. Gazaway, 122 Ga. App. 244, 176 S.E.2d 476 (1970); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 551 (1964); Allard v. Lane, 18 Me. 9 (1840); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 3-105 (Supp. 1986); Baker v. Otto, 180 Md. 53, 56-57, 22 A.2d 924, 926 (1941); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 479:7 (1983 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-26-3 (1984).
169. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 661, 726.
170. Several states permit strict foreclosure in very limited circumstances, as
described below. Three states, Connecticut, Vermont, and Illinois, permit strict foreclosure
in less narrowly defined situations. In Connecticut, a court may decree a strict foreclosure
after default if the borrower fails to repay the loan within the time set by the court. Any
party to the foreclosure proceeding, however, may petition the court for foreclosure by pub-
lic sale, and the borrower has a right to redeem after a strict foreclosure. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 49-15, 49-16, 49-19, 49-20, & 49-24 (West 1958 & Supp. 1986). In recognition
of the fact that Connecticut is one of the few states to provide for strict foreclosure, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, in City Say. Bank v. Lawler, 163 Conn. 149, 157, 302 A.2d 252,
256 (1972), described its provisions for strict foreclosure as "somewhat unique."
Although Vermont statutorily provides for strict foreclosure, V.C.R.P. § 80.1 (1984 cum.
supp.), foreclosure by sale is available if the foreclosing lienor is a federal agency or other
person that federal law prevents from using strict foreclosure, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531
(supp. 1986); if the mortgage to be foreclosed includes a power of sale clause and the mort-
gagor or mortgagee requests in its initial pleading a power of sale foreclosure, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 4531 (1973); or to foreclose a judgment lien if the outstanding amount of the debt
is greater than the fair market value of the encumbered land. One treatise describes strict
foreclosure as the "predominant remedy" in Vermont. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, at 502.
In Illinois, strict foreclosure is a common-law, rather than a statutory, remedy. It is
available only if the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption is insolvent, the value
of the encumbered property is less than the outstanding debt amount plus outstanding
property taxes, and the mortgagee waives its right to a deficiency judgment. Great Lakes
Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 302 N.E.2d 248, 250 (1973).
The commentators disagree concerning the availability of strict foreclosure in the other
states. Osborne lists sixteen states, in addition to Connecticut, Vermont, and Illinois, that
permit strict foreclosure in certain circumstances. G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 651 n.38.
Glenn indicates that strict foreclosure may be available in every state under certain circum-
stances. Glenn, A Study on Strict Foreclosure, 29 VA. L. REV. 519 (1943). Strict foreclosure
normally is available in states other than Connecticut, Vermont, and Illinois only when a
junior lienor has been omitted from a foreclosure by action in which the encumbered prop-
erty was worth less than the amount of the foreclosed lien. G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra
note 5, at 504-05. In this case, the junior lienor would not be benefited by participating in a
foreclosure sale because it could not generate sufficient proceeds to pay the debt secured by
the junior lien.
Strict foreclosure generally is not available in this country because it operates "summa-
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sure did not disappear in this country, as in England, because
lenders sought a more efficacious means of eliminating a borrower's
interest in encumbered land. Instead, American legislatures have
acted to eliminate strict foreclosure almost completely. The legisla-
tures have taken this action in recognition of the fact that, in
America, a lender's only interest should be in repayment of the
debt, rather than in the land. Generally, strict foreclosure is availa-
ble today only in those exceptional circumstances in which a fore-
closure sale would not benefit any holder of an interest in the
property. Title theory states' treatment of mortgages thus demon-
strates that these states actually do not understand the mortga-
gee's interest to be an estate in land despite the nomenclature they
use to describe the interest.
Comparing a mortgagee's interest with that of other creditor
lien claimants also militates in favor of treating the mortgage as a
species of lien, which is a personal property interest, rather than as
a real property interest. A judgment lien, for example, does not
constitute an estate in the encumbered land; the lien creates only
the right to foreclose the lien to satisfy the outstanding judg-
ment.1 7 1 Similarly, many courts characterize mechanics' liens as
creating only a personal property interest. 172 Those courts that
rily, harshly, and oppressively." Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV.
575, 595 (1937), cited in G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 652; Atlantic Oceanic Kampgrounds,
Inc. v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 473 A.2d 884, 889 (Me. 1984) ("[Ilt is entirely fair to assume the
Legislature regarded strict foreclosure as working an unjust and inequitable result, namely
the forfeiture of the excess of the value of the land over the amount of debt remaining. It is
noteworthy that the majority of sister jurisdictions do not recognize strict foreclosure.").
Furthermore, the predominance of the lien theory has prevented widespread adoption of
strict foreclosure. "Strict foreclosure is thought of as not creating any new rights in the
mortgagee, but as merely destroying all interest of the mortgagor in the property, leaving
the mortgagee's title to it free and clear. A requirement, therefore, is that the mortgagee
must have legal title." G. OSBORNE, supra note 65, at 653 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to strict foreclosure, a limited number of New England states permit a
mortgagee to take possession of the encumbered property and eventually acquire title by
specialized procedures called Entry Under Process or Entry and Publication, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 479:19 (1983), Foreclosure by Entry or Action, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244,
H8 1-10 (West 1959 & Supp. 1986), or Entry Without Process, R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 34-23-3,
-23-4 (1984). Nelson and Whitman state that these procedures are "at most only sporadi-
cally used." G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at 503. Furthermore, each of these
methods provides the borrower a redemption period ranging from one to three years.
171. Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926); Farrow v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 192 N.C. 148, 134 S.E. 427 (1926). Unfortunately, courts have applied merger to judg-
ment liens, committing the same analytical error that causes them to apply merger to mort-
gages. Watson v. Strohl, 220 Ind. 672, 46 N.E.2d 204 (1943); Gardner v. Coker, 184 S.C. 190,
192 S.E. 151 (1937); George v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 421, 66 S.E. 526 (1909).
172. Sorsby v. Woodlawn Lumber Co., 202 Ala. 566, 81 So. 68 (1919); Gray v. McKin-
ley, 34 Ala. App. 630, 43 So. 2d 421, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 199, 43 So. 2d 424 (1949); James
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have characterized mechanics' liens as creating a real property
interest attribute that characterization to the fact that the lienor
increased the value of the subject property. In the case of materials
suppliers, for example, the materials often have become affixed to
and part of the property.173 The mechanic lienor in these states,
however, does not have the right to possess the land or any other
incident of ownership, but merely obtains a lien in the improved
property. 174 Therefore, like mortgages, characterization of mechan-
ics' liens as creating a real property interest is a matter of legal
verbiage rather than substance. 75
Title theory states characterize mortgages differently from
other forms of creditor liens only because mortgages came into ex-
istence during an early era in the development of land laws. As
described above, land became widely used as security for loans
when the recognized categories of rights in land were the right to
possess and to receive feudal incidents. In the absence of paper
records and the right to charge interest on loaned money, lenders
took possession of encumbered land to protect their security and
to receive the only possible economic profit. Because property ju-
risprudence had not evolved to the stage of recognizing the concept
of a lien, the lender's interest was characterized as an estate in
land, except during the earliest stage of development-the Glanvil-
lian gage-and during the most recent incarnation of the mortgage.
Physicists have yet to quantify the inertia of legal theory, but its
qualities have frustrated practitioners and commentators for
centuries.
An American commentator writing almost one hundred years
ago remonstrated:
[W]hile a mortgagee's interest in land has for a long period, in this country,
been a mere chattel estate, and has amounted in substance to a mere pledge
of the land, and is constantly characterized as such, we still ... permit to
cling to the contract, like a lichen growth, certain embarrassing features of
real-estate title.
178
Drywall, Inc. v. Europa Dev. Corp., 116 N.H. 619, 365 A.2d 1047 (1976).
173. Fleming v. Kirkland, 226 Ala. 222, 225, 146 So. 384, 385 (1933); Canvasser Cus-
tom Builders, Inc. v. Seskin, 38 Mich. App. 643, 647, 196 N.W.2d 859, 861 (1972); B.&F.
Concrete Co. v. Colton Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1939).
174. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 12.4.
175. As with judgment liens, courts generally apply merger to mechanics' liens. Title
Guar. Co. v. Wrenn, 35 Or. 62, 56 P. 271 (1899); North Texas Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Over-
ton, 91 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). By applying merger to mechanics' liens, courts
obviously have failed to recognize that a mechanics' lien is not the type of interest to which
merger applies.
176. Chaplin, supra note 79, at 4.
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Application of merger to mortgages is one of those "embarrassing
features," and by now courts should recognize that merger is
inapplicable to mortgages. Merger is a procedural device that ap-
plies only when a person acquires consecutive estates in land in the
same right. Because the modern mortgage, the mere ancillary of
the secured debt, does not create an estate in land, the rights cre-
ated by the mortgage should be unaffected by operation of merger.
Although property law usually changes with glacial speed to avoid
upsetting owners' expectations, legislatures' and courts' treatment
of merger has evolved even more slowly than the law of mortgages.
These bodies should change the merger doctrine now. If not, a
commentator writing in 2087 may be quoting this Article as sup-
port for a similar reform.
III. MODERN CONTEXT
As demonstrated in the previous section of this Article,
merger, as a title simplification device, is inapplicable to mortgages
as a matter of title theory. This conclusion, however, rests on more
than theory. As will be demonstrated in this section, merger should
not be applied to modern mortgages because of modern title and
finance practices. When a mortgagee acquires encumbered land,
such as when a mortgagee accepts the land in satisfaction of the
secured debt, several reasons exist to keep the mortgage lien dis-
tinct from the fee title,11 and no real gain results from the title
simplification. Therefore, a court should not destroy the mortgage
lien regardless of whether any intent concerning merger has been
expressed. Nevertheless, courts have injured, and continue to
injure, mortgagees by applying merger to cut off their liens even
when the mortgagees had a valid need for them.
On the other hand, courts have injured property purchasers by
refusing to apply merger when the public records indicated that
one person owned the fee and mortgage interests. Therefore, even
as a title simplification device, merger rarely has benefited a pro-
spective purchaser who has relied on the public property records.
On the contrary, the doctrine has proven to be a trap for unwary
purchasers. Because courts' applications of merger have been over-
inclusive and their refusals to apply it have been underinclusive,
elimination of the doctrine would prevent wrongful destruction of
a mortgagee's otherwise valid interests and would eliminate the
trap for a purchaser who assumes that merger has occurred.
177. See infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
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Consigning merger to history also would remove two major
analytic errors committed by some courts. First and most surpris-
ing, many courts have applied merger to determine the continued
existence of a debt.17 8 Because merger essentially is a title clearing
device, the results of courts' applications of merger to debts simply
are unsupportable in terms of coherent legal analysis. Moreover,
the apparent simplicity of merger as a title device has produced
patently absurd results. Some courts have seized on merger and
have applied it in cases involving a property owner's "purchase" of
a senior mortgage encumbering the property when junior liens
exist.17 9 Rather than recognizing this transaction to be payment of
the secured debt and no more, courts have fallen into the merger
trap and have permitted owners to wipe out junior liens encumber-
ing the property. As will be shown, these harmful effects of merger
in the mortgage context greatly outweigh any positive functions.
Therefore, legislatures should abolish merger just as they have
abolished other outmoded common-law title rules.
In this section the Article first will examine the continued via-
bility of merger as applied to mortgage interests. Because of the
very different considerations governing a mortgagee's acquisition of
the encumbered land and the mortgagor's purported acquisition of
the mortgage, these situations will be examined separately. This
Article then will review the situations in which courts have applied
merger to the debt contract and will set forth the proper mode of
analysis in that context. The applicability of merger to the mort-
gage interest normally concerns the state of title to the encum-
bered land, whereas issues concerning the debt contract normally
arise in the context of determining personal liability for the debt.
A. Merger and Mortgages
The modern merger doctrine as it exists in the mortgage con-
text is indistinguishable from that of the seventeenth century
when Chancery established the equitable exception to merger.
Mortgages, however, both in theory and in practice, have evolved
into a very different animal from what existed when merger solidi-
fied into its current state. As described in the previous section of
this Article, a mortgage is now only a debt interest that is a lien
against land, rather than an estate in land. Furthermore, property
law has evolved from a primitive system of a few inflexibly defined
178. See infra notes 283-322 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
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estates in land. Merger, unfortunately, has not kept pace with
these changes. As applied by some courts, merger is an "all or
nothing" doctrine as dogmatic as the medieval laws. For example,
if a court applies merger to deny the enforceability of a mortgage
in one context, it destroys the mortgage lien, although the security
priority should have endured. Other courts, although more sensi-
tive to the historical position of merger, also have confused the
area by introducing a variety of factors that simply are unneces-
sary to the task.
In the modern age, courts have applied merger in two different
mortgage contexts: (1) when a mortgagee acquires title to the
encumbered property; and (2) when a property owner purports to
acquire a mortgage encumbering the property. Although courts
sometimes apply case precedent across categorical lines, the two
categories are legally distinct and are governed by different
considerations.
1. Mortgagee Acquires Title to the Encumbered Property
A mortgagee may acquire title to the encumbered property by
voluntary or involuntary conveyance. The property owner volunta-
rily may convey the property to the mortgagee as a gift having no
relationship to the loan or, as is the more usual case, as full or
partial satisfaction of the debt to avoid foreclosure. A mortgagee
also may acquire the encumbered property by purchase at an
involuntary sale conducted to foreclose a lien held by it or by a
third party. Although courts occasionally discuss these essentially
factual variations as governed by different rules, the basic issue is
the same in each case: Does a legally cognizable reason exist for
keeping the lien distinct from the fee title? 180 In every legally rele-
vant way, the analyses of these cases are alike, and, therefore, they
will be considered together.
A mortgagee often has strong inducements to acquire title to
the encumbered property. For example, the mortgagee is benefited
in several ways by accepting title in satisfaction of the secured
debt. The mortgagee's acceptance of this so-called deed in lieu of
foreclosure typically occurs when the loan is in default and is an
attractive alternative to foreclosure. By immediately receiving title
to the property, the lender may realize on the loan more quickly
than if it had to await the conclusion of foreclosure proceedings.




Most significantly, the deed in lieu cuts off the borrower's equity of
redemption and any statutory right of redemption, including the
borrower's attendant rights to possess the property during the re-
demption period and to collect any income from the property. Fur-
thermore, because some jurisdictions have limited or abolished the
lender's rights to sue on the note or to employ post-foreclosure
remedies or because the borrower may be judgment proof, the
lender, by accepting a deed in lieu, is not forfeiting any
remedies.18'
Much of the benefit of accepting a deed in lieu or otherwise
acquiring title is lost, however, if a court merges the mortgage into
the lender's newly acquired fee title. Every lender that acquires
title to the encumbered property has important reasons for keep-
ing the mortgage distinct from the fee title. As discussed below
seriatim, the mortgagee must retain its lien to use offensively or
defensively against junior lienors. Additionally, the mortgagee
must retain its mortgage lien separate from the fee in case its ac-
quisition of the encumbered property is overturned should the bor-
rower subsequently go into bankruptcy or challenge the validity of
the conveyance to the mortgagee. Unless the mortgagee has pre-
vented merger of its lien in these situations, the mortgagee will oc-
cupy the unenviable position of an unsecured creditor or will hold
only a lien inferior to its mortgage lien in priority and in terms.
a. Junior Liens
A primary reason a mortgagee that acquires title to the
encumbered property wishes to prevent merger of its mortgage lien
181. A deed in lieu also can be an attractive alternative to foreclosure for the bor-
rower. As additional consideration for delivery of the deed in lieu, the borrower normally
negotiates for the lender's release of further liability for the debt or covenant not to sue.
The alternative for the borrower, a foreclosure sale, generally would entitle the lender to sue
the borrower for a deficiency judgment if the foreclosure sale proceeds were insufficient to
pay the debt in full. This threat can be of paramount importance to the borrower because
foreclosure sale prices normally are substantially less than the fair market value of the en-
cumbered property. Although a deficiency judgment currently might be uncollectible against
the borrower, the lender can enforce it at any time during the statute of limitations period,
so the judgment remains a real and continuing liability for the borrower. Furthermore, by
delivering a deed in lieu, the borrower reduces its potential liability. A deed in lieu elimi-
nates the expense of a foreclosure sale, which is a significant factor in those jurisdictions
that have not authorized power of sale foreclosures. Borrowers normally are liable to the
lender for the cost of foreclosing a mortgage, either by statute or by agreement of the par-
ties, and interest continues accruing on the outstanding debt until it is paid. Finally, the
borrower may wish to avoid the embarrassment and trouble of a foreclosure action. See P.
BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 281 (2d ed. 1970).
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is to protect its interest in the property if junior liens exist. A via-
ble mortgage lien can be used offensively, by foreclosing it to elimi-
nate junior liens. 182 Moreover, if the junior lienor initiates foreclo-
sure to enforce its lien, the senior mortgagee is best served if the
sale is subject to its lien. In this way, although the foreclosure sale
deprives the senior mortgagee of fee title, the senior mortgagee will
retain its mortgage lien, which it can foreclose to recover the
secured debt. Because the necessity of priority is so apparent in
this context, courts usually apply the equitable exception to the
merger doctrine and hold that the senior lien did not merge. 1 3
Courts reach this result even if the senior lienor apparently waived
the protection of the equitable exception, such as by recording a
lien release. 8 4 Despite this near unanimity of treatment, litigation
between junior lienors and the senior lienor/owner forms the great
bulk of merger litigation.
A holding that priority is not lost upon acquiring the fee cor-
rectly preserves the relationship between the junior and senior
lienors. By permitting the senior lienor the option to foreclose its
lien in this situation, the court in no way alters the position occu-
pied by the junior lienor. When the junior lienor agreed to extend
credit against the security of the property, he had actual or con-
structive notice 85 of the senior lien and, therefore, of the possibil-
ity of his lien's being eliminated by a foreclosure of that lien.
Indeed, some lenders are prohibited from making loans secured by
a junior lien because of obvious security difficulties.1 8 Moreover,
lenders routinely charge higher interest rates on loans secured by a
182. When a lender extends credit against the security of a parcel of land, the lender's
mortgage interest attaches to the title as it exists when the lender perfects its mortgage
interest. Therefore, when the lender forecloses its mortgage, the sale eliminates not only the
mortgage, but also all property interests junior to it. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note
5, § 7.12, at 507.
183. See, e.g., Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wetterling Constr. & Realty, Inc.,
302 Minn. 83, 223 N.W.2d 418 (1974). Cf. Miles Homes, Inc. v. Harrah Plumbing & Heating
Serv. Co., 408 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. App. 1980).
184. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hockenhull, 85 Ill. 124 (1877); Eldridge v. Salazar, 81
N.M. 128, 464 P.2d 547 (1970); Fowler v. Carter, 77 N.M. 571, 575, 425 P.2d 737, 740 (1967).
185. One of the purposes for land title recording acts is to provide potential purchas-
ers with notice of previous encumbrances and conveyances. Even if the purchaser does not
check the property records, she will be deemed to have constructive notice of all properly
recorded documents. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 904(3).
186. This restriction for national banks and savings and loan associations recently has
been repealed but still may affect state chartered institutions. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 5, § 12.9, at 904-05; Spellmen, A Banker's Tour Through the Second Mortgage
Market, 148 BANKER'S MAG., No. 2, 19, 19 (1965).
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junior lien 187 and often take extra precautions to protect their
security interests.188 When the senior lienor/owner forecloses its
lien, the junior lienor is entitled to participate in the foreclosure
sale to try to drive up the bidding so that sufficient sale proceeds
will be generated to pay off its secured debt, as well as the debt
secured by the foreclosed lien. This participation is the only right
to which junior lienors are entitled. Therefore, if merger eliminated
the senior lien, the junior lienor would enjoy an undeserved
windfall.'8 9
That the senior lienor/owner should be permitted to hold the
fee and mortgage interests separately is demonstrated most con-
vincingly when the senior lienor acquires title to the fee by a deed
in lieu of foreclosure. The very fact of the deed in lieu transaction
indicates that the debt secured by the senior lien was, or soon
would be, in default. Rather than accept the deed, the senior lienor
immediately could have foreclosed its lien, and all junior liens
thereby would have been eliminated from the title. If the senior
lienor instead agrees to accept a deed in lieu, the senior lienor has
fully or partially surrendered its right to enforce the debt against
anyone personally liable for it, but has the senior lienor altered its
187. See Spellmen, supra note 186, at 22.
188. For example, junior lienors often include in their security instruments a provision
that the junior lienor may cure any default in the terms of the senior lien. Junior lienors
also often include in their security instruments a "cross default" clause, which provides that
a default in the senior lien also constitutes a default under the junior lien. In this way, the
junior lienor can exercise its remedies as soon as the borrower defaults in any of its obliga-
tions. For a description of additional covenants often required by junior lienors, see id. at
24. Furthermore, several states have adopted statutes permitting junior lienors to cure a
default in a senior lien, see, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924(c) (West 1974); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95,
§ 57 (Smith-Hurd 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (West 1945), or granting junior lienors a
statutory right to redeem the property after foreclosure of a senior lien. G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 8.4, at 616.
189. Lowman v. Lowman, 118 Ill. 582, 9 N.E. 245 (1886); Quality Fin. Co. v. Bourque,
315 So. 2d 656 (La. 1975); Ross v. Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 245 Md. 507, 226 A.2d 553
(1967); Citizens Sec. Bank v. Courtney, 572 P.2d 1302 (Okla. App. 1977). Cf. Shaffer v. Mc-
Closkey, 101 Cal. 576, 36 P. 196 (1894); Note, Remedies of Junior Lienors Omitted from
Prior Foreclosure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 994 (1940).
When a senior lienor has acquired fee title, junior lienors also have argued that a fore-
closure sale on the junior lien is free of the senior lien because the latter merged into the
fee. A holding that the senior lien had merged would grant the junior lienor a similarly
unjust windfall. When the junior lienor agreed to extend credit against the security of the
property, that decision was made with actual or constructive knowledge of the senior lien.
Even if after the junior lienor made the loan the value of the encumbered property
decreased to less than the amount of outstanding debts secured by the property, the junior
lienor is not entitled to sell the land free of the senior lien. Like any other secured creditor,
the junior lienor, when it agreed to make the loan, gambled that the value of the collateral
would not decrease to less than the amount of the junior debt and all debts senior to it.
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rights against any junior lienors? The answer should be uniformly
"no," because all the junior lienors' expectations have been pre-
served, and the lien holders remain in status quo ante.
Junior lienors have argued that mere acceptance of a deed in
lieu connotes acceptance of the state of title, including the junior
liens. If, as is the usual case, the senior mortgagee accepted the
deed in lieu without actual knowledge of junior liens, the senior
lien should not merge into the fee even if the senior mortgagee had
constructive notice of the junior liens by virtue of the public prop-
erty records. Although the senior mortgagee might have been
incautious in failing to ascertain the state of title before accepting
the deed in lieu, a thorough title check will not always protect the
mortgagee from accepting a deed to property subject to a junior
lien. A mechanics' lien, for example, might not be recorded until
after the senior mortgagee accepted the deed in lieu. By operation
of a mechanics' lien statute, however, the lien may attach retroac-
tively to the property title as of a date before the senior mortgagee
accepted the deed, such as when the mechanic rendered its ser-
vices.1 90 Regardless of the senior mortgagee's diligence in checking
title, however, a junior lienor should not benefit from conveyance
of a deed in lieu because the junior lienor's expectations upon
extending credit still will be satisfied. 9'
Furthermore, application of merger to eliminate the senior lien
potentially would deprive the senior lienor/owner of all interest in
the property. The junior lienor, upon becoming the senior lienor as
a result of merger of the former senior lien, could foreclose its lien,
and the original senior mortgagee, whose lien merger previously
will have destroyed, would lose his fee title by operation of the
foreclosure sale. If, in consideration of the former owner's convey-
ance of the property to the senior lienor, the latter released liabil-
ity for the debt or covenanted not to sue on the debt, he also will
have lost the right to enforce the debt. Thus, a lienor who acquires
title to the encumbered property obviously is best served by keep-
ing his lien distinct from the fee title.
192
190. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 12.4, at 864.
191. Fowler v. Carter, 77 N.M. 571, 575, 425 P.2d 737, 740 (1967).
192. One court, although recognizing the applicability of this principle, gutted it by
placing unperformable conditions on the lienor's right to foreclose. In American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Eidelberg, 283 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1967), the borrower had executed two mortgages
encumbering the same property. After defaulting on the senior mortgage debt, the borrower
conveyed the property to the senior mortgagee. The deed, evidently prepared by a knowl-
edgeable lender, expressly provided that the parties did not intend the mortgage lien to
merge into the fee title. The case arose when the senior mortgagee commenced foreclosure
1987]
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b. Former Owner's Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy often awaits the owner who loses title to encum-
bered property. Therefore, in addition to retaining its lien to use
against junior lienors, every mortgagee that acquires title to
encumbered property must retain its lien to protect itself if the
former owner goes into bankruptcy within one year of the convey-
ance. In this event, the bankruptcy trustee may challenge the
mortgagee's acquisition of title as a fraudulent transfer pursuant to
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,193 a preference pursuant to
section 547 of the Code,"' or a violation of any other federal or
proceedings on the lien, presumably to eliminate the junior mortgage lien.
The court's analysis reflected a misplaced solicitude for the junior lienor. Although the
court correctly stated the ground rules for analysis, the parameters of accord and satisfac-
tion and the dispositive character of the stated intent to prevent merger, the court mis-
perceived the nature of the security interest. Unaccountably, the court held that the senior
mortgagee, in foreclosing the mortgage, must do so "in a manner which will not prejudice
the holder of the second mortgage." Id. at 257. The court compounded its error by holding
that the foreclosure action was available only if the deed in lieu did not completely retire
the mortgage debt. The court reasoned that the senior mortgagee was not entitled to
"appropriate the security and then enforce the debt without regard to the value of the se-
curity." Id. at 257.
The court's analysis, though premised on correct principles, went seriously awry. Fore-
closure was the first legal principle to suffer. Whenever a senior lienor exercises its right to
foreclose, any junior lienors will be "prejudiced" because such sales always operate to elimi-
nate junior liens. This result follows more from the nature of the mortgage than from the
subsequent decision to foreclose. When the senior lienor agreed to extend credit based on
the security of the mortgaged property, the title was unencumbered by the junior liens. This
is the status that the foreclosure sale is designed to preserve. This normal, indeed basic,
incident of a foreclosure sale would be eliminated if the court's analysis were generally
accepted.
In addition to distorting foreclosure, the court mischaracterized the substance of the
suit. Rather than attempting to "enforce the debt," the senior mortgagee sought to enforce
its security interest. The complaint neither prayed for a deficiency judgment nor otherwise
requested recovery against those personally liable for the debt. The gravamen of the action
was elimination of the junior lien by foreclosure of a senior lien.
Finally, the decision amounts to a windfall for the junior lienor. Should the evidence
establish that the senior lienor accepted the property in complete satisfaction of the debt,
the former junior lien will be advanced to first priority. In contrast, if the senior mortgagee
had not accepted the deed, which it was not bound to do, the junior lienor could have fore-
closed and sold the fee title, but only subject to the senior mortgage. According to the court
in Eidelberg, however, the junior lienor may convey title free and clear of the senior mort-
gage, although the junior lienor never held a security interest in unencumbered property. In
contrast, the senior mortgagee's economic interest in the property has vanished: The bor-
rower's personal liability is extinguished, the senior mortgagee will lose the fee title as a
result of the junior's foreclosure sale, and its mortgage lien is extinguished. The court's
holding substantially diminishes the utility of deeds in lieu of foreclosure.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. II 1986).
194. Id. § 547.
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state law pursuant to section 544 of the Code.195 If the trustee is
successful, the mortgagee will lose title to the property. Addition-
ally, if a court is persuaded that the mortgage merged into the fee,
the mortgagee will have lost all its interest in the encumbered
property. 196
i. Fraudulent Transfer
Every means by which a mortgagee acquires fee title, whether
by voluntary or involuntary transfer, potentially is subject to chal-
lenge as a fraudulent transfer pursuant to section 548 if the trans-
fer occurred within one year before the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy.1 97 A gift of the fee title to the mortgagee is particularly
susceptible to challenge under section 548 even if the debtor did
not intend to commit a fraud, because the mortgagee gave no value
for the property. A mortgagee's acquisition of title by deed in lieu
is similarly subject to challenge. If the outstanding amount of the
secured debt was less than the property value, the transfer clearly
will be voided. 9" Therefore, an appraisal prepared in connection
195. Id. § 544.
196. Virtually no case law exists concerning the mortgagee's ability to revive its lien in
this circumstance. The decision in Matter of Apex Carpet Finishers, Inc., 585 F.2d 1323
(5th Cir. 1978), indicates that the lien may revive only in limited circumstances. In that
case, the bankruptcy trustee and creditors' committee determined that the debtor had no
equity in a parcel of land to which it held title. At the debtor's suggestion and to save
expense, the bankruptcy court authorized the debtor to deliver a deed in lieu of foreclosure
to the holder of the second mortgage encumbering that land. The deed in lieu did not
include an expression of intent to keep the second mortgage separate from the fee. When
the third mortgagee attempted to enforce its lien, the third mortgagee convinced the bank-
ruptcy court and the district court that the second mortgage had merged into the fee,
thereby enabling the third mortgagee to sell the land free of the second mortgage. The
appellate court reversed the lower courts on the issue of merger. In stating this holding,
however, the appellate court did not state the generally accepted rule that a lienor that
accepts a deed in lieu retains its lien priority for the purpose of eliminating junior liens.
Instead, the appellate court, like the bankruptcy and district courts, apparently viewed the
factual circumstances as a special case. The appellate court based its holding on the fact
that the deed-in-lieu transaction was "done as an accommodation to the debtor estate," id.
at 1325, indicating that the court was using its discretionary power to revive the lien. Thus,
a substantial possibility exists that a court would not permit revival in the more usual situa-
tion in which the lienor accepted a deed in lieu before the debtor went into bankruptcy.
197. Pursuant to § 548(a), the trustee can avoid any transfer made by the debtor on or
within one year before the bankruptcy petition was filed if the debtor made the transfer
with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" any creditor. The trustee also can avoid a
transfer if it was constructively fraudulent. That is, the trustee can avoid a transfer if the
debtor received less than a "reasonably equivalent value" for the transfer and was or
thereby became insolvent, was engaged in a business with unreasonably small capital, or
intended to incur debts beyond his ability to pay.
198. See In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 137-38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Busby v. United
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with the conveyance of the deed in lieu will be a necessary compo-
nent of the mortgagee's case before the bankruptcy court. The
bankruptcy trustee, however, is free to counter with contrary ap-
praisals or other evidence of value. Furthermore, even if the out-
standing debt amount exceeded the property value, the court will
void the transfer if it finds actual intent to defraud. In light of the
inexact art of real estate appraisal and the vagaries of factfinding
in general, this "safe harbor" simply does not provide the certainty
that most mortgagees, as lenders, desire. Moreover, even acquisi-
tion of title at a validly conducted foreclosure sale may trigger a
fraudulent transfer challenge.' 9
States Steel Corp., 237 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Okla. 1965).
199. Whether the trustee's power extends to challenging a validly conducted foreclo-
sure sale as a fraudulent transfer currently is uncertain. Section 548(a) broadly permits the
trustee to challenge any "transfer" of the bankrupt's property that satisfies the other statu-
tory criteria. In Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth
Circuit construed a similar provision of the former Bankruptcy Act to include foreclosure
sales. The court's holding was based on the Act's broad definition of a "transfer," which
neither expressly included nor excluded a purchase at a foreclosure sale. Because the fore-
closure sale purchaser in that case paid only 57.7% of the fair market value of the foreclosed
property, thereby acquiring for substantially less than its value an asset that otherwise
might have been included in the bankruptcy estate, the court held that the purchase consti-
tuted a fraudulent transfer and directed the district court to rescind the transfer. Several
courts have adopted the Durrett reasoning. See, e.g., In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom. First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Hulm, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); In re
Frank, 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Carr, 34 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1983), afl'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1983); In re Berge, 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Bates, 32 Bankr. 40
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re
Smith, 21 Bankr. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
Other courts, however, have rejected the Durrett rationale. In In re Madrid, 21 Bankr.
424 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Madrid v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Co., 469 U.S. 833 (1984), the Ninth Circuit held that a foreclosure sale is not a
transfer subject to avoidance under § 548(a). The court held that the "transfer" of the bank-
rupt's property occurred when the deed of trust was perfected under state law. Because the
trust deed had been perfected more than one year before the debtor filed her bankruptcy
petition, the court held that the transfer was not voidable and expressly declined to find
whether the foreclosure sale price was a reasonably equivalent value for the property in that
case. The court also expressed its concern that subjecting foreclosures to avoidance under
the bankruptcy laws would interfere unduly with state law and lending practices. Like Dur-
rett, Madrid has acquired a camp of followers. See, e.g., In re Strauser, 40 Bankr. 868
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re William, 39 Bankr. 678 (D. Minn. 1984); In re Gilmore, 31
Bankr. 615 (E. D. Wash. 1983).
Congress apparently chose Durrett over Madrid when it amended the Bankruptcy Code
in 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), but questions remain. The definition of
"transfer" was amended to include "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 11
U.S.C. § 101 (1979), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 101 (48) (Supp. 11 1986). On its face, that
language establishes when the transfer occurs and equates foreclosure sales with other trans-
fers as to the possibility of avoidance. Whether Congress intended to resolve the issue in the
1984 Amendments Act, however, remains at issue. In the course of its deliberations, the
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Should a court void the mortgagee's acquisition of the encum-
bered property as a fraudulent transfer, revival of his mortgage
lien if it has merged into the fee title is problematic. Section 548(c)
of the Code provides that, if the transfer of title to the mortgagee
constituted a fraudulent transfer, the mortgagee "that takes for
value and in good faith has a lien on... or may retain any interest
transferred... to the extent that such transferee... gave value to
the debtor in exchange for such transfer." Courts and commenta-
tors construing this statutory provision rarely have considered
whether the mortgagee's former lien is revived. At least one federal
appellate court expressly has held that the lien will not be revived
in any form.200 Instead, courts and commentators generally con-
strue section 548(c) as authorizing the creation of a new lien in
favor of the mortgagee. 01 Presumably, this lien, which is consid-
House adopted not only the amendment to the definition of "transfer" set out above, but
also an amendment to § 548 providing that a foreclosure sale purchaser pays a reasonably
equivalent value if he pays the full amount of the debt secured by the foreclosed lien. When
the Senate considered the House's version of the Amendments Act, however, it apparently
decided to sidestep the issue and dropped the amendment to § 548. The Senate, however,
failed to drop the complement to the § 548 amendment, the amendment of the "transfer"
definition. The failure to eliminate the "transfer" amendment only can be considered an
oversight. See Andrew, Real Property Transactions and the 1984 Bankruptcy Code
Amendments, 3 MINN. REA. EsT. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1986); see also G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 5, § 8.16, at 663; Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Convey-
ances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933, 938 n.14 (1985).
Courts have yet to decide whether to follow the letter of the law or to alter it based on
the legislative history. Although courts can disregard statutory language when necessary to
effectuate the legislative intent, some courts have refused to do so when the language is
clear and consistent with the remaining language. See, e.g., Christopherson v. Federal Land
Bank, 388 N.W. 2d 373, 374 (Minn. 1986). 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.37 (Singer 4th ed. 1984). If courts defer to the statutory language, they
still must grapple with the issue of what is a reasonably equivalent value. Foreclosure sales
are conducted as public auctions, thereby avoiding the possibility of the mortgagee's over-
reaching that exists with private arrangements, such as the deed in lieu. Foreclosure sales,
however, are notorious for the inadequacy of the price paid in relation to the value of the
foreclosed property. The Durrett court indicated that 70% of fair market value might con-
stitute reasonably equivalent value. At least one court has required a lender to pay a bank-
ruptcy trustee the entire difference between the fair market value and the price paid by the
lender at the foreclosure sale, which was the outstanding amount of the debt. In re Hulm,
45 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984). In determining the fair market value, the court took
into account the adverse impact of the foreclosure sale on the property value. The issue,
however, is far from a resolution.
200. Crawford v. Broussard, 260 F. 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 560
(1920) ("A fraudulent purchaser of property is not entitled to have it subjected to the satis-
faction of a lien on it which existed in his favor prior to his purchase.").
201. See, e.g., In re Carr, 34 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), af'd, 40 Bankr.
1007 (D. Conn. 1984); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 994-95 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); 2 W. NOR-
TON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 34.07 (1984); Ehrlich, supra note 197, at 968. But see
4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 548.07[4], at 548-83 (L.P. King 15th ed. 1979).
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ered a new and different lien, would have priority only as of the
date it attached to the property by the bankruptcy court's order.
Therefore, a mortgagee that had enjoyed senior priority may now
become the most junior, thereby significantly decreasing the
probability that its debt will be paid in full. If this is the penalty
for accepting a deed in lieu or for purchasing at a foreclosure sale,
it is strong medicine indeed.0 2
ii. Preference
If the mortgagee acquired title to the encumbered property by
a deed in lieu or at a foreclosure sale on its mortgage, the convey-
ance may satisfy the statutory test for a preference. 03 A finding
202. Furthermore, a mortgagee who acquires title to the encumbered property will not
always be entitled to the relief granted by § 548(c). Pursuant to the terms of § 548(c), if the
mortgagee's acquisition of the land constitutes a preference as well as a fraudulent transfer
or if the court determines that the mortgagee did not acquire the property in good faith, he
is not entitled to the relief provided in § 548(c). Courts generally have held that a mortga-
gee's purchase at a foreclosure sale does not constitute bad faith even if the price he paid
was less than the reasonably equivalent value because the mortgagee merely exercised his
rights under state foreclosure laws. See, e.g., In re Carr, 34 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1983), afl'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984). If the mortgagee acquired the land by gift or
by deed in lieu of foreclosure, however, the court may deem his acquisition to be in bad
faith if he knew or had reason to know of the debtor's insolvency or that the property value
exceeded the outstanding debt amount. A noted commentator has stated: "The unpredict-
able circumstances in which the courts may find its presence or absence render any defini-
tion of 'good faith' inadequate, if not unwise." 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 201, 1 548.07 [2], at
54868. In these cases, unless the mortgagee preserved his mortgage lien, he may lose his
secured creditor status and find himself in the unenviable position of an unsecured creditor.
Furthermore, if the lender is guilty of misconduct, the trustee may seek to subordinate the
lender's claim to other claims or to transfer the lender's lien to the estate pursuant to
§ 510(c) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982 & Supp. II 1986). See Jones, Structuring the
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Transaction, 19 REAL PROP. PRO. & T&. J. 58, 64-65 (1984).
203. Pursuant to § 547(b) of the Code, a bankruptcy trustee may void a transfer of the
bankrupt's property as a preference if it was: (1) to or for a creditor's benefit; (2) made on
account of an antecedent debt; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made on or
within 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or between 90 days and one year
before the filing if the creditor was an insider; and (5) gives the creditor more value than if
the bankruptcy were under Chapter 7 of the Code and the transfer had not been made. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. II 1986). By its very nature, a deed-in-lieu transaction satis-
fies the first two elements of the preference test. The debtor obviously delivered the deed to
benefit the mortgagee, and the deed constitutes full or part payment of the outstanding
debt. The third element also often will be satisfied when the mortgagee is not an insider of
the debtor, as evidenced by a statutorily created presumption that the debtor was insolvent
for the 90 days preceding the date the petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982) ("For the
purposes of [§547], the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.").
The final element in the preference test usually is the most crucial element in determin-
ing whether a deed in lieu can be voided. This single element requires a two-part analysis.
The court must determine the value of the property the mortgagee received and the value it
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that the conveyance constitutes a preference carries a potentially
greater penalty than that provided for a fraudulent transfer.
Unlike the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Code, the prefer-
ence provisions provide no security for the outstanding debt if the
deed in lieu is voided. Therefore, if the mortgagee permitted its
mortgage lien to merge, the mortgagee will be an unsecured credi-
tor. Because secured creditors are paid first from their collateral in
bankruptcy proceedings,0 4 an unsecured creditor's chance of
receiving full or even significant payment for its debt normally is
minimal.
iii. Other Federal or State Laws
In addition to powers devolving from provisions governing
fraudulent transfers and preferences, section 544 of the Code
grants the bankruptcy trustee additional powers to void a property
transfer. Section 544 empowers the trustee to void any transfer
that could be voided under state or federal law by a judgment lie-
nor, an unsatisfied execution creditor, a bona fide purchaser of real
property, or an unsecured creditor.20 5 As with the preference provi-
sions, section 544 does not provide the mortgagee a lien if the
transfer is voided. Again, if the mortgagee permitted the mortgage
lien to merge into the fee, the mortgagee may occupy the inferior
would have received in a liquidation case if the transfer had not occurred. Thus, the secured
creditor is afforded a safe harbor of sorts. If the outstanding amount of the debt held by the
mortgagee is greater than the value of the transferred property, the transfer will not be
deemed a preference. Because secured creditors are the first creditors entitled to be satisfied
from the collateral, the mortgagee will not have received more than would have been pro-
vided by a liquidation proceeding. If the outstanding debt amount was less than the prop-
erty value, however, the trustee is authorized to void the transfer as a preference. See In re
Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 136-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Busby v. United States Steel Corp.,
237 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Okla. 1965); In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 393 F.2d 60, 63-64 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gibralter Factors v. Baranow, 393 U.S. 837 (1968); 2 W. NOR-
TON, supra note 201, § 32.07, at 19; id. § 32.09, at 28; Jones, supra note 202, at 59-63.
At least two courts have held that a foreclosure sale constituted a preference. In re
Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Matter of Fountain, 32 Bankr. 965 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1983). In each case, the court's holding was based on the foreclosing mortgagee's
purchase at the sale for an amount significantly less than the fair market value. Each court
held that the mortgagee's acquisition of title constituted a preference because the mortgagee
received more than it would have if the bankruptcy were under Chapter 7 and if the trans-
fer had not been made. The court in Fountain erroneously based its holding on a passage in
Collier on Bankruptcy dealing with a bankruptcy trustee's ability to challenge the granting
of a mortgage as a preference. Id. at 965. For a discussion of the trustee's power to challenge
the sale as a preference, see G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 8.16, at 667-69.
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. II 1986); 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 201,
1 541.01; 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 201, 507.02[2].
205. See Jones, supra note 202, at 63-64.
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position of an unsecured creditor. The possibility that the transfer
to the mortgagee may be voided as a fraudulent transfer, a prefer-
ence, or an otherwise illegal transfer under federal or state law
thus provides a substantial cause for the avoidance of merger.
c. Validity of the Deed-in-Lieu Transaction
In addition to the possibility of the borrower's bankruptcy or
the existence of junior liens, a lender that accepts a deed in lieu of
foreclosure must be concerned with merger because, in light of the
usual inequality of bargaining power between lenders and borrow-
ers, courts often view such deeds with suspicion. Although deeds in
lieu of foreclosure are used with increasing frequency,206 especially
with the increased number of foreclosures occurring nationwide, if
a borrower challenges the deed in lieu transaction, the court gener-
ally will be solicitous of him and will closely scrutinize the transac-
tion and its surrounding circumstances to determine whether the
lender's conduct was oppressive or otherwise unconscionable.07
Generally, unless the lender can satisfy the court that the value of
the property was substantially equivalent to or less than the debt
amount, the court will void the title conveyance. An appraisal pre-
pared on the lender's behalf, certifying that the property was
worth no more than the debt amount on the date of the convey-
ance, may lead to nothing more than an evidentiary battle with the
206. P. BASYE, supra note 181, § 281, at 605; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 459, at
696.26 n.5 ("The use of this device as a substitute for foreclosure is widespread .... With
delays [in foreclosure proceedings] amounting to between twenty-three days and twenty-five
months per mortgage . . . the incentive to avoid . . . loss by procuring a deed from the
mortgagor is apparent."); Pease, The Acceptance of Quit-Claim Deeds in Lieu of Foreclo-
sure of Real Estate Mortgages, 2 J. MA& L.Q. 252, 252 (1936) ("This topic has become more
and more important to banks, insurance companies and private mortgagees as the costs in
connection with foreclosures have increased . . ").
207. Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332 (1877); Villa v. Rodriguez, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 323, 339
(1870):
The law upon the subject of the right to redeem where the mortgagor has conveyed to
the mortgagee the equity of redemption, is well settled. It is characterized by a jealous
and salutary policy. Principles almost as stern are applied as those which govern where
a sale by a cestui que trust to his trustee is drawn in question. To give validity to such
a sale by a mortgagor it must be shown that the conduct of the mortgagee was, in all
things, fair and frank, and that he paid for the property what it was worth. He must
hold out no delusive hopes; he must exercise no undue influence; he must take no
advantage of the fears or poverty of the other party. Any indirection or obliquity of
conduct is fatal to his title. Every doubt will be resolved against him. . . . The form of
the instruments employed is immaterial. That the mortgagor knowingly surrendered
and never intended to reclaim is of no consequence.
See also G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 5, § 6.19, at 474-75.
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borrower's appraisals. Once again, the operation of merger may
leave the lender as an unsecured creditor if the court voids the
deed in lieu.
A deed-in-lieu transaction need not be completely voided for
the mortgagee to have beneficial reasons for keeping its mortgage
interest distinct from the fee. Based on the borrower's allegations,
a court might determine that the conveyance was intended as addi-
tional security for the debt. The borrower may attempt to estab-
lish, for example, that the lender agreed to extend the time for
repayment in exchange for the borrower's title conveyance. Then,
if the borrower defaulted, no foreclosure proceeding would be nec-
essary. Instead, the lender would own the land outright pursuant
to the deed and could dispose of it in a manner more likely than a
foreclosure sale to return the fair value of the property. Addition-
ally, the lender would avoid the time and expense of a foreclosure.
Should the court accept the borrower's argument, the court
will hold that the deed in lieu is an equitable mortgage rather than
a title conveyance. 20 8 As a result, the lender's position will be
impaired seriously if merger has occurred. The deed in lieu, be-
cause it is a deed, will not contain the provisions for the lender's
208. See, e.g., Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332 (1877); Sutphen v. Cushman, 35 Il. 186,
196-97 (1864):
We are of the opinion that the deed . . . should be regarded as a mortgage. . . . The
appellant was indebted to the appellee at the time the conveyance was made, and there
is no evidence whatever of the discharge of that indebtedness. The bond and note by
which the greater portion of it was evidenced, were retained by the appellee, as well as
the... notes which had been pledged as security; and the payment of the indebted-
ness might have been enforced at any time thereafter. Until the contrary is shown, the
presumption is that the indebtedness was not satisfied by the conveyance; and absolute
certainty in regard to the fact takes the place of presumption, in case the creditor
retains the evidence of the indebtedness, the securities pledged for its payment, and
collects the money due upon such securities . . . . It is sufficient for us to know that
when [the appellee] took the conveyance on account of a preexisting indebtedness,
without in any manner canceling or discharging it, that equity will regard the deed as a
mortgage, whether he so regarded it or not.
See also Wallace v. Greenman, 321 Ill. 423, 430, 152 N.E. 137, 140 (1926); Burton v. Perry,
146 Ill. 71, 114, 34 N.E. 60, 71 (1893); G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at 475; Pease,
supra note 206, at 259-60. The adverse impact of these decisions on the utility of deeds in
lieu prompted at least one state legislature to enact a statute creating a presumption that
the deed does not constitute new security.
No conveyance absolute in form between parties sustaining the relation of mortgagor
and mortgagee, whereby the mortgagor or his successor in interest conveys any right,
title or interest in real property theretofore mortgaged, shall be presumed to have been
given as further security, or as a new form of security, for the payment of any existing
mortgage indebtedness, or any other indebtedness, or as security for any purpose.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.18 (West 1984).
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protection normally included in mortgages. 209 Furthermore, the eq-
uitable mortgage will have priority only as of the date of its record-
ing. The possibility of a challenge to the deed as an equitable
mortgage looms particularly large for lenders because the statute
of limitations to challenge a deed in lieu can be as long as fifteen
years.21 0 Therefore, to retain its senior lien status and the rights
and powers it has pursuant to the originally executed mortgage in-
strument, the lender is best served by preventing merger.
Finally, if a property owner who executes a deed in lieu is not
personally liable for the secured debt, the deed may be challenged
for failure of consideration. For example, if the property owner is
not the original borrower and did not assume personal liability for
the debt, the lender's release of that person from any liability on
the debt in exchange for the deed in lieu does not constitute con-
sideration and creates the possibility that a court will void the
transaction.2 ' Similarly, if the debt is nonrecourse, even the origi-
nal borrowers are not personally liable, and the deed-in-lieu trans-
action is subject to invalidation for failure of consideration. There-
fore, in this case, as in the previously described cases, application
of merger is inimical to the lender's best interests.
In light of the above considerations, it is not surprising that,
from the earliest American merger cases, courts have recognized,
implicitly or explicitly, that the obvious and important benefits a
mortgagee enjoys by keeping the mortgage and fee interests dis-
tinct outweigh the slight benefit derived from merging them to
simplify the state of title. Frequently citing Forbes v. Moffatt, the
early American courts usually declined to apply merger when a
mortgagee acquired title to the encumbered property.2 12 Therefore,
compared to the common-law history, the American doctrine of
merger began at a relatively mature stage of development.
The American courts' treatment of merger, however, now has
evolved substantially beyond Forbes. Rather than focusing analysis
209. For example, the deed will not provide for foreclosure by advertisement in those
states where permitted; will not obligate the debtor to maintain the property, to pay the
property taxes, and to keep the property insured; and will not permit the lender to inspect
the property. Therefore, the lender will have less control over the property during the life of
the loan and will have a more difficult time realizing against the property in case of default.
210. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.19 (West 1984).
211. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 6.19, at 475.
212. E.g., Baldwin v. Norton, 2 Conn. 161, 163-64 (1817); Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6
Conn. 373, 389-90 (1827); Freeman v. Paul, 3 Me. 260 (1825); Gibson v. Crehore, 20 Mass. (3
Pick.) 475 (1826); Hunt v. Hunt, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 374 (1833); James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246
(N.Y. 1823). Contra James v. Johnson, 6 Johns. ch. 416 (N.Y. ch. 1822).
[Vol. 40:283
FREEING MORTGAGES OF MERGER
on the mortgagee's express or implied intent upon acquisition of
the title, modern courts normally permit the mortgagee to assert
the mortgage lien if she has a beneficial reason for doing so even if
she previously expressed an intent that the interests merge. Courts
now routinely hold, for example, that a mortgagee can retain and
enforce her lien despite unequivocal statements in the deed by
which she acquired title or in the accompanying documents that
the fee and mortgage interests merge.213 Courts even have permit-
ted enforcement of a mortgage lien though the mortgagee recorded
a mortgage release in the public property records214 or the statute
of limitations has expired for enforcement of the debt.215 Although
these holdings violate the common-law merger rule that the
holder's intent when she acquires the consecutive interest controls,
courts have disregarded the rule when it would harm the holder's
interests. Not surprisingly, then, courts usually do not merge the
fee and mortgage interests in the common fact situation in which
the mortgagee manifests no intent. In these cases, courts merely
repeat the well-worn rote that merger will occur only when it is in
the owner's best interest. The effect of these holdings is to destroy
the value of merger as a title clearing device.
Small v. Cunningham21 '6 is a fairly typical example of a court's
refusal to hold that merger has occurred despite an initially
expressed intent to merge. In that case, decided by the North Da-
kota Supreme Court in 1963, a judgment creditor perfected a judg-
ment lien against property already subject to a mortgage. After the
judgment lien attached, the mortgagee accepted a deed in lieu to
the property and recorded a mortgage release. The judgment lienor
then asserted its right to sell the property to satisfy its lien and
claimed the property would be free of the mortgage because the
mortgage had merged into the fee title. In rejecting the judgment
lienor's claim of merger, the court stated: "[E]quity assumes it was
213. Crosby v. Chase, 17 Me. 369, 369 (1840). Contra 200 E. 64th St. Corp. v. Manley,
37 N.Y.2d 744, 337 N.E.2d 133, 374 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1975).
214. Shaffer v. McCloskey, 101 Cal. 576, 36 P. 196 (1894); Quality Fin. Co. v. Bourque,
315 So. 2d 656 (La. 1975); Eldridge v. Salazar, 81 N.M. 128, 464 P.2d. 547 (1970); Fowler v.
Carter, 77 N.M. 571, 575, 425 P.2d 737, 740 (1967); Small v. Cunningham, 120 N.W.2d 13
(N.D. 1963); Sullivan v. Saunders, 66 W. Va. 350, 353, 66 S.E. 497, 498 (1909).
215. Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 765-76 (1885); Austin v. Edwards, 201 Ala. 532,
533, 78 So. 886, 887 (1918); Allen v. Glenn, 87 Ga. 414, 13 S.E. 565 (1891); Katz v.
Obenchain, 48 Or. 352, 358, 85 P. 617, 620 (1906). Contra Ford v. Nesbitt, 72 Ark. 267, 269,
79 S.W. 793, 794 (1904); Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn, 157 Cal. 237, 239, 107 P. 111, 112
(1910); McGovney v. Gwillim, 16 Colo. App. 284, 287, 65 P. 346, 347 (1901); Jenks v. Shaw,
99 Iowa 604, 610, 68 N.W. 900, 902 (1896).
216. 120 N.W.2d 13 (N.D. 1963).
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not the intention of the holder of a greater and a lesser estate
which meet in his person to merge the same when an intermediate
estate intervenes. ' 21  Far from requiring a mortgagee who acquires
fee title to express an intent to keep the interests distinct, as was
required at earlier common law, the court created a presumption
that merger does not apply. This presumption survived even a
recorded release of the mortgage, which is a clear manifestation of
intent to release the lien.
Similarly, in Eldridge v. Salazar,21 8 a 1970 New Mexico
Supreme Court case, a mortgage and a subordinate deed of trust
encumbered title to a parcel of property. After the property owner
declared bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed the prop-
erty to the mortgagee, and the mortgagee recorded a mortgage
release. The holder of the deed of trust then commenced foreclo-
sure proceedings and, based on merger, asserted the right to sell
the property free and clear of the mortgage lien. Despite the re-
corded mortgage release and testimony by an officer of the mortga-
gee that the bankruptcy trustee's deed had satisfied the secured
debt, the court held that the mortgage had not merged. The court's
analysis was similar to that used with respect to a waiver argu-
ment. The court stated that because the mortgagee had been una-
ware of the trust deed when it agreed to accept title to the prop-
erty, the mortgagee "could not have had an intent to take title
subject to the prior lien .... [N]o intent to act to its own detri-
ment can be presumed from the recording of the release .... It is
the intent with which the release is made, not the making of the
release, which controls. ' 21 9 Essentially, the mortgagee did not
waive its lien priority because it was unaware of the trust deed.
In contrast, courts generally hold that merger has eliminated a
mortgage interest in two clearly defined situations. First, in the
unusual case in which a senior mortgagee assumes personal liabil-
ity for the debt secured by a junior lien when the senior mortgagee
acquires the encumbered property, the mortgagee cannot later
claim that its mortgage interest remained distinct and enforceable
to eliminate the junior lien.' 22 This situation can occur when the
junior lienor is entitled to require assumption as a condition of a
217. Id. at 15.
218. 81 N.M. 128, 464 P.2d 547 (1970).
219. Id. at 131, 464 P.2d at 550.
220. Kneeland v. Moore, 138 Mass. 198, 199 (1884); Drew v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
120 Okla. 250, 252, 252 P. 64, 66 (1926); Bolin v. La Prele Live Stock Co., 27 Wyo. 335, 343-
44, 196 P. 748, 749-50 (1921).
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property conveyance or when the borrower conditions its offer to
convey on the senior mortgagee's assumption. Second, similarly, if
the senior mortgagee acquired title by a deed in lieu of foreclosure
with actual knowledge, rather than just constructive notice, of a
junior lien and clearly expressed an intent that its mortgage inter-
est merge, the senior mortgagee cannot later claim the right to
foreclose the mortgage to eliminate the junior lien.221 A senior
mortgagee would accept a deed in lieu and record a release under
these circumstances only if the value of the property subject to the
junior lien was at least equal to the outstanding amount of the sen-
ior debt. In these cases courts have reasoned that the holder's clear
expression of intent, coupled with its knowledge of the conse-
quences of merger, is sufficient to take the case outside the equita-
ble exception.
The courts' characterization of these two types of cases as
exceptions to the merger exception is false and misleading. The
results in these cases sharply contrast with the body of merger ju-
risprudence. The courts apply merger in the first type of case, in
which the senior mortgagee assumes the junior debts, regardless of
whether the senior mortgagee intended to keep its mortgage and
fee interests distinct and regardless of the mortgagee's best inter-
ests. In light of the fact that these cases typically arise when the
senior mortgagee is attempting to enforce its lien, it obviously did
not intend the interests to merge and was best served by keeping
the mortgage alive. Nevertheless, the courts hold that merger has
occurred, which is in sharp contrast to the usual merger case. The
contrast is drawn even more sharply when compared to those cases
in which a court holds that merger has not occurred despite the
interest holder's originally expressed intent that it should. Simi-
larly, in the second type of case, in which a senior mortgagee
expresses an intent to merge with actual knowledge of junior liens,
the courts apply merger though they do not in other cases in which
the holder originally expressed an intent to merge. Therefore,
merger is not the key to these cases, although the courts state it as
the basis for their holdings.
Waiver is the key to these cases. Re-examination of these
holdings in light of the waiver doctrine reveals that courts have
reached the right result in most, though not all, such cases by ap-
221. Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858, 863, 49 S.W.2d 1046,
1048 (1932); Sheldon v. La Brea Materials Co., 216 Cal. 686, 692, 15 P.2d 1098, 1101 (1932);
Beacham v. Gurney, 91 Iowa 621, 625-26, 60 N.W. 187, 188 (1894); Errett v. Wheeler, 109
Minn. 157, 163-67, 123 N.W. 414, 415-17 (1909).
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plying merger. In the first type of case, the courts have been cor-
rect in prohibiting an assuming senior mortgagee from enforcing
its lien to eliminate junior liens. The senior mortgagee's assump-
tion of the junior debts has a twofold significance. First, the as-
sumption constituted a portion of the consideration for the bor-
rower's conveyance of the property to the senior mortgagee.
Second, the senior mortgagee thereby became primarily liable for
the debt, and the borrower a mere surety.222 Thereafter, if a junior
lienor sued the borrower to recover the debt, the borrower would
be subrogated to the junior lienor's rights to sue the person pri-
marily liable, the senior mortgagee, and to exercise the junior lie-
nor's security rights, including the right to foreclose. If the senior
mortgagee were permitted to foreclose its mortgage and thus elimi-
nate the junior liens, the borrower would be deprived of its right to
enforce the lien by subrogation. Therefore, the senior mortgagee,
by assuming primary liability for the debts secured by the junior
liens, waived the right to eliminate the security for those debts.
Similarly, when a senior mortgagee has accepted title to the
encumbered property with actual knowledge of junior liens, that
decision was based on the encumbered value of the property. Al-
though the senior mortgagee did not assume personal liability for
the junior debts, its acquisition of the title subject to the liens ren-
dered the property the primary source for payment.22 Thereafter,
if a junior lienor recovers against the borrower, the borrower is
subrogated to the lien and can sell the land to satisfy the debt. If
the senior mortgagee is permitted to foreclose its lien and thus
eliminate the junior liens, however, the borrower will have no re-
course against the land. Furthermore, the senior mortgagee would
be enriched unjustly because it then would own the land free and
clear of the junior liens.
By focusing on merger, the courts have defined this second
type of case too narrowly. In tune with usual merger analysis,
courts have defined this group of cases to include only mortgagees
that express an intent to merge. As the above analysis demon-
strates, however, the senior mortgagee should be prohibited from
exercising its lien in this situation regardless of whether it has
manifested any intent concerning merger. Each time a deed in lieu
transaction is negotiated with the understanding that the mortga-
gee will acquire title subject to junior liens, the senior mortgagee
222. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 5.10.
223. Id. § 5.3.
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has waived its right to eliminate those liens. Courts' focus on
merger diverts them from focusing on the substance of the
transaction.
Moreover, by focusing on merger, the courts use a butcher's
knife when a scalpel is required. Although the senior mortgagee
waived its right to eliminate junior liens by foreclosure in the cir-
cumstances outlined above, the senior lienor has other valid rea-
sons for retaining its lien. For example, if the conveyance to the
senior mortgagee is successfully voided as a result of the borrower's
bankruptcy, the senior mortgagee can be restored to status quo
ante only if its lien has survived. By applying merger in these
cases, however, the courts have held that the senior mortgage is
extinguished. The application of waiver analysis, on the other
hand, requires the court to focus on exactly what rights have been
waived. In these cases, the senior mortgagee has waived only the
right to foreclose the lien to eliminate junior lienors.
This line of anlysis, then, like the line of analysis followed in
the first part of this Article, has brought us to the same end point:
Merger is inapplicable to the modern mortgage. As described
above, courts normally do not apply merger to destroy mortgage
liens. The two situations in which courts do apply merger are cor-
rectly analyzed based on waiver rather than on merger. Therefore,
merger no longer serves a useful function. Much more than com-
plete lack of utility, however, requires the elimination of merger
from the body of mortgage law. Merger has several pernicious
effects.
A particularly objectionable effect of merger is the amount of
litigation it spawns. Although junior lienors generally are unsuc-
cessful in asserting merger of a senior mortgage, merger is an issue
in a significant number of cases each year. After all, if frankalmoin
had not expressly been abolished, zealous advocates undoubtedly
still would be arguing it in any case to which it conceivably could
apply. In addition to further crowding already grossly overcrowded
court dockets, merger litigation is particularly troublesome because
it clouds property titles. Furthermore, the mere existence of
merger and of the threat of litigation over the issue, especially with
the specter of a court's wrongful application of the doctrine,
decreases the utility of deeds in lieu of foreclosure. Although a
practitioner representing a lender that has agreed to accept a deed
in lieu can counsel certain precautionary actions,22 4 acceptance of a
224. The most important precaution is to ensure that the deed in lieu includes Ian-
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deed in lieu always will implicate merger under the current state of
the law. The results are that quiet title actions are required to re-
solve the merger issue and that more foreclosures are conducted by
judicial process, which further crowds the courts.225
In addition to concerns about the quantity of litigation created
by merger are concerns about the quality of the resulting law.
Merger has become ensnarled in a byzantine body of case law. In
deciding merger cases, courts have focused on a large variety of
factors. Different courts have considered, for example:
(1) whether the lienor assumed or took subject to the debt se-
cured by its lien or by the junior liens;226
guage clearly stating that the lender intends the fee and mortgage interests to remain dis-
tinct. Additionally, the lender's attorney should require the borrower to execute an estoppel
certificate certifying that the transaction is fair, that the value of the property is less than
the amount of the outstanding debt, and that the transfer is genuine and equitable. The
certificate should be buttressed by an independent appraisal that states that the property
value is less than the debt, if true. If necessary, the lender should give the borrower a cove-
nant not to sue rather than a release of liability. Assuming that the land value is less than
the outstanding debt, the covenant not to sue leaves the debt in existence, although the
lender has agreed not to sue the borrower for it. If the lender executes a release, on the
other hand, the debtor's liability is extinguished, in turn subjecting the mortgage to possible
extinguishment on the basis that it is unsupported by a debt. P. BAYSE, supra note 181, at
717-25; Jones, supra note 202, at 66-72. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 284,
285 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.24, at 289 (1982). The lender also can attempt
to obtain title insurance insuring that merger has not occurred. But see M. FRIEDMAN, CON-
TRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 4.8(a), at 347-48 (4th ed. 1984). Finally, the
mortgagee could acquire title in the name of a nominee, R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 540-41 (2d ed. 1981), though this action is not always effective
to avoid merger. Cook v. American States Ins. Co., 150 Ind. App. 88, 275 N.E.2d 832 (1971).
Of course, the above precautions will come to naught if a court voids the deed in lieu on
one of the grounds described above. Therefore, merger always must be a concern for the
lender. Even if a lawyer is successful in preventing merger of the mortgage lien by inserting
a clause in the deed in lieu, this procedure is a legally required instance of exalting form
over substance. If the merger doctrine is legislatively or judicially eliminated, on the other
hand, a lender would never jeopardize its lien interest by acquiring title to the encumbered
property. Elimination of merger will not protect the lender who has acted unconscionably or
otherwise has acquired property worth more than the amount of the outstanding debt; that
transaction still can be voided under the bankruptcy laws or on the other grounds specified
above. Merger operates only to injure the unwary in the deed-in-lieu transaction or the
unlucky in a legal proceeding.
225. 2 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, LAND TITLES § 564, at 454 (2d ed. 1957). Of course, the
lender is required to foreclose by judicial action only if the jurisdiction in which the prop-
erty is located does not authorize foreclosure by advertisement. Foreclosure by advertise-
ment is legislatively authorized in approximately 25 states. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 7.19. To enhance the utility of deeds in lieu, a few state legislatures have enacted
statutes creating a presumption that the deed is valid, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.18 (West
1984); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 706.09 (West 1981 & Supp. 1986), and title standards have been
adopted in some states for the same purpose. See P. BASYE, supra note 181, at 606-07.
226. Fouche v. Delk, 83 Iowa 297, 299-300, 48 N.W. 1078, 1079 (1891); Nebraska Cent.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. H.J. Hughes & Co., 121 Neb. 266, 268-69, 236 N.W. 699, 700 (1931);
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(2) whether the statute of limitations has expired on enforce-
ment of the secured note or mortgage;22 7
(3) whether the lienor was aware of the existence of the junior
liens when he acquired the encumbered property;2 28
(4) whether the lienor was negligent in failing to discover the
junior liens;
229
(5) whether the lienor received or gave consideration in addi-
tion to the property;
2 30
(6) whether the lienor acquired title from the owner or at an
involuntary sale;
23 1
(7) whether the involuntary sale at which the lienor acquired
title was conducted on a lien held by the lienor or by a third
party;
232
(8) whether the lienor had assigned the lien to secure its obli-
gation to a third party;
233
(9) whether the lien or encumbered land is owned in tenancy
by the entirety or in another form of concurrent ownership;234
Waft Bros., Inc. v. Bank of North Carolina, N.A., 289 N.C. 198, 206-09, 221 S.E.2d 273, 278-
80 (1976); Senter v. Senter, 87 Ohio St. 377, 101 N.E. 272 (1913).
227. Mortgage can be enforced: Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1885); Austin v.
Edwards, 201 Ala. 532, 533, 78 So. 886, 887 (1918); Allen v. Glenn, 87 Ga. 414, 13 S.E. 565
(1891); Katz v. Obenchain, 48 Or. 352, 358, 85 P. 617, 620 (1906). Mortgage cannot be
enforced: Ford v. Nesbitt, 72 Ark. 267, 269-70, 79 S.W. 793, 794 (1904); Kern Valley Bank v.
Koehn, 157 Cal. 237, 239, 107 P. 111, 112 (1910); McGovney v. Gwillim, 16 Colo. App. 284,
287, 65 P. 346, 347 (1901); Jenks v. Shaw, 99 Iowa 604, 610, 68 N.W. 900, 902 (1896).
228. Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858, 863, 49 S.W.2d 1046,
1048 (1932); Lowman v. Lowman, 118 Ill. 582, 586-87, 9 N.E. 245, 257 (1886); Overland-
Wolf, Inc. v. Koory, 183 Neb. 611, 162 N.W.2d 889 (1968); Eythe v. Commercial Bank &
Say. Co., 40 Ohio App. 150, 178 N.E. 425 (1930); Katz v. Obenchain, 48 Or. 352, 358, 85 P.
617, 619 (1906).
229. Lien merged: Maulding v. Sims, 213 Ill. App. 473, 477-78 (1919); Fort Dodge
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Scott, 86 Iowa 431, 434, 53 N.W. 283, 284 (1892); Rice v. Winters, 45
Neb. 517, 531-34, 63 N.W. 830, 834-35 (1895); Bohn Sash & Door Co. v. Case, 42 Neb. 281,
290-98, 60 N.W. 576, 578-81 (1894). Contra: Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Collins, 120 N.J.
Eq. 266, 269-70, 184 A. 621, 623 (1936); McCraney v. Morris, 170 S.C. 250, 256-62, 170 S.E.
276, 278-80 (1933).
230. Mortgagee gave additional consideration: Gray v. Nelson, 77 Iowa 63, 67-68, 41
N.W. 566, 567 (1889); McCraney v. Morris, 170 S.C. 250, 170 S.E. 276 (1933). Mortgagee
received additional consideration: Campbell v. Carter, 14 I1. 285, 290-91 (1853).
231. Schnell v. Schroder, 8 S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 328, 332-33 (1831); Southworth v.
Scofield, 51 N.Y. 513, 517 (1873).
232. Toston v. Utah Mortgage Loan Corp., 115 F.2d 560, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1940); In re
Bogue, 19 F. Supp. 348, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1937); Hospes v. Almstedt, 83 Mo. 473, 474-75 (1884),
af'g, 13 Mo. App. 270 (1883).
233. International Bank v. Wilshire, 108 Ill. 143, 148-50 (1883).
234. Wallach v. Wallach, 107 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (1951); Sparrow v. Mowers, 315 Pa.
460, 173 A. 273 (1934).
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(10) whether the lien is a deed of trust or a mortgage;23 5
(11) whether the lienor holds one or more liens encumbering
the property;2 36
(12) whether the lienor acquired all or only a portion of the
mortgaged land;2 37 and
(13) whether the lienor acquired full fee title or only an undi-
vided interest in the mortgaged land.23 s
By focusing on these extraneous factors, courts lose sight of
the basic issue presented in the garden variety merger case: Should
the mortgagee be permitted to enforce its lien? Focusing on these
extraneous factors also causes courts to apply merger mechanically
without considering the real issue, which normally is preservation
of security. If the facts of the case involve one or more of the fac-
tors listed above, a court reacts rather than deliberates, and the
result is categorical. Courts should recognize that the answer to the
question of merger depends on the purpose for which the question
has been asked. Elimination of merger would focus attention on
the substance of a security dispute rather than on its artificial
categorization.238
Elimination of merger also would remove other sources of
judicial error. As demonstrated in the next section of this Article,
some courts have extended the usual presumption against applica-
tion of merger to the completely inapposite case in which a prop-
erty owner "acquires" a mortgage encumbering its property and
then forecloses the mortgage to eliminate junior liens. Equally sur-
prising is that some courts wrongfully have applied merger when
considering the continued enforceability of a secured debt, as will
235. Deed of trust is equivalent to mortgage for merger analysis: Landoff v. Garfinkel,
467 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Sheldon v. La Brea Materials Co., 216 Cal. 686,
690, 15 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932). Contra Hospes v. Almstedt, 13 Mo. App. 270, 273 (1883),
aff'd on other grounds, 83 Mo. 473 (1884).
236. Maulding v. Sims, 213 Ill. App. 473, 475-76 (1919); Wright v. Anderson, 62 S.D.
444, 448-49, 253 N.W. 484, 486-87 (1934).
237. Ex parte Powell, 68 S.C. 324, 325, 47 S.E. 440, 440 (1904); Trimmier v. Vise, 17
S.C. 499, 501-04 (1882); Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trustees of Cent. States, 93 Nev. 257, 563
P.2d 82 (1977); Souther v. Pearson, 28 A. 450, 451 (N.J. Ch. 1894).
238. Cole v. Beale, 89 Ill. App. 426, 432 (1900); Chase v. Van Meter, 140 Ind. 321, 333,
39 N.E. 455, 459 (1894); Haggerty v. Byrne, 75 Ind. 499, 508 (1881); Thebaud v. Hollister, 37
N.J. Eq. 402, 405 (N.J. Ch. 1883); Jemzura v. Jemzura, 36 N.Y.2d 496, 330 N.E.2d 414, 369
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1975).
239. See, e.g., Miles Homes, Inc. v. Harrah Plumbing & Heating Serv. Co., 408 N.E.2d
597 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Despite the usual analytic rigidity of the early common law with
respect to estates in land, even some early common law courts and commentators recognized
that merger might apply to extinguish a property interest for some, but not all, purposes.
Ferrers v. Fermor, Cro. Jac. 643 (1622), 79 Eng. Rep. 554 (1907); Coke Litt. § 338.b.
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be described in the final section of this Article. Moreover, despite
the completely nonsubstantive purpose for merger, some courts
have applied it wrongfully to eliminate valuable mortgage rights.
For example, in Floorcraft Distributors, Inc. v. Horne- Wilson,
Inc.,2" 0 a 1971 Florida appellate court case, a first mortgagee
accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure apparently without knowl-
edge of a junior lien encumbering the property. After discovering
the junior lien, the first mortgagee brought suit to eliminate it. The
court held that the first mortgagee could not eliminate the junior
lien because the first mortgage had merged into the fee title. As a
result, the first mortgagee either must pay the debt secured by the
junior lien or must risk losing the property if the junior lienor
forecloses.24
Unaccountably, the court in Floorcraft did not mention the
equitable exception to the merger doctrine, which should have con-
trolled. Instead, the court relied on language from a Florida
Supreme Court decision:
When a mortgage on land and the equity of redemption in the same lands
become united in the same person, ordinarily the mortgage is merged and the
same ceases to be an incumbrance and the owner will hold the lands with an
unincumbered title, if there be no other mortgage or lien.
242
Taken out of context, this language is subject to the construction
that the mortgage will not merge if another lien encumbers the
title. Of course, that would be the appropriate result under the
almost universally applied equitable exception. The opinion from
which this language was quoted, however, involved a case with
facts very similar to those in Floorcraft, and that court reached the
same incorrect result as the court in Floorcraft. Because courts are
not infallible, merger should be eliminated to avoid such results.
The most telling objection to courts' continued application of
merger, however, is that modern title recording acts and title prac-
tices have rendered the doctrine obsolete. Every state has a title
recording act.243 The acts are designed to provide a record of land
ownership so that a prospective purchaser will be put on notice of
240. 251 So. 2d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
241. The plaintiff in Floorcraft, however, was not completely without recourse. If the
deed in lieu contained title covenants that did not except the junior lien, the mortgagee who
accepted the deed will have a cause of action against the former owners. The value of this
right probably will be negligible, however, because the necessity of giving a deed in lieu
normally is precipitated by the former owners' financial distress.
242. 251 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), quoting from Alderman v. Whid-
den, 142 Fla. 647, 195 So. 605 (1940).
243. 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 17.4; 6A R. POWELL, supra note 2, 905[1].
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previous conveyances of any interest in the property.24 4 To effectu-
ate this purpose, recording acts generally provide that an otherwise
valid property interest is enforceable against a subsequent pur-
chaser only if the earlier purchaser recorded an acceptable identifi-
cation of his ownership interest.245 In this manner, states have cre-
ated a substantial incentive for grantees of a property interest to
record proof of their ownership. Failure to do so may result in loss
of the interest and the ownership of a lawsuit.
To accomplish this goal of providing information to prospec-
tive purchasers, state legislatures have abrogated many common-
law rules concerning property titles. The common law followed the
common sense approach that "first in time is first in right." That
is, if a property owner conveyed the property and then purported
to convey it to another person, the second conveyance was a nul-
lity. According to common-law title theory, because the owner
already had parted with title, he had no title to convey to the sec-
ond grantee. This result followed no matter how reasonable were
the second purchaser's expectations and actions. 246 The recording
acts, however, change this result. Unless the first grantee complies
with the terms of the recording act, the second grantee will own
the property if he complies.
In addition to abrogating the common-law rule that "first in
time is first in right," the recording acts also vitiate the necessity
for the common-law doctrine of merger. Before the modern record-
ing acts existed, merger was a convenient tool for describing the
process by which a person who held fee and lien interests in a par-
cel of property could be characterized as owning only the fee;
merger was a tool for simplifying the state of title. Given the
embryonic state of legally recognized property interests, merger
was an appropriate device. With the multiplicity of currently rec-
ognized interests, however, merger never can be the automatic pro-
cedural device it was in the past. Indeed, to avoid penalizing an
owner who did not express an intent that the interests remain dis-
tinct, courts often have resorted to fictions to find an intent to
keep the interests distinct. This necessity of factfinding, requiring
a judicial action, severely reduces the usefulness of merger.
The recording acts have eliminated the need for fictions con-
cerning the owner's intent and for simplification where simplicity
244. 4 AM. L. PRoP., supra note 2, § 17.5; 6A R. POWELL, supra note 2, 1 904[3].
245. See 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 17.5, at 538-42.
246. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 279-80 (2d ed. 1975).
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does not exist. An owner of the fee and lien interests clearly can
express her intent concerning the continued existence of the lien
by recording vel non on the public records a release of the lien.
Indeed, to avoid a prospective purchaser's objection to her title,
the owner must record a release of the mortgage interest. Failure
to do so generally renders her title unmarketable, a result so con-
trary to her interests as to ensure near universal compliance.247
Courts' rejection of merger in the marketable title context
confirms the inefficacy of merger in modern practice. Courts have
rejected arguments that merger operates to clear the title of a
mortgage that has not been released of record. Thus, the existence
of an unreleased mortgage on the property records normally will
cause title to be unmarketable even though the same person
appears from the record to own the fee title and the mortgage lien.
The reason is that the operation of merger has become primarily a
matter of the holder's intent and, hence, is incompatible with a
system of recorded documents. As stated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Thauer v. Smith:
The recording act was not passed for the purpose of enabling a prospective
purchaser to judge for himself whether there has been a merger of two out-
standing estates . . . Whether there is a merger or not oftentimes depends
upon considerations extraneous [to] the record. . . . To permit the prospec-
tive purchaser to conclusively decide for himself whether a merger of the two
interests resulted from the execution and delivery of a deed from the original
mortgagor to the apparent record holder of the mortgage is going farther than
was intended by the recording act.
24 8
Some courts have ameliorated the harshness of this rule by
finding equitable grounds for eliminating a mortgage lien from the
record title. In a few cases, for example, the courts have presumed
that the owner of the fee and mortgage interests intended them to
merge because he had not attempted to collect the debt or to
enforce the lien for a substantial length of time. 49 Similarly, other
247. Modern title theory and practice emphasize a property buyer's right to receive a
marketable title, a title that is free of question and that does not require any action to clear
a real or apparent cloud on the title. 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 18.7. The concept of
marketable title has become so dominant that an agreement for the sale of property
includes an implied covenant that the owner will convey marketable title unless the parties
expressly agree otherwise. Id. § 18.7, at 670. Moreover, lenders contemplating loaning money
against the security of a parcel of property generally require that the owner have marketable
title, and a commonly used form of title insurance expressly insures the marketability of an
owner's title. E.g., AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION TITLE INSURANCE POLICY FORM B-
1970.
248. 213 Wis. 91, 96, 250 N.W. 842, 844 (1933). Accord G. WARVELLE, supra note 5, at
374-75.
249. Clody v. Sothard, 57 Misc. 242, 246, 109 N.Y.S. 411, 413-14 (1907); Greenfield v.
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courts have held that a mortgage lien merged into the fee title
despite the absence of a mortgage release or other recorded expres-
sion of intent when the owner of the fee and mortgage conveyed
the property by a warranty deed that did not expressly except the
lien from its title covenants.250 The courts' rationale is that the
failure to except the lien from the deed covenants is sufficient and
conclusive evidence of an intention to merge. Thus, the courts
appear to be relying on estoppel, as they do in estoppel by deed
cases.
In Lyman v. Gedney,251 for example, a person obligated to
purchase certain property attempted to avoid the purchase by
objecting to the quality of the owner's title. Among the purchaser's
objections was the claim that a mortgage lien against the title had
not been released of record. The court responded that the mort-
gage had been extinguished when a previous owner of the property,
who concurrently owned the mortgage lien, had conveyed the prop-
erty without excepting the lien from the deed covenants. The
court's holding that merger had occurred, however, was colored by
its belief that the purchaser simply was attempting to avoid its
obligation to perform under the contract.
[I]t is worthy of note that in respect of the many objections of incumbrances
on the property, not a single instance is shown where one is threatened to be
enforced. They are hunted up and magnified by the [purchaser] as after-dis-
covered excuses for a previous refusal to perform his contracts.
252
Some courts have extended this estoppel rationale to eliminate
a mortgage lien in more ambiguous circumstances. In Bridgman v.
Johnson,5 3 for example, a mortgagee foreclosed after a default on
one of three notes secured by the mortgage and purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale. The mortgagee then conveyed the
property by a warranty deed that apparently failed to exclude the
mortgage from the title covenants. In a subsequent suit to enforce
one of the remaining notes against two endorsers, the court held
that the mortgagee could not recover on the notes because her
delivery of the warranty deed extinguished the mortgage, thereby
destroying the endorsers' rights of subrogation. If the law presumes
Mills, 123 A.D. 43, 44, 107 N.Y.S. 705, 706 (1907).
250. Lyman v. Gedney, 114 I1. 388, 406, 29 N.E. 282, 286 (1885); Clody v. Southard, 57
Misc. 242, 244-45, 109 N.Y.S. 411 (1907); Greenfield v. Mills, 123 A.D. 43, 44, 107 N.Y.S.
705, 705-06 (1907); Krekeler v. Aulbach, 51 A.D. 591, 592, 64 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (1900), afl'd,
169 N.Y. 372, 62 N.E. 416 (1902).
251. 114 Ill. 388, 29 N.E. 282 (1885).
252. Id. at 411, 29 N.E. at 288.
253. 44 Mich. 491, 7 N.W. 83 (1880).
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that a mortgagee will intend what is in her best interest, the court
in Bridgman acted in obvious disregard of the mortgagee's pre-
sumed intent. Furthermore, the mortgagee had not recorded a
mortgage release or otherwise evidenced any intent to merge the
lien. Despite these facts, the court merged her lien out of existence,
thereby preventing destruction of the new owner's interest.
Thus, although the rule remains that courts will not disturb
the public record with presumed merger, in certain factual circum-
stances the courts will find an intent to merge. This reaction to
equities in certain cases, however, is by no means a vindication of
the relationship of merger with the recording act. The result that a
mortgage is merged despite the absence of a recorded release is
attained only through litigation. The avoidance of litigation, how-
ever, is one of the purposes underlying the universal adoption of
recording acts. Any doctrine that is vindicated only through judi-
cial factfinding is anathema to the basis of the recording acts.
Furthermore, even when a court ignores the owner's intent
and the recorded documents or absence of such documents to hold
that the owner's interests have merged, the court could have
reached the same result without recourse to the uncertain merger
doctrine. In the paradigmatic case in which the mortgagee/owner
conveys the fee title by a warranty deed that does not reserve the
lien, the deed itself prevents enforcement of lien rights against the
land. The delivery of the deed transfers all the owner's interests in
the property. Moreover, the use of a warranty deed buttresses this
rather obvious result with estoppel based on the title covenants.
That is, as a matter of warranty theory, as contrasted with title
theory, a seller cannot convey title, warranting it to be free of the
mortgage lien, and then attempt to assert the lien against the
property.
Similarly, recourse to merger is unnecessary in those cases
involving a lengthy lapse of time since any attempted enforcement
of the lien or the note secured by it. If the statute of limitations for
enforcement of the lien has expired, the court readily can dispose
of the merger issue by reference to the statute. Even if the statute
of limitations has not yet run, laches can prevent enforcement of
the mortgage lien. Application of laches requires findings that a
person failed to assert his rights for an unreasonable length of time
and that, as a result, another person has been injured.2 54 In those
254. 4 R. CALLMAN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES,
§ 22.21, at 109-10 (L. Altman ed. 4th ed. 1983):
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cases in which a lapse of time influenced the result, the court read-
ily could find that the mortgagee's delay in enforcement was
unreasonable and that the purchaser would be injured as a result
of the mortgagee's delay if the mortgage were now enforced. These
alternatives to merger are litigation related rather than devolving
from property recording systems. Merger as applied in these cir-
cumstances, however, also is a litigation device. Therefore, no
increased procedural costs are incurred by supplanting merger with
other more specific legal instruments. Thus, merger is unnecessary
in these cases.
Again, however, merger is worse than a mere anachronism.
Merger has exercised a rigor mortis-like grip on some courts, caus-
ing them to hold in accordance with the terms of the merger doc-
trine although the relevant recording act would require a different
result. This result is particularly surprising because, in other con-
texts, courts have destroyed a property interest when necessary to
protect the integrity of a recording act.255 Furthermore, merger is a
trap for the unwary property purchaser who relies on the appear-
ance of merger in the public property records. In Aiken v. Milwau-
kee and St. Paul Railway Co.,256 for example, a mortgagee re-
corded its mortgage and subsequently assigned it. The assignee,
however, failed to record the assignment instrument. The original
mortgagee then acquired title to the property, recorded its deed,
and sold the property. Because the property records showed the
seller to own the fee and mortgage interests, the purchaser be-
lieved that it acquired title free of the mortgage. When the mort-
gage assignee subsequently brought suit to foreclose the mortgage,
however, the court held that the assignee's lien was still alive and
It is a well-established principle that courts of equity may deny relief to those who
have delayed the assertion of their claims for an unreasonable time; they are thereby
penalized for want of due diligence in having failed to institute timely proceedings
.... an aggrieved party may become a victim of his own inertia.
... [L]aches equals unreasonable delay plus circumstances leading to an equitable
estoppel.
See also Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 416 (1894).
255. Courts have reached this result when dealing with chain of title problems, such as
the late recorded deed, the "wild deed," after acquired title, and a reciprocal negative cove-
nant that is included in the deed for only one affected lot. In each case, courts have held
that a bona fide purchaser was not bound by an earlier recorded document because it fell
outside the chain of title and, therefore, was virtually undiscoverable by the purchaser. The
courts' reason has been to preserve the integrity of the recording system by protecting the
purchaser's reliance on that system. See J. CRIBBEr supra note 246, at 290-93; G. NELSON &
D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 203-09 (2d ed. 1981).
256. 37 Wis. 469 (1875).
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enforceable. Because the original mortgagee had assigned the
mortgage before acquiring the fee, the court held that the interests
had not merged. Therefore, the assignee was entitled to foreclose
the mortgage and to destroy the purchaser's ownership interests.
The court's holding is in derogation of the property recording
system. The court held in favor of a party that took no action to
comply with the terms of the recording act to the detriment of a
party who relied on the information included in the property
records. Because recording acts are drafted broadly enough to in-
clude most types of instruments affecting property titles, including
mortgages and mortgage assignments,2 57 the court should have
held that the assignee's failure to record the assignment instru-
ment caused it to lose its interest in the property to a bona fide
purchaser from the person who appeared from the property
records to own the mortgage. The court did not consider that a
mortgage interest could be conveyed by a deed to a purchaser of
the land, as well as by an instrument of assignment to a purchaser
of the mortgage, thereby calling into play the priority provisions of
the recording act.258 Instead, the court ignored the purpose and
substance of the recording act and applied common-law merger
analysis, which has been abrogated by the recording acts. The
court's holding results in purchasers' uncertainty, the necessity for
litigation to establish the state of title, and a diminution of the
credibility of the recording system itself.
259
A few courts, however, have reached a conclusion different
from the Aiken court, particularly when the purchaser had addi-
257. 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 17.8, at 549-50. A few jurisdictions have enacted
statutes in addition to the general recording statute, specifically providing for recording
mortgage assignments. Section 2934 of the California Civil Code provides that recording a
mortgage assignment will provide "constructive notice of the contents thereof to all per-
sons." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2934 (West 1984). Accord N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 46:18-3 to 18-4 (1982).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 44305 (1981).
258. 4 AM L. PROP., supra note 2, § 18.89, at 828 n.18.
259. A New York court took a different approach to reach the same improper result as
the court in Aiken. The mortgagee in Curtis v. Moore, 152 N.Y. 159, 46 N.E. 168 (1897),
assigned the mortgage, but again the assignee did not record the assignment. The original
mortgagee then acquired the fee title and conveyed it by a deed that did not disclose the
mortgage assignment. Despite the absence of notice to the purchaser of the assignment, the
court held that the purchaser acquired title subject to the mortgage. The court reasoned
that the mortgage assignee had to record the assignment to protect its interest only from a
subsequent purchaser of the mortgage interest but not from a subsequent purchaser of the
fee. By adopting this unduly restrictive view of the recording act, the court impaired the
integrity of the state's property recording system. The court protected a person who did not
comply with the terms of the recording act to the detriment of a person who relied on the
state of title shown by the property records.
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tional reasons for believing that the property records accurately
reflected the state of title. In Ames v. Miller,260 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that a property purchaser acquired title free
of a mortgage lien that the property records showed was held by
the seller, even though the seller had assigned the mortgage before
purchasing the encumbered property. In reaching this holding, the
court noted that the purchaser had paid the full unencumbered
value of the property, that the note secured by the mortgage was
long past due, and that the seller and an attorney had assured the
purchaser that the mortgage no longer encumbered the property.
Concern for the reliability of the property records, however, prop-
erly was of primary concern to the court:
The registry act should mean something, and he who would claim an interest
in real estate should comply with the letter and spirit of its provisions and
thus prevent injury and damage to those who deal with respect to such prop-
erty relying on the record as they find it, and as they of right may and should
do. The [assignee] has failed to take ordinary business-precaution to protect
his mortgage lien ... and he alone should suffer because of such neglect.
26 1
Even in this case, however, the court felt compelled to deal
with the merger doctrine and, in the process of doing so, signifi-
cantly distorted it. Despite the fact that the original mortgagee's
ownership of the mortgage and of the fee title never overlapped in
time, the court held that merger applied to coalesce those interests
because "every fact and circumstance shows an intention on the
part of the [original mortgagee] that the two estates should
merge. ' 262 The court cited the deed to the purchaser's failure to
except the mortgage from the title covenants as evidence of the
original mortgagee's intent to merge the interests. Of course, the
original mortgagee's intent and the form of deed he delivered to
the purchaser are irrelevant under the merger doctrine because the
most crucial factor, concurrent ownership of two estates, was ab-
sent. Yet the court apparently felt obligated to harmonize its hold-
ing with the merger doctrine regardless of the transparent
absurdity of its attempted conciliation. Instead, the court should
have recognized that the recording act superseded conflicting com-
mon-law doctrines such as merger.
At least one state partially has solved the purchaser's dilemma
with respect to an unreleased mortgage. When a person holds both
the fee title to encumbered property and the mortgage encumber-
260. 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).
261. Id. at 213, 91 N.W. at 253-54.
262. Id. at 211, 91 N.W. at 253.
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ing it and subsequently sells the property, Nebraska statutes pro-
vide that the lien interest will be deemed to have merged into the
fee unless the deed expressly states otherwise.2 6 3 Although the
Nebraska legislature is to be commended for rescuing the pur-
chaser and the recording system from the necessity of litigation in
this situation, this same purpose and result could have been ac-
complished more directly without reference to merger at all. A
statute would provide merely that the lien is extinguished under
the circumstances specified in the statute, just as statutes specify
when judgment liens and other forms of lien will be extinguished.
This method undoubtedly would please John of Ockham because
reference to merger is unnecessary and because the method would
bring treatment of mortgages in line with the treatment of other
liens. Furthermore, the Nebraska statutes are underinclusive be-
cause they do not address the problem created when the property
records indicate that one person owns both the fee and lien inter-
ests although in reality different people own these interests.
Although not statutory in nature, title standards have been
adopted in a few states to set forth circumstances in which a title
examiner may treat the mortgage lien as merged into the fee ti-
tle.264 These title standards, however, are underinclusive; the stan-
dards deal only with the situation in which the mortgagee owned
both the fee and the mortgage interests at the time of the convey-
ance or with otherwise limited circumstances. Furthermore, title
standards are not binding on a court. The standards merely are
criteria that associations of title examiners or bar associations
adopt to evaluate property titles. 65 Even in those states with title
standards providing a presumption of merger in some circum-
stances, courts apply the common-law equitable exception to
merger regardless of the title standards. Thus, title standards have
not yielded the answer to the problem of merger. Elimination of
merger is the answer.
As demonstrated above, the modern recording act has sup-
planted merger as a title simplification device. In this context,
merger operates only as a trap for the unwary, including the un-
wary court that is deflected by merger from following the dictates
of the recording act. Elimination of merger and renewed reliance
263. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-274 to 275 (1981).
264. See, e.g., Maine Standards for Title Examination, Standard No. 603 (1983); Min-
nesota Standards for Title Examination, Standard No. 34 (5th ed. 1973); Ohio Standards of
Title Examination § 3.14 (1981). See also P. BAYSE, supra note 181, at 608-09.
265. 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 18.9, at 676.
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on the recording system will increase the incentive and necessity
for recording mortgage assignments and releases and will create
greater certainty of title. Eliminating merger will mean simply that
a bona fide purchaser will take free of a mortgage lien if the mort-
gagee has recorded a release. If the mortgagee has not recorded a
release, the buyer is put on notice of the existence of an outstand-
ing claim. Therefore, the retirement of merger as a legal doctrine
will encourage property owners to obtain and to record written re-
leases to ensure that title is marketable.
Furthermore, rejection of merger and reliance on the recording
system will not affect the rights of a mortgagee who acquires fee
title to the encumbered property. If the mortgagee wishes to retain
the lien, this can be accomplished without fear of merger: the
mortgagee simply does not record a release. Even if the mortgagee
records a release, he remains protected against any junior liens
that existed before the release was recorded. Just as any other pur-
chaser, the mortgagee acquires title free of any unrecorded junior
lien of which the mortgagee had no notice. Even if the junior lien
was recorded when the mortgagee recorded the release, the mort-
gagee will retain his r ight to eliminate the junior lien because the
mortgage lien was first in time and of record when the junior lienor
recorded its lien. Recording acts normally provide that a recorded
instrument gives notice, and the concomitant right to rely, only to
subsequent purchasers of an interest in the property. 26 Because
the junior lienor would have acquired its interest in the property
before the release was recorded, the junior lienor cannot claim that
the subsequently recorded release prevents foreclosure of the sen-
ior lien. Therefore, this result is the same as that achieved by
applying the equitable exception to merger and eliminates unnec-
essary law suits filed by junior lienors who claim that the senior
lien merged into the fee title. For these reasons, merger as applied
to mortgages should be given the rest it has long deserved and
should be allowed to join frankalmoin in the history books.
2. Property Owner Acquires Lien
The body of law dealing with merger when a property owner
purports to "acquire" a mortgage encumbering the property is far
less substantial than that involving a mortgagee who acquires the
encumbered property. Merger is completely inapplicable to the
enforceability of a mortgage after the property owner "purchases"
266. Id., § 17.9.
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it. The owner's payment to the mortgagee, the alleged purchase,
only constitutes payment of the debt supporting the mortgage with
a resulting extinguishment of the mortgage lien. Therefore, be-
cause payment of a senior obligation necessarily advances junior
obligations in priority, the owner never should be permitted to use
the mortgage to clear the property title of junior liens. This conclu-
sion follows whether the owner is the original borrower, a grantee
of the borrower, or a grantee further removed in the chain of title.
Despite the obviousness of this conclusion, courts have consid-
ered a great variety of factors in dealing with this issue. Courts
have held, for example, that resolution of the issue of merger
depends on the following factors:
(1) whether the owner is the original borrower, an assuming
grantee of the original borrower, or a grantee who did not assume
personal liability for the debt;
2 7
(2) whether the owner acquired an undivided interest in the
debt;
268
(3) whether a third party loaned the owner the money to dis-
charge the mortgage;
269
(4) whether only one co-maker pays the debt;270 and
(5) whether the payor owned all or only a portion of the mort-
gaged property.
2 1
These factors are only representative of the spectrum of variables
that courts have considered in determining the continued existence
of the mortgage lien. Taking these factors into account, however,
clouds the true nature of the transaction.
When the owner is the original borrower or a grantee who
assumed personal liability for the secured debt, courts generally
recognize that the consideration paid to the mortgagee constitutes
payment of the debt rather than purchase of the security.27 2
267. Barnett & Jackson v. McMillan, 176 Ala. 430, 58 So. 400 (1912); Fouche v. Delk,
83 Iowa 297, 48 N.W. 1078 (1891); Hussey v. Hill, 120 N.C. 312, 26 S.E. 919 (1897); 3 R
POWELL, supra note 2, 459, at 696.29-.30; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1482.
268. Clark v. Clark, 56 N.H. 105, 113-14 (1875).
269. Elmora & W. End Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Dancy, 108 N.J. Eq. 542, 155 A. 796
(1931); French v. Grand Beach Co., 239 Mich. 575, 215 N.W. 13 (1927); Martin v. Hick-
enlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139 (1936); Von Bernuth v. Sutton, 6 N.Y.S. 377 (Sup. Ct.
1889).
270. Bronner v. Walrath, 208 A.D. 758, 758, 202 N.Y.S. 577, 578 (1924); Saint v. Corn-
wall, 207 Pa. 270, 272, 56 A. 440, 441 (1903).
271. Duncan v. Drury, 9 Pa. 332 (1848).
272. Theisen v. Dayton, 82 Iowa 74, 76-77, 47 N.W. 891, 892 (1891) (grantee); Andros-
coggin Say. Bank v. McKenney, 78 Me. 442, 6 A. 877 (1886) (grantee); Hussey v. Hill, 120
N.C. 312, 315-17, 26 S.E. 919, 920 (1897) (original borrower); Jeffrey v. Bond, 498 S.W.2d 31,
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Therefore, when the owner claims he expressed an intent to pre-
vent merger of the fee and lien interests, thereby enabling him to
foreclose the mortgage, he simply is attempting to use the equita-
ble exception to merger to overreach. Courts are more receptive to
the property owner's elimination of junior liens, however, when the
property owner is not personally liable for the debt. In some cases,
the court's misapprehension may have been caused by the owner's
structuring the transaction as a "purchase" and assignment of the
note and mortgage rather than as a cancellation and release of
these instruments. 73 In other frankly unaccountable cases, how-
ever, the owner did not characterize his payment as a purchase.7
Apparently, the owner attempted to enforce the mortgage lien only
35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 509 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1974) (original bor-
rower); 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1482.
This result is by no means universal, as evidenced by the decision in Commonwealth
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858, 49 S.W.2d 1046 (1932). In that case, the pur-
chaser acquired title to a parcel of property and assumed personal liability for a loan
secured by it. Subsequently, the purchaser retired the debt and had the mortgage cancelled
of record. When she later discovered the existence of a judgment lien encumbering the prop-
erty that had been junior to the mortgage, she commenced foreclosure proceedings based on
the cancelled mortgage to eliminate the judgment lien. Even though the purchaser was pri-
marily liable for the mortgage debt because of the assumption, the court reached the sur-
prising and incorrect conclusion that she was subrogated to the lender's rights under the
mortgage and could foreclose it to eliminate the judgment lien.
Apparently because the suit involved a mortgage foreclosure, the court immediately
focused on the merger vel non of the mortgage into the fee title. Reciting the familiar re-
frain that merger will occur only when the owner's best interests would be served, the court
held that the mortgage lien had not merged and, therefore, was enforceable. The court failed
to consider that the vitality of the lien ceased when the debt it secured was retired. Instead,
the court relied on cases concerning a mortgagee that acquired fee title to the mortgaged
property and subsequently foreclosed the mortgage to eliminate junior liens on the title.
These cases are inapposite to the instant situation in which the person primarily liable for a
debt purports to acquire and to exercise the mortgage lien securing the debt. See supra
notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
The Commonwealth court's decision was based in part on the purchaser's ignorance of
the judgment lien when she acquired the property. Actual notice is irrelevant, however, be-
cause the judgment lien was recorded in the appropriate public records. The purchaser
thereby had constructive notice of its existence, and it remained a lien on the title after she
acquired the property. The purchaser does have a cause of action against her grantor based
on the title covenants in the deed by which she acquired title, but she does not have the
right to eliminate the judgment lien by foreclosing the mortgage. Any damages resulting
from the purchaser's lack of actual notice of the judgment lien should be borne by the pur-
chaser's grantor; the judgment lienor cannot be put at risk because of events beyond its
knowledge and control.
273. Von Bernuth v. Sutton, 6 N.Y.S. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Hussey v. Hill, 120 N.C.
312, 315-17, 26 S.E. 919, 920 (1897); Duncan v. Drury, 9 Pa. 332, 333 (1848).
274. Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Shaffer v. McCloskey, 101 Cal.
576, 36 P. 196 (1894); Becker v. Snowden Dev. Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 1060, 323 N.Y.S.2d 79
(1971). Contra Moore v. Olive, 114 Iowa 650, 87 N.W. 720 (1901).
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after discovering the existence of junior liens on the title. Once this
type of plaintiff succeeds in arguing the court onto the merger
treadmill, the court automatically responds by reciting the basic
rule of modern merger that the interests will merge only if the
holder so intends and that equity will presume the intent most
beneficial to the interest holder. The Pavlovian court then upholds
the owner's right to foreclose the lien, and the conditioned
response to merger is complete.
Kelly v. Weir,275 a 1965 federal district court decision, pro-
vides a striking example of this automatic response to merger. In
that case, the plaintiffs acquired a farm as a result of a foreclosure
sale on a junior lien .21  Their acquisition of title was subject to a
senior mortgage lien and to certain dower and homestead rights.
Although the unencumbered value of the farm was more than
200,000 dollars, they paid only 61,639.34 dollars for it. The plain-
tiffs subsequently invested an additional 22,843.82 dollars to
"purchase" the senior mortgage and then instituted a foreclosure
action on the mortgage to eliminate the dower and homestead
rights. The court held that these "purchasers" could foreclose be-
cause the mortgage had not merged into the fee. To justify its
holding, the court recited the ubiquitous principle that merger oc-
curs only if so intended.
The court's superficial analysis of the case caused it to violate
the doctrine of merger, economic common sense, and all concepts
of fairness. The invocation of merger requires a union of consecu-
tive interests. In Kelly the plaintiffs never actually purchased the
mortgage lien, but rather extinguished it by discharging the debt it
secured. Before the equitable exception to merger can come into
play, the requisites of the merger doctrine obviously must be
satisfied.
Moreover, by mechanically stating and applying the equitable
exception to merger, the court reached a result that violated the
most basic economic common sense. The unencumbered value of
the farm was more than 200,000 dollars, but the plaintiffs invested
less than half that amount to buy it and to pay the senior mort-
gage debt. Yet the court's holding permits them to foreclose the
mortgage to eliminate all the junior interests, thereby giving the
275. 243 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
276. The plaintiffs did not buy the farm at the foreclosure sale on the junior lien.
Rather, the successful bidder at that sale sold the plaintiffs the certificate of purchase he
received at the sale. Id. at 591. Therefore, for all purposes relevant to this analysis, they
occupied the same position as a foreclosure sale purchaser.
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plaintiffs an unencumbered title. Even the most consumer-oriented
advocate would have trouble justifying this result, but the Kelly
court accepted this argument.
Finally, the court permitted the plaintiffs to eliminate the
dower and homestead interests although the court expressly had
found that the plaintiffs' purchase price was "fair" only if the farm
was encumbered by those interests. 7 Ironically, the court boot-
strapped the plaintiffs' desire to foreclose into evidence of an
intent to prevent merger, though the plaintiffs previously had not
expressed any such intent. Thus, from an intent to engage in sharp
dealing, the court fashioned a right for the plaintiffs to foreclose.
This result is objectionable particularly in light of the social poli-
cies underlying the creation of marital and homestead interests.
Distressingly, the Kelly decision is not a rare anomaly.2 78
In some cases courts are motivated to hold that the purchaser
can enforce the lien it "acquired" because the purchaser was una-
ware of the existence of the junior lien. In Shaffer v. McCloskey,
27 9
for example, the two owners of a parcel of property executed a
mortgage encumbering the property. When payment was due on
the debt secured by the mortgage, one cotenant conveyed his prop-
erty interest to the other cotenant in consideration of the latter's
agreement to pay the entire debt. The conveying cotenant did not
reveal that he had executed a junior trust deed encumbering his
interest in the property, but the trust deed was validly recorded.
The acquiring cotenant discharged the debt secured by the
mortgage, and the mortgagee released the lien of record. When the
owner cotenant discovered the existence of the trust deed, he
brought suit to revive the mortgage in his hands so he could fore-
close it to destroy the lien of the trust deed. The holders of the
trust deed argued that the mortgage interest had merged into the
277. "No one has ever contended that $60,000 would have been a fair price for the
unencumbered fee simple title to the farm. Indeed the record reveals that plaintiffs have
executed an option covering the property which calls for a price of more than $200,000." Id.
at 592 n.1.
278. See, e.g., Nebraska Cent. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. H.J. Hughes Co., 121 Neb. 266,
236 N.W. 699 (1931). In that case, the plaintiff acquired title to a parcel of property by a
deed that expressly stated that the conveyance was "subject to existing mortgage to
Nebraska Central Building & Loan Association and all other liens of record." Id. at 267, 236
N.W. at 700. When the plaintiff accepted the deed, the title was encumbered not only by
the mortgage, but also by a judgment lien junior to the mortgage. After the plaintiff dis-
charged the mortgage by payment, he initiated a foreclosure action to eliminate the judg-
ment lien. The court permitted this result because "it is clear that there was no merger
intended by [him]." Id. at 269, 236 N.W. at 700.
279. 101 Cal. 576, 36 P. 196 (1894).
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fee. Reciting the equitable exception to the merger doctrine, the
court held that the mortgage had not merged into the fee. The
court reasoned:
[The junior lienors] took the deed of trust while the mortgage was in full
legal existence, recorded and unsatisfied, and with perfect understanding that
it was a valid prior lien, and they are merely seeking to take an advantage
offered by an inadvertence or mistake of [the payor].
[The payor] clearly intended that his payment of the mortgage should inure
to his own benefit, and not to the benefit of [the junior lienors]; and there is
no equitable ground upon which [the junior lienors] can object to it so
inuring.2
80
As the sole legal support for its reasoning, the court cited a case
involving the wholly inapposite fact situation in which a senior
lienor who accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure subsequently was
permitted to foreclose the lien to eliminate a junior lien. s
The reasons described above for permitting a senior mortgagee
that accepts a deed in lieu to foreclose its lien simply do not exist
in the facts presented in Shaffer. First, the plaintiff in Shaffer was
primarily liable for the debt secured by the senior lien. Therefore,
as described above, his payment extinguished the debt and accom-
panying mortgage. He could not acquire and hold the mortgage
distinct from the fee because he never acquired the mortgage. Sec-
ond, he acquired the property title subject to the junior lien
because the lien was properly recorded, which caused the land to
become the primary fund for payment of the debt secured by the
lien. Therefore, the court should not have permitted the plaintiff
to destroy the junior lienors' rights in the land, which, in light of
the borrower's financial difficulties, presented the lienors' best
opportunity for recovery of the debt.
Unquestionably, the plaintiff in Shaffer was wronged in the
economic sense. His recourse and the proper direction of legal
analysis, however, should not be against the junior lienors, who are
innocent of any wrongdoing. Instead, the plaintiff's proper recourse
is against his cotenant. If the plaintiff acquired the cotenant's
interest by warranty deed, the plaintiff has an action based on the
title covenants. If he unwisely accepted a quitclaim deed, however,
he will have to establish a representation concerning the state of
title that survived delivery of the deed. Furthermore, the owner
cotenant could have avoided this difficulty by checking the prop-




erty records. The junior lienors, on the other hand, had done noth-
ing to create the owner's problem and, more important, had no
way of protecting their lien. Because the court's attention was
focused on merger, however, the court concerned itself only with
the result that would best serve the plaintiff's interests. 2
2
As stated above, courts generally recognize that a property
owner who is personally liable for a debt cannot pay the debt and
then foreclose the lien securing it to eliminate junior liens. Many
courts, however, such as the courts that decided Kelly and Shaffer,
treat a property owner who is not personally liable differently.
This different treatment is illogical and unjust. Distinctions based
on whether an owner is personally liable for a debt are valid when
considering enforceability of the debt. That distinction is irrele-
vant, however, when considering the property title. Regardless of
whether the owner is personally liable for the secured debt, he
acquired title to the property subject to the lien securing it. Many
courts, however, have not recognized this fact. Instead, they recite
the equitable exception to merger and, of course, hold that the
owner is benefited by being able to foreclose the senior lien. Other
courts blindly apply cases involving mortgagees who accept a deed
in lieu, although that fact situation is completely inapposite. By
eliminating merger as applied to mortgages, courts will not be
drawn onto the merger treadmill and will avoid unjustly destroying
junior creditors' liens.
282. Two authors of case notes have argued for the result reached by the Shaffer court
in cases involving assuming grantees. See Note, Mortgages-Subrogation-Right of Assum-
ing Grantee to be Subrogated to Senior Mortgage Paid by Him as Against an Unknown
Recorded Junior Mortgage, 24 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1939) [hereinafter "Minn. Case Note"];
Note, Mortgages-Right of Assuming Grantee to be Subrogated to First Mortgage Paid by
Him in Ignorance of Recorded Second Mortgage, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 1012 (1939) [hereinafter
"Pa. Case Note"]. Both authors reasoned that, "[i]f the grantee had known of the junior lien
he could have protected himself by purchasing the mortgagor's interest in the land, without
assuming the senior mortgage, and then procuring an actual assignment of the latter upon
its payment," thereby enabling the grantee to eliminate the junior lien by foreclosure. Minn.
Case Note at 123. See Pa. Case Note at 1013. Although the noted cases involved grantees
who assumed personal liability, rather than the original borrower as in Shaffer, the same
analysis applies. The grantee in each case was primarily liable for the senior debt by virtue
of the assumption agreement. Therefore, as described above, the grantee's payment extin-
guished the debt and accompanying mortgage. Even if the grantee had acquired title subject
to the junior lien without assuming liability for it, the grantee would have no right to elimi-
nate it except by payment because the land would have become the primary fund for
payment.
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B. Merger and Debts
Some courts and commentators, misapprehending the proper
role of the doctrine of merger, have applied it to analyze the con-
tinued enforceability of a debt when one person holds a mortgage
and the encumbered land. As discussed above, merger is absolutely
inapplicable to the debt aspect of the mortgage transaction. The
debt relationship, if evidenced by a negotiable instrument as
defined by the Uniform Commercial Code,83 is governed by Article
3 of the Code and by supplemental contract principles. If the debt
relationship falls outside the ambit of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it is governed by contract law. Because merger is concerned
only with matters of title, application of merger to the contractual
debt relationship can cause obviously incorrect results, as will be
demonstrated in this section.
Understanding these incorrect results is facilitated by first
examining the appropriate methods of analysis, as contrasted with
the merger-related attempts. The question of the continued exis-
tence of the debt can arise in several different factual contexts, but
its resolution is governed in every case by contract principles. As
will be shown, many courts fail even to consider contract law in
their analyses of these cases. The most backward of these
approaches focuses exclusively on the issue of merger. As a result,
courts using this analysis hold that the debt is enforceable only if
the mortgage has not merged into the fee. Other courts, while rec-
ognizing that contract principles are at least relevant, either have
ignored the real estate context or have treated the debtor's convey-
ance of the mortgaged property to the lender as irrelevant to the
debt though the parties intended otherwise. Each type of error
leads to unsupportable results.
In general, courts err by failing to recognize that the enforce-
ability of the debt and of the mortgage usually are independent
questions. When a lender makes a secured loan, it has two differ-
ent methods of recovering the debt. A lender can enforce personal
liability on the note or foreclose the mortgage and sell the land.
Although under modern theory a borrower retains the absolute
right to convey fee title to the encumbered property, the convey-
ance will not adversely affect the lender's right to enforce its secur-
ity interest if the lender has complied with the applicable record-
ing act or, less commonly today, if the purchaser otherwise has
283. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1977).
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notice of the lender's interest.2 4 Therefore, unless the borrower
discharges the debt before conveying title to the purchaser, the ti-
tle will remain encumbered by the mortgage lien. In real estate
parlance, the purchaser has acquired title "subject to" the
mortgage.
Although the property is encumbered, the purchaser does not
become personally liable for the debt solely by reason of acquiring
the land. Personal liability occurs only if the purchaser assumes
liability for the debt. Upon assumption, the purchaser becomes
primarily liable and the original borrower secondarily liable.285 In
recognition of the purchaser's assumption of the original bor-
rower's primary liability, the purchaser's price for the property is
reduced by the outstanding debt amount. For example, if the fair
market value of the property unencumbered by any liens is 100,000
dollars and if the purchaser assumes an 80,000 dollar debt secured
by the property, the purchaser should pay 20,000 dollars, which
represents the market value of the property encumbered by the
mortgage. In case of default on the note or the mortgage, the
lender may proceed directly against the assuming purchaser based
on the assumption agreement or may foreclose the mortgage. 28
Additionally, if the lender has not released the borrower, the
lender retains its right to sue the borrower for the debt.
When the purchaser has assumed, courts treat the original
borrower as a surety for the debt. Thus, if the borrower retires the
debt, either voluntarily or in satisfaction of a judgment against her
on the note, she is subrogated to the lender's rights in the note and
in the mortgage and, therefore, has recourse against both the pur-
chaser and the land, respectively.287 Although the borrower paid
the debt, the debt is not extinguished, but continues to exist for
the purpose of enforcing the borrower's subrogation rights. Accord-
ing to subrogation theory the debt is not extinguished until the
person or property that is primarily responsible for it has satisfied
284. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, §§ 5.1-5.2. Although the borrower retains
the right to convey title to the property, the conveyance may trigger the lender's right to
enforce a due-on-sale clause if the mortgage contains one. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 591.1-.6 (1986). If
the lender exercises the due-on-sale clause, the loan must be repaid, and the lien securing it
will be extinguished.
285. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 224, § 10.5, at 735; G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 5.10.
286. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 224, § 10.5, at 735; G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 5.11.
287. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 224, § 10.5, at 735; G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 5.10.
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that responsibility. 28
Nothing in the law requires the debt to be assumed, of course;
the decision is the result of negotiation. If the purchaser does not
assume the debt, title to the land remains encumbered by the lien,
but no personal liability attaches to the purchaser. Therefore, in
case of default on the debt or the mortgage, the lender can sue the
original borrower for payment of the debt or can foreclose the
mortgage and recover any deficiency from the borrower. The
lender, however, has no recourse against the new owner in his per-
sonal capacity. All that the purchaser risks is title to the property.
If a purchaser acquires title subject to a mortgage, the com-
mon practice is for the purchase price to be reduced by the amount
of the outstanding debt even though the purchaser does not
assume the debt. The parties expect that the purchaser will make
the required payments for as long as he owns the land to protect
his title from foreclosure. Because the purchaser's cash payment
for the property is reduced to reflect the outstanding debt and
because of the practical assumption of the duty to pay, the pur-
chaser's obligation may be described as quasi-contractual. Unlike
the actual assumption scenario, however, the borrower cannot be
subrogated to any rights in the note against the purchaser because
of the absence of personal liability.
As when the purchaser assumes, the borrower remains liable
'for the debt, unless the lender has released her. The borrower,
however, no longer is the ultimate source for satisfaction of the
debt. The mortgaged property effectively becomes primarily liable.
Therefore, if the borrower satisfies the obligation, she is subro-
gated to the lender's rights in the land and can foreclose the mort-
gage to recover her payment. As in the case of the purchaser's as-
sumption of liability, the borrower's payment does not extinguish
the debt, at least up to the value of the property. The debt re-
mains to support the borrower's subrogation rights in the
mortgage. 3 9
288. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-601(3) (1977).
289. Although the statement that property, an entity without legal capacity, can be
liable for a debt, primarily or otherwise, appears to be conceptually illogical, it is merely a
descriptive shorthand for the correct result. By selling the property for an amount equal to
the unencumbered fair market value less the amount of the outstanding debt, the borrower
essentially has transferred ultimate liability for the debt. Rather than selling the property
subject to the lien, thereby permitting the purchaser to defer payment of a portion of the
value of the property, the borrower might have sold the property free of the lien by charging
the full unencumbered value and using the sale proceeds to pay the debt. Therefore, a bor-
rower who discharges the loan or any portion of it after selling property subject to the loan
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The result is different in the fairly unusual case in which the
purchaser acquires title subject to the mortgage lien but the bor-
rower agrees to remain primarily liable for the debt. In exchange
for this agreement, the purchaser pays the full unencumbered
value of the property. Again, neither the lender nor the borrower
can sue the purchaser on the note since he did not assume liability,
but the property remains liable to foreclosure pursuant to the
mortgage. If the borrower who remains primarily liable defaults
and the purchaser discharges the debt to protect his interest in the
property, the purchaser may pursue the borrower based on both
counts: the transfer agreement and under subrogation to the
lender's rights against the borrower pursuant to the note. Simi-
larly, if the lender forecloses the mortgage, the purchaser can sue
the borrower based on their agreement for damages for the loss of
the property.2
0
The results in cases deciding the continued enforceability of a
debt are well accepted and conform to the parties' expectations
and to the economic realities. When one person holds the fee and
mortgage interests, however, many courts either have misapplied
these basic contractual principles or, not having recognized their
applicability, improperly have applied merger. Commentators
describing this body of case law have divided it into several differ-
ent factual contexts: (1) the mortgagee acquired title to the prop-
erty from the mortgagor, with further distinctions based on
whether the mortgagee assumed the debt; (2) the mortgagee
acquired title to the property from the mortgagor's grantee, with
further distinctions based on whether the grantee or the mortgagee
assumed the debt; (3) the mortgagee acquired title to the mort-
gaged property at a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to its
mortgage with further distinctions based on whether the mortgagee
owned only that mortgage or also owned other liens encumbering
the property; (4) the mortgagee acquired title to the mortgaged
property at an involuntary sale conducted by a third party, such as
an execution sale on a tax lien; (5) the mortgagor acquired the note
and mortgage from the mortgagee or the mortgagee's assignee; and
(6) the mortgagor's grantee acquired the note and mortgage from
the mortgagee or the mortgagee's assignee, with further distinc-
is entitled to be subrogated to the lender's rights to prevent unjust enrichment of the pur-
chaser and to compensate the borrower for, essentially, a double payment on the loan. See
Franklin Mortgage Co. v. McDuffie, 43 Ga. App. 604, 604-05, 159 S.E. 599, 600 (1931).
290. See 2 G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 258.1, at 1159; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1435,
at 365.
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tions based on whether the mortgagor's grantee asumed the
debt.291 Such fact specific and categorical descriptions are unneces-
sary, however, The only relevant distinctions, which will be ex-
amined separately below, are between a lender who acquires the
property by voluntary or by involuntary conveyance and betweeen
an acquiring lender and an acquiring owner.
1. Effect of Mortgagee's Property Acquisition on Debt
Enforceability
a. Voluntary Conveyance
Because debt devolves from a contractual relationship com-
pletely separable from the security aspect of the mortgage, only
contractual analysis is appropriate to determine debt enforceabil-
ity. Therefore, when a property owner, whether the original mort-
gagor or a subsequent grantee, conveys encumbered property to
the mortgagee, the mortgagee's subsequent right to enforce the
debt depends only on whether the mortgagee and the property
owner intended the conveyance to be in full or partial satisfaction
of the debt. If satisfaction was intended and if the owner conveyed
the property on or before the performance date specified in the
note, the conveyance constitutes substituted performance. 2 If the
owner conveyed title after the due date, on the other hand, the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction governs. 93 The parties' mutual
intent is primary in substituted performance and in accord and
satisfaction analyses;2 94 the parties' intent concerning the debt,
291. See, e.g., 4 AM. L. PROP., supra note 2, § 16.143; G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 6.16; 9 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§§ 4798-4799 (1958).
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 278 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
224, at § 4.24, at 283-84.
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
224, § 4.24 at 285-86.
294. Ideally, the parties' intent is evidenced by express cancellation of the note, by a
written release of the owner's liability, or by a writing of similar effect. In the absence of
such an expression of intent, however, other facts can evidence the parties' intent. If the
mortgagee assumes the debt in connection with the conveyance, for example, the mortgagee
becomes primarily liable for the debt. Because the mortgagee also is entitled to payment of
the debt, the debt is extinguished. Similarly, if the deed to the mortgagee states that the
conveyance is subject to the mortgage, the property becomes the primary fund for payment.
Therefore, the debt is extinguished at least to the value of the land. On the other hand, if
the owner conveyed the property to the mortgagee as a gift or in full or partial satisfaction
of another debt held by the mortgagee, the debt that is the subject of the mortgagee's
enforcement action will not be extinguished because the parties did not so intend. There-
fore, the mortgagee can sue anyone who is personally liable for the debt even though the
mortgagee owns the property that secures it.
1987]
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however, is unrelated to the mortgagee's unilateral intent concern-
ing merger and the continued enforceability of the mortgage lien.
Despite the clear applicability of these contractual doctrines,
some courts have not applied them, with the astounding result that
the conveying owner receives no credit against the debt in
exchange for the property conveyance.295 Other courts inexplicably
have applied merger analysis. Some of these courts base their hold-
295. These cases demonstrate most clearly the complete breakdown of legal analysis
and economic common sense when courts become enmeshed in merger. Some courts apply
merger in a manner that completely obscures the payment aspect of the borrower's convey-
ance to the lender, as illustrated by Morton v. Rifai, 339 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976). In that case, the plaintiffs sold the defendants a parcel of property, and the defend-
ants executed a note and mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs as part of the purchase price.
After defaulting on the note, the defendants reconveyed the property to the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs then sued the defendants for the entire preconveyance balance owed on the note.
In deciding the case, the court began correctly, holding the issue of merger of the mort-
gage lien into the fee to be irrelevant to determining whether the defendants were still liable
on the note. Unfortunately, the court grounded its holding on another irrelevant principle: A
creditor is not required to satisfy a debt from the collateral securing it but, rather, enjoys
the option to sue on the note or to enforce its rights in the collateral. Incorrectly disregard-
ing the conveyance as an exercise of rights against the collateral, the court compounded its
error by reasoning that "when the [defendants] reconveyed the property to the [plaintiffs],
there may have been a merger insofar as the second mortgage was concerned, but the prom-
issory note, constituting a separate and distinct agreement, was unaffected by the reconvey-
ance." Id. at 708.
The court's conclusion that the conveyance had no effect on the debt is incredible. The
connection of the debt and the conveyance was unambiguous. No evidence existed that the
plaintiffs held any other debts for which the defendants were liable to justify a conclusion
that the value of the defendants' equity in the property was to be credited to another debt.
Furthermore, no evidence existed that the value of the defendants' equity in the property
was insufficient to repay the debt in full. By refusing to credit the debt with the value of the
property, the court made a gift to the plaintiffs of the defendants' equity in the property.
The parties' intent concerning the effect of the conveyance, the dispositive issue in the case,
vanished with the appearance of merger.
Unaccountably, the court expressly rejected the argument that the reconveyance consti-
tuted an accord and satisfaction. Id. Because the plaintiffs were suing to enforce the full
amount of the debt, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not intend the conveyance to
constitute an accord and satisfaction. Accord and satisfaction, however, is a more versatile
tool than the court recognized. The court's analysis ignored the existences of an implied
accord and satisfaction and of a partial accord and satisfaction. Thus, even if the parties
had not expressly agreed on the effect of the reconveyance, the necessary implication fur-
nished an agreement because the reconveyance was not referable to any cause other than
satisfaction of the debt. Moreover, even if the property had declined in value to less than
the amount of the debt, the conveyance constituted at least partial payment.
Accord Ellsworth v. Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc., 424 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
After the lender accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure, the value of the property decreased.
The lender then sued to foreclose its mortgage and to obtain a deficiency judgment. The
court held that the mortgage had not merged into the fee and that the conveyance had not
affected the borrowers' note obligation. Therefore, in calculating the amount of the defi-
ciency, the borrowers received a credit only for the foreclosure sale price rather than for the
greater value of the property on the date they conveyed title to the lender.
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ings on whether the debt merged into the mortgage,2 96 which these
courts do not recognize as legally impossible; a contract right can-
not merge into a property right. Other courts hold that if the mort-
gage and fee interests merged, the debt is unenforceable. Con-
versely, if the interests did not merge, the debt is enforceable.
Once a court dons the merger blinkers, it is oblivious to the eco-
nomics of the case.
In Johnson v. Gammill,2 7 for example, the court was misled
by merger to produce a result that not only was theoretically incor-
rect, but also failed to conform either to the mortgagors' or mort-
gagee's best interest or to their intent concerning the transaction.
In Johnson a lender held several notes executed by the borrowers.
In partial satisfaction of the aggregate debt, the borrowers con-
veyed to the lender property that secured an outstanding debt of
6,000 dollars held by the lender. The issue in the case was the
amount to be credited against the borrowers' total debt in ex-
change for the title conveyance. The lender testified that the par-
ties had agreed to a 4,500 dollar credit. The borrowers testified
that they had agreed to a 6,500 dollar credit. Rather than simply
making the evidentiary choice, the court unaccountably quoted
and applied two passages from Corpus Juris Secundum concerning
merger of mortgage and fee titles. Based on this superficial review
of the law, the court concluded that, because the lender had con-
veyed the property to a third party by a deed that did not ex-
pressly reserve the mortgage lien, the mortgagee intended to merge
the mortgage lien into the fee title. Because the mortgage lien had
merged, the 6,000 dollar debt secured by the property was extin-
guished, thereby resulting in a 6,000 dollar credit.
The court's approach could not help but obfuscate the real
issue. The borrowers' conveyance was mutually intended as partial
payment. The only question was the amount of the payment. That
issue is separate and distinct from the mortgagee's unilateral
intent concerning merger of the mortgage lien. Obviously, a secur-
ity can be released without affecting the debt obligation. Indeed,
the court's analysis is a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
By determining the continued enforceability of the debt based on
the enforceability of the lien securing the debt, the court reversed
the relationship of dependency between the debt and its security.
296. See, e.g., Cook v. American States Ins. Co., 150 Ind. App. 88, 101, 275 N.E.2d 832,
839 (1971); see also 4 AM. L. PRoP., supra note 2, § 16.143, at 336-37; G. OSBORNE, supra
note 65, § 272, at 547, 549; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1483, at 516-18.
297. 231 Ark. 1, 328 S.W.2d 127 (1959).
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Finally, and outside the realm of the theoretical, no evidence sup-
ported a credit in the amount of 6,000 dollars. The only evidence
concerning the parties' understanding was the mortgagee's testi-
mony that the agreed credit was 4,500 dollars and the mortgagors'
testimony that the agreed credit was 6,500 dollars. Clearly, the
court did not consider either party's intent concerning the effect of
the conveyance on the debt, which is the determinative factor for
accord and satisfaction. Unfortunately, Johnson is not an isolated
case.
298
298. By focusing on merger of the fee and mortgage interests rather than on the par-
ties' intent and the economics of the debt relationship, courts create the potential for un-
justly enriching lenders. As discussed earlier, a firmly established aspect of the doctrine of
merger is that it will occur only if that result is most beneficial to the interest holder. Obvi-
ously, a mortgagee always will enjoy the greatest benefit by holding title and by retaining
the right to enforce the secured debt. Analysis of the debt relationship, however, requires
that the court focus on the parties' mutual intent concerning the effect of the conveyance,
rather than on the lender's best interest.
The potential problem created by a court's analytically incorrect focus on the lender's
best interest is illustrated by Sheehan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Scanlon, 310 Pa. 6, 164 A. 722
(1933). In Sheehan, the borrower, after defaulting on his loan, conveyed the mortgaged
property to the lender. To accommodate the borrower, the lender agreed to hold title to the
property indefinitely and to reconvey it to him upon satisfaction of the loan. The lender had
obtained a judgment on the outstanding debt but never attempted to enforce the judgment.
The case arose when the borrower attempted to reopen the judgment on the debt or to have
it marked as satisfied based on his conveyance of the property to the lender.
In the course of analyzing the merits of the case, the court apparently began debt anal-
ysis by observing that a property conveyance constitutes payment of the secured debt only
if the parties so intended. In the next sentence of the opinion and for the rest of its analysis
of the applicable law and facts, however, the court detoured from debt analysis to merger
analysis. Rather than focusing on the parties' intent concerning the effect of the borrower's
conveyance to the lender, the court repeated the familiar rules that merger is a question of
the lender's unilateral intent and that merger will occur only if it is in the lender's best
interest. After concluding that the lender did not intend the mortgage to merge into the fee,
the court held that the conveyance did not extinguish the borrower's note liability.
Merger analysis was completely unnecessary to decide the case. In light of the lender's
agreement with the borrower to hold title pending payment of the debt, the evidence was
clear that the parties did not intend the conveyance to constitute payment of the debt. The
significance of this agreement apparently escaped the court and the parties. Instead, they
focused on merger. Despite its inappropriate focus on merger, the court reached the correct
result. Its analysis, however, created misleading precedent.
Although courts usually decide the issue of merger in accordance with the holder's best
interests, as in Sheehan, courts occasionally have applied merger in a manner detrimental to
the holder's best interests. In Jensen v. Burton, 117 Cal. App. 66, 3 P.2d 324 (1931), for
example, the court had to determine whether a mortgagee who accepted a deed in lieu of
foreclosure could recover the debt from the grantee. The court framed the issue raised by
the case as: "Is there any evidence that would support a finding that such transaction
resulted in a merger and consequent satisfaction of the note sued on here?" Id. at 69, 3 P.2d
at 326. Based on the mortgagee's actions in dealing with the property, the court concluded
that he had intended merger of the fee and mortgage interests, thereby preventing him from
recovering on the note.
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b. Involuntary Conveyance
If the mortgagee acquired title to the property through an
involuntary conveyance, the mortgagee and former property owner
obviously will not have formed a mutual intent concerning the con-
tinued enforceability of the debt. Instead, the result turns on
whether the mortgagee acquired title subject to the lien securing
the debt. Like any other property purchaser, if the lender acquires
title subject to a lien, including one that it owns, it cannot enforce
personal liability for the debt secured by that lien. If, on the other
hand, the lender acquires title free of its lien, it can enforce the
related debt.
When a lender buys land at an involuntary sale, such as a
foreclosure sale, it acquires title to the encumbered property
cleansed of the lien for which the sale is conducted and of any jun-
ior liens. 299 Therefore, if a mortgagee buys the encumbered prop-
erty at a foreclosure sale conducted on its mortgage, the mortgagee
acquires title cleared not only of all junior liens, but also of its
mortgage lien. In this case, the mortgagee retains the right to sue
anyone personally liable for the debt to collect any deficiency re-
maining after the sale.30 0 Because the foreclosure sale eliminated
any further security rights in the property, the mortgagee's only
recourse for a deficiency is against those liable on the note.
The court's invocation of merger was completely inappropriate. The post-conveyance
viability of the debt depended on the parties' contractual intent concerning the purpose of
the conveyance and its effect on the debt. If the parties intended the conveyance to satisfy
the debt, the debt was satisfied and extinguished. The mortgagee's unilateral decision to
merge the mortgage lien into the fee was entirely separate from his agreement with the
debtor concerning the effect of the conveyance on the debt. Merger of the mortgage lien and
the enforceability of the debt are distinct issues, one involving the state of title to the prop-
erty and the other involving contractual liability for the debt.
Although the court in Jensen erred analytically, its holding was correct. First, the
circumstances of the case indicated that the parties intended the conveyance to satisfy the
debt in full. The value of the property at the time of the conveyance exceeded the amount
of the debts it secured. Moreover, after the conveyance, the mortgagee made no further
attempts to collect the debt until he filed suit. Because the court did not limit its holding to
the facts before it, however, its analysis would have deprived the mortgagee of the right to
enforce the debt even if the property value had been less than the outstanding debt amount.
Accord Commercial Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Le Tourneau, 137 F.2d 87, 89 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 779 (1943) ("Under Illinois law, if there were a merger, the
mortgage debt was extinguished."); Toston v. Utah Mortgage Loan Corp., 115 F.2d 560 (9th
Cir. 1940); Friedman v. Pohnl, 143 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Baxter v. Redevco,
279 Or. 117, 122-23, 125, 566 P.2d 501, 503, 505 (1977); see also 4 Am. L. PRoP., supra note 2,
§ 16.143, at 336; 9 G. THOMPSON, supra note 291, § 4798, at 585; 5 H. TFFANY, supra note 2,
§ 1479, at 506.
299. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 7.12.
300. See id. § 8.1.
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Similarly, if the mortgagee owns more than one lien on the
property, forecloses the most senior lien, and buys at the sale, the
mortgagee can enforce the debt secured by each of its liens to the
extent that the debt was not satisfied from the foreclosure sale
proceeds.30 1 Again, unless the lender is permitted to sue on the
debt, the lender will have no means of recovering the debt because
the foreclosure sale eliminated its right of recourse against the
land. The reasoning and result are the same if the mortgagee
purchases the property at a sale conducted to satisfy a lien held by
someone other than the mortgagee. Because the mortgagee's lien
interest is extinguished, its ownership of the land has no impact on
liability for the debt.
Despite this relatively straightforward analysis, at least one
court recently has stated the doctrine of merger so broadly as to
indicate that it would apply merger to prevent a lender from
obtaining a deficiency judgment though the foreclosure sale extin-
guished its lien. In Southern Bank of Lauderdale County v. Com-
missioner"32 two mortgagees foreclosed their mortgages, and each
purchased at its sale. When the mortgagees subsequently discov-
ered that the foreclosure sales failed to eliminate junior tax liens
because the mortgagees had not given the statutorily required
notice, the mortgagees attempted to reforeclose their mortgages af-
ter giving the required notice. In holding that the mortgagees could
not reforeclose, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit stated: "When a
mortgagee forecloses on property, the doctrine of merger generally
operates to extinguish the mortgage indebtedness and the lien held
by the mortgagee."303 Because the suit concerned the existence of a
mortgage lien after a foreclosure sale, the court's overinclusive
statement concerning extinguishment of the debt is dictum. The
dictum is troubling, however, because the mortgagees alleged that
the fair market values of the properties were less than the amounts
of the outstanding debts that were the bases for the foreclosures.
The court's statement suggests that, if presented with the issue of
the availability of a deficiency judgment, the court would deny
recovery based on the doctrine of merger because the "merged"
indebtedness would be deemed extinguished.304
301. See id. § 6.16, at 467.
302. 770 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub noma. Mid-State Homes, Inc. v.
United States, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
303. Id. at 1007.
304. Besides incorrectly stating that the debts were subject to the operation of merger,
the court also was incorrect in holding that the liens merged into the fee titles, thereby
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Courts commit an equally serious analytic error when they
apply merger to determine the enforceability of a debt after the
lender acquires the collateral for it subject to the lender's lien. A
court that has fallen into the merger trap reasons that the debt is
enforceable if the lien securing it has not merged into the fee.
Because the lien normally will not merge when it is in the holder's
best interest to keep it alive, the court accordingly holds that the
lien did not merge and, therefore, that the debt is enforceable.
This approach to the issue ignores the economic aspects of the case
and usually results in a windfall to the lender as is strikingly
demonstrated in Londoff v. Garfinkel.
3 05
In Londoff a property owner encumbered his land with two
deeds of trust to secure loans to him. After default on the debt
secured by the junior lien, the junior lienor foreclosed on the en-
cumbered property, bought the property at the sale for one hun-
dred dollars, and collected the entire deficiency on the junior note
from the borrower. After paying the debt secured by the senior
lien, the junior lienor/owner foreclosed the senior lien, bought the
property at the sale for less than half the amount of the senior
debt, and sued the borrower for the deficiency on the senior
debt.306 Contrary to reason, the court's analysis and the parties'
preventing reforeclosures. When a junior lien is not eliminated by a foreclosure because of
an oversight by the foreclosing senior lienor, such as failing to give the junior lienor required
notice or to join the junior lienor in a judicial foreclosure action, courts revive the liens that
were eliminated by the senior foreclosure sale and treat those liens as having been acquired
by the foreclosure sale purchaser. As the holder of the revived liens, the foreclosure sale
purchaser can reforeclose the most senior lien. In this way, the junior lienor is returned to
status quo ante. Its lien occupies the same priority position as before the sale, and it is
entitled to participate in the sale to stimulate bidding or to purchase the property and to
exercise the other rights available to a junior lienor. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5,
§ 7.15. By preventing the senior lienors in Southern Bank from reforeclosing, on the other
hand, the junior tax liens at issue became the only lien against the properties they encum-
bered, resulting in a substantial and unjust windfall for the Internal Revenue Service. Based
on this incorrect decision, the Service has taken the position in at least one other case that a
tax lien it holds on a parcel of property became the first lien because it did not receive the
statutorily required notice of a foreclosure of the first mortgage on the property.
305. 467 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
306. The facts of the Londoff case given in the text are distilled from a more complex
set of facts. The borrower had executed the first and second notes and two trust deeds to
secure them in favor of a straw person acting on the lender's behalf. The lender, acting
through this straw person, then sold the first note and trust deed and guaranteed payment.
Subsequently, the borrower defaulted on the second note, and, at the lender's direction, the
trustee of the second trust deed foreclosed it. The foreclosure sale purchaser was another of
the lender's straw persons. The trustee's deed stated that it was subject to the first trust
deed. After the sale, the lender retired the first note, and the holders delivered the note and
trust deed to the lender although the instruments were not endorsed over to the lender. The
lender's straw person who purchased at the foreclosure sale then conveyed the property to
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arguments revolved solely around whether the junior lienor had
intended the senior lien to merge into the fee title when he paid
the senior debt. The borrower argued that the junior lienor's rea-
son for paying the senior debt was to eliminate the senior lien as
an encumbrance on the title and, therefore, that the senior lien
merged into the fee title rendering the debt unenforceable. The
junior lienor argued that, because he did not intend to extinguish
the senior lien, the debt was enforceable.
Accepting the issue as framed by these arguments, the court
scrutinized the facts to determine whether the junior lienor/owner
actually had intended the interests to merge. The court concluded
that the junior lienor's best interests were served by holding that
merger had not occurred, although no evidence existed of an
express intent to prevent merger of the trust deed. As a result of
this determination, the court held that the borrower was liable for
the deficiency on the senior note. Thus, the junior lienor obtained
the land, all but one hundred dollars of the junior debt, and more
than half of the senior debt, which had an aggregate value substan-
tially greater than the junior lienor's investment in the property.
The court's failure to apply contract principles thus resulted in an
obviously unjust windfall to the junior lienor3
07
Those courts that do not get caught up in merger analysis,
unlike the court in Londoff, normally recognize that the lender's
purchase subject to its lien renders the property the primary fund
for payment and that the purchase price usually reflects that fact.
These courts then reason that, like a third party purchaser who
bought subject to a lien, the purchasing lender would be enriched
the lender and his spouse, and the lender directed the trustee of the first trust deed to
foreclose it. Yet another straw person acting for the lender bought the property at the sale.
The lender then commenced the subject suit for an alleged deficiency on the first note. The
lender testified that he satisfied the first debt in fulfillment of his guaranty. That fact, even
if true, does not entitle him to recover on the debt because of his acquisition of the primary
fund for repayment. Additionally, the lender's payment while title to the land was held by
the lender's straw person was irrelevant to the court's reasoning; the court treated the
lender as the owner while the straw person held the property. Id. at 298-300.
307. The court attempted to justify its incorrect holding by citing evidence indicating
that the fair market value of the property had decreased from the time the borrower pur-
chased it. See id. at 302. This conclusion is suspect because no evidence was presented con-
cerning the value of the property when the lender acquired it at the foreclosure sale on the
second trust deed, which is the relevant date for valuation. The lender acquired title in
November 1966. The court, however, relied on evidence of the property value in April or
May 1969. The logical, but unstated, effect of the court's analysis is to render the borrower
an indemnitor for the lender's benefit for any decrease in the property value after the lender
acquires it.
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unjustly if it could collect the debt secured by that lien.308
Although this conclusion ignores the debtor's subrogation rights in
the mortgage, by which the debtor could foreclose and recover its
payment from the sale proceeds, the result in any given case nor-
mally is correct. By holding that the lender cannot recover the
debt, transactional costs are decreased and lenders are prevented
from retaining the debtor's personal liability as a hedge against
declining land prices.309 By failing to recognize the differences
between a purchasing lender and a third party purchaser, however,
at least one court has extended this rule beyond its proper
scope."' 0
308. See Belleville Say. Bank v. Reis, 136 Ill. 242, 26 N.E. 646 (1891); McDonald v.
Magirl, 97 Iowa 677, 66 N.W. 904 (1896); Board of Trustees v. Ren-Cen Indoor Tennis &
Racquet Club, 145 Mich. App. 318, 377 N.W.2d 432 (1985); Baxter v. Redevco, 279 Or. 117,
566 P.2d 501 (1977).
309. If the lender were permitted to sue on the debt after acquiring the property,
which is the primary fund for payment of the debt, the payor would be subrogated to the
lender's rights in the mortgage, including the right to foreclose. If the property is worth at
least the debt amount, the final result is essentially a wash. The lender will collect the debt
but will lose the property as a result of the payor's foreclosure sale. The payor will recover
her debt payment from the foreclosure sale, either in cash if a third party buys at the sale or
in kind if she purchases at the sale. To avoid the transaction costs associated with this
scenario, the lender should be forced to elect initially between suit on the debt or acquisi-
tion of the primary fund for its payment. This result is accomplished by the courts' usual
rule that prevents a lender from suing on the debt after acquiring property subject to the
lien securing the debt.
Furthermore, this rule prevents lenders from shifting to debtors the risk of declining
property values. If the property value decreases to less than the outstanding debt amount
after the lender acquires it, the lender should not be permitted to shift the loss by suing on
the note and leaving the debtor with subrogation rights insufficient to recoup the debt pay-
ment. The correctness of this result is highlighted by the fact that, by purchasing at the
foreclosure sale subject to the lien, the lender eliminated the possibility of the property
being sold to a third party who would have reduced the outstanding amount of the debt by
making payments on it to protect his title.
310. Unlike third party purchasers, a lienor sometimes has valid reasons for buying at
a foreclosure sale even if the property is worth less than the outstanding debts encumbering
it. For example, the lender may foreclose and buy at the sale if the owner is mismanaging
the property. The lender justifiably may believe that, if properly managed, the property will
sufficiently increase in value or will generate sufficient income to repay the debt. The lender
also might acquire the property if it believes the borrower to be judgment proof, indicating
that the property is the only asset available for the lender's recovery. Therefore, the rule
preventing a purchaser who buys land subject to a lien from enforcing the related debt
should be a presumptive, rather than a per se, rule. Two courts have adopted that view. See
Clark v. Jackson, 64 N.H. 388, 11 A. 59 (1887); Lydecker v. Bogert, 38 N.J. Eq. 136 (N.J. Ch.
1884).
At least one court, however, has applied the rule despite the obvious equities of the
case. In Wright v. Anderson, 62 S.D. 444, 253 N.W. 484 (1934), the holder of the first and
second mortgages bought at the foreclosure sale on the second. She bid the full amount of
the second note because she believed the debtor to be judgment proof. Although the South
Dakota Supreme Court was "quite satisfied" that the mortgagee paid more for the property
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Although the courts that recognize the inapplicability of
merger to these cases normally reach the correct result, the superfi-
ciality of their rationale for reaching the result is matched by their
superficial focus on the facts specific to each case. Courts' analyses
traditionally have focused on the type of sale at which the lender
acquired the encumbered property. Courts have analyzed sepa-
rately cases in which a lender purchased at a tax sale,311 a trustee's
sale in connection with the mortgagor's insolvency or liquida-
tion,3 12 a sale by a deceased mortgagor's estate,3 13 an execution sale
on a judgment held by a third party314 or by the lender,31 5 and a
foreclosure sale.3 1 6 The law and policy affecting each type of case
are the same, however, so that such distinctions are analytically
meaningless. The almost uniform denial of the lender's claim in
each type of case evidences the lack of a need for separate analy-
ses. The primary issue in each case is whether the lender in fact
would be enriched unjustly if it were permitted to enforce the
debt.
at the second mortgage foreclosure sale than its unencumbered value and that the mortga-
gee was unaware of the legal consequences of buying subject to the senior lien, the court
held these facts to be irrelevant. The court stated that in the absence of fraud or of similar
equitable grounds "a purchaser who was willing to pay money for the equity of redemption
will not be heard to say. . . that the land (the primary fund for the discharge of the prior
encumbrance) is not worth the amount thereof." Id. at 450, 253 N.W. at 487.
The difference between Wright and Clark and Lydecker possibly is that Wright was
decided in 1934 in a state particularly hard hit by droughts and the economic depression, so
that the court was particularly solicitous of borrowers who lost property in foreclosure sales.
See First State Bank v. Ihringer, 217 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1974). The effect of the court's
holding, however, is to excuse the borrower from the senior debt although the lender
received substantially less than the outstanding debt amounts. Of course, a unilateral mis-
take of law or of fact normally does not entitle a person to relief. In Wright, however, the
mistake unjustly enriched another. For this reason, the rule prohibiting a lender from en-
forcing a debt after buying property subject to the lien securing it should be presumptive
only.
311. See Devereux v. Taft, 20 S.C. 555 (1883).
312. See Savings Bank v. Grant, 41 Mich. 101, 2 N.W. 1 (1879); Clark v. Jackson, 64
N.H. 388, 11 A. 59 (1887); Cock v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 328, 23 A. 370 (1892).
313. See Findlay v. Hosmer, 2 Conn. 350 (1817); Walker, Smith & Co. v. Baxter, 26 Vt.
710 (1854).
314. See Biggins v. Brockman, 63 Ill. 316 (1872); McClain v. Weise, 22 Inl. App. 272
(1887); Greensburg Fuel Co. v. Irwin Natural Gas Co., 162 Pa. 78, 29 A. 274 (1894).
315. See Lydecker v. Bogert, 38 N.J. Eq. 136 (N.J. Ch. 1884); Stevenson v. Black,
1 N.J. Eq. 338 (N.J. Ch. 1831); McLure, Brawley & Co. v. Wheeler, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.)
343 (1854).
316. See Board of Trustees v. Ren-Cen Indoor Tennis & Racquet Club, 145 Mich.
App. 318, 377 N.W.2d 432 (1985); Baxter v. Redevco, 279 Or. 117, 566 P.2d 501 (1977).
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2. Effect of Property Owner's Note and Mortgage Acquisition
on Debt Enforceability
Despite contrary judicial opinions, when a property owner
purports to acquire a mortgage encumbering his property and the
debt it secures, merger is completely inapplicable to determine
whether the debt remains enforceable. Apparently misled by the
owner's purported ownership of two property interests, the mort-
gage and fee, many courts have focused on merger and have held
that the debt is enforceable if the mortgage has not merged.3 17 Pre-
317. See, e.g., Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588, 598 (E.D. Ark. 1965) ("When the doc-
trine of merger is applied to . . . an acquisition [of the fee by the mortgagee or of the
mortgage by the fee owner], the result is normally to extinguish the mortgage debt.");
Wilhelmi v. Leonard, 13 Iowa 330, 338 (1862); Flanigan v. Sable, 44 Minn. 417, 46 N.W. 854
(1890); Citizens Trust Co. v. Going, 288 Mo. 505, 517-18, 232 S.W. 996, 1000 (1921); 3
J. STORY, supra note 67, § 1385, at 39; Note, The Effect of Merger Upon Mortgage Debts,
15 HARV. L. REv. 740 (1902).
Flanigan is a classic example of a court ignoring every consideration other than merger.
The mortgagors in the case executed first and second mortgages in favor of different mort-
gagees. After default on the second loan, the second mortgagee f6reclosed and bought the
property at the sale subject to the first mortgage. The second mortgagee then paid the debt
secured by the first mortgage and instituted the instant action against the borrowers to
recover the debt. In holding that the second mortgagee could enforce the first note, the
court focused solely on whether the second mortgagee intended the first mortgage to merge
into the fee. The court held that the interests had not merged because:
The [second mortgagee] was not under any obligations to pay the first mortgage;
neither is it alleged that the sale on [the second] mortgage was made subject to it.
When [the second mortgagee] foreclosed she was not the owner of the first mortgage.
In fact it is not alleged that she then had any notice, actual or constructive, of its
existence.
44 Minn. at 418, 46 N.W. at 854. Although the court is correct on the facts of this case that
the first mortgage lien did not merge into the fee, the court's analysis misses the mark. The
gravamen of the suit is enforceability of the debt. Merger is irrelevant to that analysis. This
conclusion follows regardless of notice of the lien or of the other factual findings recited by
the court to support its holding.
Furthermore, some of the court's findings are incorrect. First, the court broadly states
that the second mortgagee was not obligated to pay the first mortgage debt. Although the
second mortgagee was not personally liable for the first debt, that fact is insufficient to
support the court's conclusion that she was entitled to reimbursement for payment of the
debt. By buying the property subject to the senior lien, the land became the primary fund
for payment of the related debt, and the purchase price should have reflected that fact.
Second, the court's statement that no allegation had been made that the foreclosure sale
was subject to the first mortgage is senseless. If the first mortgage had not been recorded on
the public records, the second mortgagee would have acquired title free of that lien, and her
payment of the first mortgage note would have been unnecessary to protect her interest in
the property. Indeed, she would have been an officious intermeddler, who would not be
entitled to any subrogation rights. Finally, ownership of the first mortgage on the date of
the second mortgage foreclosure sale is irrelevant. As described above, with very limited
exception, a person who purchases subject to a lien, regardless of whether he owns the lien,
cannot be subrogated to the lender's rights in the note secured by it. See supra notes 308-10
and accompanying text.
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dictably, the results in these cases often are at odds with the cor-
rect result because these cases are quintessential subrogation cases.
The basic issue raised is whether a person who pays a debt can
recoup that payment from someone else who had been liable for it.
If a property owner is primarily liable for a debt secured by the
property because she is either the original mortgagor or a pur-
chaser who assumed personal liability, she cannot enforce the debt
after paying it. Pursuant to established subrogation doctrine, a
person who is primarily liable for a debt never can be subrogated
to the lender's rights in the note or mortgage.318 This result
devolves from the very nature of primary liability. When the owner
paid the debt, it was extinguished, even if she characterized the
payment as a purchase.
If the property owner acquired title subject to the mortgage
but without assuming personal liability, however, her right to
enforce the debt depends on the price paid for the property; if the
price reflected the outstanding mortgage debt, she cannot enforce
the debt after purporting to purchase it. As discussed above, the
property in this case is the primary fund for payment, and the
price reduction represents a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the
debt for as long as she owns the property.3 19 Therefore, by dis-
charging the debt, the owner, as the primary obligor in fact, simply
is fulfilling her obligation and cannot be subrogated to the mortga-
gee's rights in the note.
3 20
318. See 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1482, at 512-13; Note, Subrogation of Pur-
chaser to Rights of Senior Mortgagee Against Junior Encumbrances, 48 YALE L.J. 683, 687
(1939). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-601(3) (1977).
319. In one unusual case, the owner may successfully sue the seller for the difference
between the outstanding debt amount and the property value. If the property value has
decreased to less than the outstanding debt amount and if the mortgagee assigns the debt
and related mortgage to the owner as a gift, the owner may be able to collect the difference
from the seller. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, § 6.16, at 469-70.
320. 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 1482, at 514. Courts have not always recognized this
principle and have reached the economically unsound result of permitting a "subject to"
purchaser to be subrogated to the lender's rights in the note. Even when a court recognizes
the applicability of the U.C.C. and contractual principles, it can reach a result opposite to
the correct result. In Ryan v. Stearns, 135 Vt. 385, 376 A.2d 728 (1977), for example, the
court relied on a provision of the U.C.C. that is meaningless in the real property security
context to reach a result diametrically opposed to the correct result. In Ryan the plaintiff
acquired title to a parcel of property subject to a mortgage, thereby rendering the property
the primary fund for payment of the debt. After paying the debt, the plaintiff instituted the
instant suit against the note makers to recover her payment. Surprisingly, the court held
that she could recover. Equally surprising was the court's reasoning. The court held that the
plaintiff was a holder in due course under the terms of the U.C.C. because "she had given
value in good faith without notice of any possible defense." Id. at 388, 376 A.2d at 730. This
obvious misuse of the U.C.C. highlights the court's failure to apprehend the legal effect of
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On the other hand, if the owner acquired title subject to the
buying property subject to a mortgage. Furthermore, actual notice of a lien is irrelevant and
has been since recording acts were enacted. As long as courts refuse to accept the concept of
constructive notice, recording acts will not achieve their full potential.
The court's holding also was economically unsound. The price the plaintiff paid for the
property, plus the amount she paid to "purchase" the debt, was $16,542.89. She sold the
property for $16,500, thereby making her economically whole without recourse against the
note makers. Furthermore, the debt she paid had been secured by two parcels of property,
only one of which she owned. Because she took an assignment of the mortgage lien with
respect to the parcel she did not own, a valuable interest in its own right, she actually paid
$16,542.89 for the property she owned, plus a mortgage interest in another parcel, thereby
recovering more than her economic outlay.
The court's analysis was further confused by its mixing of security issues with contrac-
tual liability issues. The court observed, for example: "By the time [plaintiff] became the
holder of the note, none of the parties liable thereon had any interest whatever in the parcel
in question. Its utility as a security device for the note was effectively terminated." Id. at
389, 376 A.2d at 731. This observation is irrelevant in determining liability for the debt
because security rights and debt liability are different legal animals. In virtually every case
in which a purchaser acquires title subject to a mortgage and subsequently "acquires" a
note secured by the property, the original note makers no longer own an interest in the
property. Therefore, the court's statement served only to obfuscate, rather than to clarify.
Another court, though it properly focused on subrogation as the controlling contractual
principle, reached the same incorrect result as the court in Ryan. In Hazle v. Bondy, 173 Ill.
302, 50 N.E. 671 (1898), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a purchaser who bought land
encumbered by a trust deed could be subrogated to the lender's rights against the note
makers because:
The debt is [the note makers'], and they are primarily liable to pay it, by the terms of
their contract. Having failed to do so, if. . . their remote grantee, is compelled to pay
the debt in order to protect his property, no reason is perceived why he should not
have his remedy against them.
Id. at 314-15, 50 N.E. at 676. The reason is the purchaser acquired title subject to the trust
deed, thereby rendering the property the primary fund for repayment of the loan.
One treatise cites Hazle for the reasonable proposition that if a purchaser pays the full
unencumbered price of the property in reliance on the seller's agreement to remain primar-
ily liable for the debt, the purchaser can be subrogated to the lender's rights in the note
against the seller. G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 5, § 10.2, at 709. The facts in Hazle
belie that proposition, however. First, the trust deed appeared in the chain of title for the
purchaser's lot. The deed by which the purchaser's seller acquired title expressly stated that
the conveyance was subject to the lien. Although a second deed conveying the same lot to
the seller failed to specify the lien, that failure was an oversight as demonstrated by the fact
that the purchase price was not increased in exchange for delivery of the second deed. Sec-
ond, when the purchaser acquired the property, he paid only $85 more for it than his seller
had paid, although the debt secured by the purchaser's lot was substantially greater than
$85. Third, the seller sold the lot to the purchaser within a few days after acquiring it.
Therefore, the property value and the outstanding debt amount could not have changed
substantially enough to believe that the purchaser paid the unencumbered value of the
property. Finally, no evidence existed that would take this case outside the usual rule that
applies when a purchaser acquires title subject to a lien. No evidence existed that the seller
agreed to remain primarily liable for the debt or that he affirmatively misrepresented the
state of the title to the purchaser, although the deed by which the purchaser acquired title
did not mention the trust deed. The purchaser is not without remedy, however. He can sue
his seller based on the title covenants in his deed for failure to disclose the existence of the
lien. He has no right, however, to sue the original note makers based on subrogation to the
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mortgage but paid the full unencumbered value of the property,
she would be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights in the note if
she retires the debt. By agreeing to pay the debt in exchange for
the purchaser's payment of the unencumbered value of the prop-
erty, the seller remained primarily liable for the debt.321 Therefore,
if the purchaser pays the debt to protect her possessory interest in
the property, she is subrogated to the mortgagee's rights and can
enforce the note against the seller, as well as enforce her rights
based on the seller's agreement to pay the debt.
Despite the obvious applicability of the contractual analyses
recommended in this Article for deciding debt enforceability, many
courts, by applying merger, reach results diametrically opposed to
the correct result. Courts' applications of merger in this context
are particularly perplexing because merger, a property title device,
is manifestly inapplicable to issues of debt enforceability. Ridding
modern law of merger will eliminate this problem. By diverting
courts from an incorrect focus on merger, courts are more likely to
focus on the economics of the cases raising this issue and on the
parties' expectations in dealing with the debt and the encumbered
land.
IV. CONCLUSION
Merger, as it applies to mortgages, has not been comprehen-
sively reviewed since 1821, when Richard Preston published his
merger treatise. Merger still is, as Preston described it, "a curious
and interesting learning. 3 2 2 That description, however, no longer
is commendatory. After approximately seven hundred years, a lab-
yrinth of analysis has developed about merger that provides the
grist for a litigation mill. Despite fairly regular rejection of merger
claims and lawyering practices designed to eliminate any claim
that merger has occurred, courts decide a significant number of
cases involving merger as it applies to mortgages every year.
Modern courts' application of the merger doctrine to mort-
gages primarily results from the fact that at certain points in the
early common law the paths of their legal development crossed.
Because some early mortgage counterparts legitimately were sub-
ject to the operation of merger, it has clung tenaciously to mort-
gages ever since, although mortgages have evolved beyond the form
lender's rights in the note.
321. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
322. 3 R. PRESTON, supra note 12, at 1.
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to which merger applied. The law has grown up around merger,
developing systems, such as the title records, that reflect modern
practices and obviate the need for merger. Elimination of merger
will strengthen this infrastructure.

